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Articles 
ARE LAW CLERKS FAIR GAME?  INVADING 
JUDICIAL CONFIDENTIALITY 
Charles W. Sorenson, Jr.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent disbarment of two attorneys and suspension of a third in 
Bar Counsel v. Curry,1 for their surreptitious sting directed at a former 
trial court law clerk, presents one of the most bizarre and troubling cases 
of attorney misconduct imaginable.  At first blush, the story seems so 
outlandish that one assumes that it must be fiction of the type penned by 
a novelist, or perhaps, a television writer for “Boston Legal.”2  In fact, the 
229-page special hearing officer decision and final Massachusetts Board 
of Bar Overseers (“BBO”) decision read more like pages from a tabloid 
than a typical bar discipline decision.  Nothing is typical about this case.  
It involves an underlying multimillion (if not billion) dollar lengthy 
dispute among family members over a supermarket empire.3  It involves 
a colorful and controversial trial judge, who subsequently became a 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts.  Many thanks 
to Barry Stearns, New England School of Law Reference Librarian, and to Scott Carman, 
class of ’08, for their invaluable assistance.  I also want to thank New England School of 
Law for the sabbatical that helped make this Article possible.  The author may be contacted 
at csorenson@nesl.edu. 
1 Bar Counsel v. Crossen, Curry, Donahue, BBO File Nos. C1-97-0602, C1-97-0589, & C1-
97-(9)589 [hereinafter Bar Counsel v. Curry II], available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/ 
ccd2.pdf.  A prior hearing officer’s report recommended disbarment of all three attorneys. 
Bar Counsel v. Curry, BBO File Nos. C1-97-0602, C1-97-0589, & C1-97-(9)589, 229 (Special 
Hearing Officer’s Hearing Report May 11, 2005) [hereinafter Bar Counsel v. Curry I], 
available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/ccd.pdf. The hearing officer’s report was 
adopted virtually in total by the BBO, except that the Board recommended that attorney 
Donahue be suspended rather than disbarred.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra, at 2, 51.  
Only lawyers Crossen and Curry appealed the recommendation.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court heard their arguments on October 4, 2007 and February 6, 2008 and adopted the 
board’s recommendation to disbar lawyers Crossen and Curry.  See In re Crossen, 880 
N.E.2d 352, 388 (Mass. 2008); In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 411 (Mass. 2008). 
2 See ABC, Boston Legal, http://abc.go.com/primetime/bostonlegal/index?pn=about 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2008) (describing the television program as stories about “emotionally 
challenged attorneys[]” who “continually stretch the boundaries of the law.”). 
3 See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4. 
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television judge.4  The lawyers involved arguably represent the best and 
possibly the worst of the profession.5  The victim, and former law clerk, 
is both a sympathetic and very unsympathetic character.6  Finally, 
perhaps what is most remarkable, given the backgrounds and numbers 
of lawyers who were involved in, or aware of, the elaborate and 
convoluted events that transpired over a six-month period in 1997, is the 
fact that no one put a stop to it and the fact that afterward some lawyers 
apparently thought the defendant lawyers did nothing wrong.7 
Reduced to the bare essence, the facts are as follows:  lawyers 
representing the losing side in a very contentious, lengthy, and 
expensive dispute over control of a supermarket empire pursued a 
scheme by which they hoped to get a new trial.  Convinced that the trial 
judge who presided over their case was prejudiced against them, they hit 
upon what they believed was a way to expose the judge through the 
former law clerk who had worked on the case.  The lawyers set up a false 
job interview for a “dream job[.]”8  The former law clerk was initially 
lured to Nova Scotia, presumably because surreptitious taping was not 
illegal there.9  In the course of the fake job interview, the interviewers 
repeatedly tried to get the law clerk to reveal the extent of his 
                                                 
4 Christopher Muther, Judge Lopez Takes Tough Style to TV, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 2006, 
at A1, available at http://boston.com/ae/tv/articles/2006/09/09/judge_lopez_takes_ 
tough_style_to_tv. 
5 See notes 31, 35. 
6 See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 221–23.  Former law clerk Walsh was 
described as a vulnerable victim by the special hearing officer based in part on his 
difficulties in finding work after his first year as a law clerk for the superior court and his 
naiveté.  Id. at 221; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396 n.13, 397 n.16; In re Crossen, 880 
N.E.2d at 387.  On the other hand, Walsh clearly engaged in puffery and dishonesty in his 
bar application and violated his duties of confidentiality to the court.  See Bar Counsel v. 
Curry I, supra note 1, at 50, 64, 223; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 362, 365, 366 & n.26; In re 
Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397–98. 
7 See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 119–27.; Board of Bar Overseers Hears 
Arguments in Conduct Case Against Boston Attorney, MASS LAW. WEEKLY, Mar. 6, 2006, at 2, 
available at 2006 WLNR 9318898 (reporting that former Massachusetts Attorney General 
Robert H. Quinn had planned to testify that Curry’s conduct was ethical); Joan Vennochi, 
Righting a Wrong, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2005, at A19; Ralph Ranalli, For Demoulas Case 
Clerk, Vindication, BOSTON GLOBE, May 16, 2005, at A1; Ralph Ranalli, Recommendation 
Shocking to Some in Boston Legal Circles, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 2005, at B4; John Strahinich, 
Lawyers Get ‘Sordid’ Out; Judge Recommends Trio Be Disbarred for Demoulas Case Action, 
BOSTON HERALD, May 13, 2005, at 26.  Defendants’ lawyers who had not been involved in 
the law clerk contact and ruse initially and who were skeptical of its value and propriety 
when they found out about it, did not stop it.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 
122–25.  Apparently one lawyer, however, Edward Barshak advised lawyer Donahue that 
he would leave the case if the law clerk information was used.  See id. at 127. 
8 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 404–05 (internal quotation marks omitted); Bar Counsel v. 
Curry II, supra note 1, at 6. 
9 See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396–97; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
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responsibility for drafting the decision in the case, and more importantly, 
that the judge had decided the outcome of the case prior to hearing 
evidence.10  The job interview ruse was continued several weeks later in 
New York City, essentially in an effort to elicit more specific, and 
hopefully admissible, evidence of prejudgment by the trial judge.11  
Finally, when the results of the two fake job interviews yielded less than 
the lawyers had hoped they would, a third interview was arranged with 
the law clerk—this time in Boston—for the purpose of “brac[ing]” the 
former law clerk.12  This included revealing that the job offer was false 
and threatening to go public with information that would be damaging 
to the former law clerk, unless the law clerk cooperated with the lawyers 
by signing a statement that would more clearly support the claim of the 
trial judge’s prejudgment.13  Instead, the former law clerk went to the FBI 
and participated in a reverse sting that eventually resulted in the 
exposure of the lawyers and bar discipline proceedings.14 
After the longest proceedings in the history of the Massachusetts 
BBO,15 the lawyers were found to have violated numerous provisions of 
the Massachusetts Code of Professional Conduct.  The elaborate ruse 
they perpetrated was found to have run afoul of proscriptions on lying, 
deceiving, and making misrepresentations.16  Efforts seemingly aimed at 
coercing the law clerk into testifying favorably to the defendant-lawyers’ 
position were seen as attacks on the administration of justice and 
inconsistent with the fitness to practice law.17  What received relatively 
less attention, however, is the aspect of the case that struck me first when 
                                                 
10 See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 at 7–8. 
11 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 399–400; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 362–63; see Bar Counsel 
v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10–15. 
12 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363, 364–66 (internal quotation marks omitted); Bar 
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17, 34, 44. 
13 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365–66; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17–19.  
It appears that in addition to revealing the law clerk’s obvious breach of confidentiality, the 
lawyers also threatened to reveal that the law clerk’s bar application had been supported 
by a letter written by a lawyer who did not know the law clerk.  See In re Crossen, 880 
N.E.2d at 366; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 145–46.  Such a submission would 
have violated Massachusetts Disciplinary Rules 1-101 (A) (false statement in support of bar 
application) then in effect.  See MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE NEW 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 130 (James S. Bolan ed., 1998) (quoting old rule DR 1-
101(A) that subjected a lawyer to discipline that “made a materially false statement 
in[] . . . connection with[] his application for admission to the bar[.]”), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/disciplinaryrules.pdf; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.1(a) (2003). 
14 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366–69; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20–26. 
15 See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 2. 
16 See infra Part II.C. 
17 See infra note 88. 
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I read the newspaper reports concerning the case.  Unlike other cases 
involving lawyer lying, deceit, or undercover stings, which have been 
directed at potential criminal activity or civil wrongdoing by private 
parties, the ruse in this case was a blatant effort to invade the 
confidential relationship between a judge and a law clerk. 
While I recognized that lawyer deceit in the forms of undercover 
criminal stings,  the use of testers in civil rights and intellectual property 
infringement cases, and the use of puffery in negotiations were 
permissible in some circumstances,18  I assumed that it was widely 
understood that efforts to get a former law clerk to reveal confidential 
information, just like ex parte contacts with law clerks and judges 
generally,19 were clearly an impermissible interference with a judge-law 
clerk confidential relationship that would be inconsistent with 
fundamental principles governing the administration of justice.  Close 
examination of the defendant-lawyers’ conduct and arguments, the 
BBO’s analysis of the issue, and the state of the law in this area suggests 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Soc’y, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 462–64, 471 
(D.N.J. 1998) (rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s investigators calling to order 
stamps to test compliance with a consent order for a copyright was unethical behavior); 
Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that plaintiff’s 
videotaping of gas station attendants to evince that African Americans were required to 
prepay for gas, while Caucasians were not, in a civil rights action was not unethical); In re 
Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 972 (Or. 2000) (suggesting that an attorney’s deceitful conduct 
in a criminal sting operation would not be unethical if the attorney’s reliance on Bar 
Counsel’s letter was reasonable); Transp. Ins. Co. V. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 282 (Tex. 
1995) (stating that “puffery[]” regarding the value of an unliquidated claim during 
negotiation is permissible). 
19 See, e.g., Mallory v. Hartsfield, Almand & Grisham, LLP, 86 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Ark. 
2002) (stating that attorney’s ex parte communication with judge’s “law clerk[] . . . is a 
violation[]” of the state’s code of judicial conduct); Vanzant v. R.L. Products, Inc., 139 
F.R.D. 435, 438 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (stating that an attorney’s attempt to elicit comments on 
the merits of cases from law clerks are “impermissible ex parte communication[s] with 
chambers.”); Davis v. United States, 567 A.2d 36, 40 n.8 (D.C. 1989) (stating that judges 
should not consider ex parte communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 113(1) (2000) (“A 
lawyer may not knowingly communicate ex parte with a judicial officer before whom a 
proceeding is pending concerning the matter, except as authorized by law.”); Today’s News:  
Update, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 1, 1 (explaining that a law professor was “publicly 
censured . . . for engaging in ex parte communications with [a] . . . [j]udge . . . and his law 
clerk[]”); John R. Maley, 1997 Federal Civil Practice Update for Seventh Circuit Practitioners, 31 
IND. L. REV. 483, 498 (1998) (citing judge that stated that ex parte communications with a 
law clerk about a case are just as inappropriate as direct ex parte communications with a 
judge); Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that 
law clerks have a duty to avoid ex parte “contacts outside the record that might affect the 
outcome of the litigation.”); Boston Bar Association Civilty Standards for Civil Litigation, 
BOSTON B.J., Sept.–Oct. 1994, at 11, 13 (“A lawyer should avoid ex parte communication on 
the substance of a pending case with a judge (or his or her law clerk) before whom such 
case is pending.”). 
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that the courts should be concerned that their former clerks, and 
apparently some lawyers, generally do not share this understanding, but 
assume, instead, that the information that former law clerks have about 
the judges for whom they clerked is fair game for acquisition.20 
Questions about the confidentiality of the relationship between 
judicial law clerks and their judges, as well as the extent to which the 
communications between law clerks and their judges are subject to some 
sort of evidentiary privilege, have arisen sporadically over the past 
century.  Usually, the issue has arisen in the context of an asserted breach 
of confidentiality by law clerks in writing an expose of the inner 
operations of the Supreme Court21 or in the context of a public 
investigation into alleged judicial wrongdoing.22  Prior to Curry, 
apparently no cases had addressed efforts by lawyers to privately 
acquire confidential information from law clerks for reasons related to 
ongoing cases. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine the issue of whether a 
lawyer’s mere act of attempting to obtain confidential information from a 
former judicial law clerk violates accepted standards of lawyer conduct 
so as to justify bar discipline.  Part I briefly reviews the circumstances 
giving rise to, and the findings in, Bar Counsel v. Curry.  Part II explores 
the judge-law clerk relationship, focusing particularly on the uniquely 
private and confidential nature of that relationship.  It also reviews cases 
and circumstances in which judge-law clerk confidentiality has been 
discussed.  Part III explores possible legal doctrines that are related to 
law clerk confidentiality and that might support discipline against 
lawyers who attempt to acquire confidential information from a judge’s 
former law clerk.  The Article concludes that the relationship between a 
law clerk and judge is widely recognized as uniquely confidential and 
worthy of protection.  Furthermore, efforts by lawyers to induce a former 
law clerk to breach that confidentiality should be seen as either the 
improper acquisition of privileged information23 or the improper 
inducement of a breach of a law clerk’s fiduciary duty of 
confidentiality.24  Given the obvious deleterious impact that such 
impropriety would have on the judicial system, lawyers who engage in 
                                                 
20 Indeed, one indication of the extent to which lawyers may believe that acquiring 
confidential information from former law clerks is permissible is reflected in the statement 
by lawyer Donahue in this case to the effect that law firms routinely hire former law clerks 
as associates because of their confidential information.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra 
note 1, at 76; see also infra note 59. 
21 See infra notes 130–59 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 244–323 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 372–96 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra Part IV.D. 
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such actions must be seen as behaving in a manner that is prejudicial to 
the administration of justice so as to justify imposing severe discipline 
under the Rules of Professional Conduct.25  However, this Article also 
concludes that the law in this area should be clarified.  The most effective 
way to accomplish this would be by express judicial recognition of the 
common-law limited privilege for judge-law clerk communications.  
Such recognition would reduce the deleterious impact of lawyer 
intrusions on the judge-law clerk relationship.  In combination with 
existing rules of professional conduct prohibiting lawyer interference 
with privileges and conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice,26 recognition of this privilege would protect the judicial 
deliberative process and provide an unquestionably clear basis for 
lawyer discipline. 
II.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE DISBARMENTS 
A. The Demoulas Supermarket Dispute 
Two brothers—George and Telemachus Demoulas—created and 
operated an extremely successful supermarket chain beginning in 1964.  
Ownership of the corporation was shared evenly by the two brothers’ 
families in 1971 when George died.  At that point, Telemachus assumed 
control of the management of the company.  In 1990, members of the 
George Demoulas family filed two state court suits in the same court 
against Telemachus Demoulas and his family.  The first was a suit in 
which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had fraudulently 
transferred company stock from the George Demoulas family to the 
Telemachus Demoulas family in breach of their fiduciary duties.  The 
second suit was a shareholder derivative suit alleging that Telemachus 
and his immediate family had diverted corporate opportunities from the 
jointly-owned supermarket company to entities owned and controlled by 
the defendants.  The same lawyer represented the plaintiffs in both 
suits.27 
Both cases were assigned to the same Massachusetts Superior Court 
Judge—Judge Maria Lopez.  The fraudulent stock transfer case was tried 
first to a jury.  The shareholder derivative suit was tried subsequently to 
the judge.28  Both cases were lengthy, expensive, very acrimonious, and 
characterized by numerous ancillary disputes and allegations of 
                                                 
25 See infra Part IV.F. 
26 See infra Part IV.F. 
27 See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 3. 
28 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 393 (Mass. 2008); see Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, 
at 3. 
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wrongdoing by one side or the other, which is not surprising given the 
fact that about one billion dollars in assets were at stake.29 
Lawyer Gary Crossen was part of a large team of lawyers 
representing the defendants—the Telemachus Demoulas family.30  
Crossen had been involved in the trial of both cases.  He had a relatively 
distinguished background and reputation.31 
In May 1994, a jury returned a verdict in the stock transfer case 
primarily in favor of the plaintiff—the George Demoulas family.  The 
bench trial in the shareholder derivative suit began in December.  The 
law clerk assigned to assist Judge Lopez was Paul Walsh.  Walsh, who 
had been unsuccessful in finding a lawyer job after the first year of his 
Superior Court Clerkship, was beginning his second year as a law clerk 
in the fall of 1994.  He worked for Judge Lopez throughout the trial of 
the case beginning in December 1994 until August 1995 when it ended 
with the judge entering a decision finding for the plaintiffs and ordering 
“rescission of certain transactions, surrender of all illicit gains from those 
transactions, and payment of attorney’s fees.”32 
Given the enormity of the losses they faced, defendants pursued 
several post-trial measures in an effort to reverse their losses.  They hired 
another attorney, Edward Barshak, to handle the appeal in the derivative 
action and to assist in other post-trial matters.33  They brought in Richard 
K. Donahue “to supervise and coordinate the continuing litigation, to 
monitor its cost, and to handle public relations for them.”34  Like 
Crossen, Donahue had enjoyed a distinguished career and reputation to 
that point.  In fact, Donahue had been the Chair of the BBO, the 
disciplinary agency for the state.35 
                                                 
29 See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 3–4.  
Essentially, as a result of losing the two cases, the defendants were not only faced with 
having to pay millions of dollars in attorneys fees and losing “enormously valuable assets,” 
but would also lose control of the Demoulas supermarket empire to the plaintiffs.  Id. at 4; 
see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394. 
30 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 358 (Mass. 2008); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 
1, at 4. 
31 The special hearing examiner found that Crossen, who had served as an assistant 
district attorney, chief of a major crimes unit in the United States Attorney’s Office, and a 
member of the state’s Judicial Nominating Commission, had a “reputation for excellence in 
the legal community.”  Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 214, 216–18; see also In re 
Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 358. 
32 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393–94. 
33 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4. 
34 Id.; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 399 n.21. 
35 See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 206, 218.  The special hearing officer 
described Donahue as follows:  “A respected Massachusetts practitioner for five decades, 
he is a fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and has served as chair of the MBA 
[Massachusetts Bar Association] Commission on Professionalism, chairman of the Board of 
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While defendants’ counsel believed that the shareholder suit would 
be difficult to overturn on appeal, given that the decision was “well 
written, well researched, and founded on credibility determinations[,]” 
they doubted that the decision had been written by Judge Lopez.36  
Moreover, both defendants’ counsel and defendants believed that the 
judge had been prejudiced against them.37  Apparently, it was this belief 
that led to several post-trial efforts, including the elaborate fake job ruse 
involving the judge’s former law clerk, to establish judicial prejudice as 
grounds for obtaining a new trial.38 
B. The Post-Judgment Sting 
The notoriety of the case, the defendants’ belief that the judge was 
prejudiced against them, the defendants’ wealth, and the potential loss 
that the defendants faced after the judge’s decision in the shareholder 
derivative suit probably attracted lawyer Kevin P. Curry and his 
investigator, Ernest P. Reid, to the defendant Telemachus Demoulas and 
provided the incentive for Curry and Reid to create the ruse directed at 
the judge’s former law clerk.39  At the time of the August 1995 decision in 
the shareholder derivative case, lawyer Curry had not been involved in 
the supermarket litigation.40  Unlike defendants’ lawyers Crossen and 
Donahue, Curry did not have a distinguished reputation.  In fact, he was 
described by one of defendants’ lawyers as a “bottom dweller[.]”41 
                                                                                                             
Bar Overseers, assistant to President John F. Kennedy and president of Nike Corporation.”  
Id. 
36 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394–95. 
37 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394–95, 398; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 358–59 & n.6 
(Mass. 2008); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 4. 
38 In addition to trying to establish judicial prejudice through information obtained from 
the former law clerk, defendants’ lawyers, including Gary Crossen, repeatedly attempted 
to establish prejudice based on allegations that Judge Lopez had dined with the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer during the litigation.  In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 358–59; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, 
supra note 1, at 4.  Crossen also brought a federal court proceeding on behalf of defendants 
trying to establish that plaintiffs had bugged the offices of Telemachus Demoulas in order 
to acquire information for the litigation.  See Kate Zernike, Demoulas v. Demoulas, BOSTON 
GLOBE MAGAZINE, Jan. 11, 1998, available at http://graphics.boston.com/globe/magazine/ 
1998/1-11/family. 
39 See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 393–96; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 3–5. 
40 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394 n.7; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5. 
41 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10, 16 (finding that other lawyers for 
defendants warned Crossen and Donahue “to have nothing to do with Curry[]”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 68 (finding that an 
attorney involved had doubts about the “probity” of Curry).  The special hearing officer 
stated:  “Curry, by contrast, does not enjoy a stellar reputation.  He introduced no character 
evidence.  During closing argument, his counsel quipped that Curry’s character witnesses 
would fit in a telephone booth.” Id.  at 219. 
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Shortly after the August 1995 decision in the Demoulas shareholder 
derivative action, Reid, the investigator who worked with lawyer Curry, 
contacted defendant Telemachus Demoulas to set up a meeting 
“concerning ‘a matter of importance and confidence.’”42  Thereafter, at a 
meeting with Telemachus and his son, Arthur Telemachus, Curry 
reinforced defendants’ belief that Judge Lopez was prejudiced and 
corrupt, telling them that the “case ‘was over before it began.’”43  Curry 
advised the defendants that he and Reid could do an investigation that 
would reveal misconduct by the judge that could be used to obtain a 
reversal of the shareholder derivative decision.  Curry and Reid were 
retained by the defendants by Labor Day, 1995.44 
The investigation included sifting through public records concerning 
Judge Lopez and her husband, Steven Mindich.45  It also included 
reading all of the judge’s written opinions with the goal of establishing 
that she had not written the Demoulas decision.  Apparently, as part of 
their scheme to elicit information from the judge’s former law clerk, 
Walsh, they also investigated him.  This included obtaining his bar 
application, a Motor Vehicles Registry Report, his and his parents’ 
addresses and phone numbers, and his and his parents’ neighbors’ 
addresses and telephone numbers.46 
In the spring of 1997, based on their investigation, Curry and Reid 
launched their ruse aimed at Walsh.  Walsh had found it difficult to find 
a job after his clerkship.  He had even submitted resumes to some of the 
Demoulas defendant’s lawyers.  At this point, he was working for a 
Boston firm earning $68,000 a year, but was dissatisfied.47  Based on the 
information they had gathered about Walsh, Curry and Reid created a 
fake job opportunity to be used as a lure to “pump” Walsh for 
information about the Demoulas case and the judge.  A fake $90,000 a 
year job as in-house counsel at an international corporation with offices 
in Bermuda, Boston, and London was designed to appeal to Walsh’s 
                                                 
42 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 394; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5. 
43 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5. 
44 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5. The 
investigation and other activities proved to be quite lucrative—Curry was paid at least 
$130,000 for his work for the defendants.  In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395 n.11; Bar Counsel v. 
Curry II, supra note 1, at 5. 
45 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 395 n.9.  
There had been substantial press coverage of the public and private lives of the Judge and 
her publisher husband.  See Muther, supra note 4; Chris Wright, The Wrong Publisher, 
BOSTON MAGAZINE, Sept. 2006, available at http://www.bostonmagazine.com/ 
arts_entertainment/articles/city_journal_the_wrong_publisher/AmericanProfile.com, Ask 
American Profile, Sept. 10, 2006, http://www.americanprofile.com/article/18985.html. 
46 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 5–6; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396. 
47 See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 25. 
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interests and supposed abilities; it was “‘Walsh’s dream job, and they 
knew it.’”48  Portraying himself as a headhunter representing a client, 
Reid called Walsh and described the job, telling Walsh that they were 
looking for “someone with no history of ethical problems or other 
skeletons in his closet, who was married and ‘settled down,’ and who 
had ‘excellent writing skills.’”49  Perhaps indicating Walsh’s naivete,50 
the bait worked immediately.  When asked by Reid if he had worked on 
any significant cases, Walsh told him he had worked on the Demoulas 
shareholder derivative case.  When Reid subsequently asked for a 
writing sample, Walsh gave him the decision in that case, which Walsh 
said had been read, but not edited, by the judge.51 
In May 1997, Reid again contacted Walsh, telling him that the client 
was especially impressed by the Demoulas decision writing sample and 
asking him questions about how it was written.  Reid told Walsh that 
representatives of the client, an international insurance underwriting 
company, wanted to meet him, probably in New York or Halifax.52  
Subsequently, Reid told Walsh that he was the only remaining candidate 
for the job and that the interview with a person named “‘Kevin 
Concave’” on behalf of the client would be held at a hotel in Halifax.53  
Reid gave Walsh an airline ticket and $300 as compensation for the day.  
In preparation for the fake job interview, Reid and lawyer Curry, who 
was to be “‘Kevin Concave,’” brought in another investigator named 
Richard LaBonte to play another representative of the corporate client at 
the interview.54 
                                                 
48 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 6; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396. 
49 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 6; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396. 
50 Given Walsh’s previous difficulties finding a job, his background, the Boston job 
market at the time, and the “out of the blue” nature of the headhunter call, perhaps Walsh 
should have been more cautious and skeptical as the ruse played out. 
51 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 6–7.  Oddly, 
lawyer Curry attached great significance to the fact that Walsh had written the decision, 
reportedly telling defendant Arthur T. Demoulas that if defendants could show that a third 
person wrote the decision, it “‘could tip the whole darn thing[.]’”  Id. at 7.  Drafting judicial 
opinions is one of the primary activities of law clerks.  See infra text accompanying note 101.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that the defendants’ other lawyers saw this fact as virtually 
meaningless.  See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 359 (Mass. 
2008); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9. 
52 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396–97; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7.  It appears 
that New York and Halifax were chosen based on the belief that surreptitious taping would 
be permissible in those locations.  See In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 396–97; Bar Counsel v. 
Curry II, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
53 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7. 
54 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7.  The ruse was 
carried so far as to have business cards printed for Curry and LaBonte listing a fake 
company, “British Pacific Surplus Risks, Ltd.” at a real address in London.  In re Curry, 880 
N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7.  They also hired someone to 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/1
2008] Invading Judicial Confidentiality 11 
Taking on false identities as representatives of the corporate client, 
Curry and LaBonte met with Walsh in a hotel in Halifax.  The focus of 
the interview was on the Demoulas decision and how it was prepared, 
with Curry and LaBonte asking Walsh questions that were intended to 
reveal the judge’s deliberative process and extent of involvement in 
writing the decision, as well as to unearth damaging personal 
information about the judge.55  Walsh’s response to the interview 
questions reiterated that he had been completely responsible for the 
drafting of the decision and that the judge had merely read and signed 
the opinion.  He also indicated that the judge had told him at the 
beginning of the bench trial that “‘very quickly he would know who the 
good guys were and who the bad guys were’ and who the winners and 
losers were going to be.”56  Finally, Walsh made disparaging remarks 
about Judge Lopez and other state judges.  Afterward, lawyer Curry was 
apparently quite satisfied that the ruse had worked, reporting to 
defendant Arthur T. that, ‘“I think we got him.’”57 
Defendants’ lawyers Crossen and Donahue became involved in the 
Curry and Reid law clerk ruse shortly after the Halifax phony interview.  
Defendant Arthur T. Demoulas told them what Curry had related about 
Walsh’s claims to have written the shareholder derivative decision and 
                                                                                                             
answer the telephone number listed in London.  In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel 
v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 7. 
55 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8.  An 
interesting and ultimately significant side issue that arose during the interview related to 
Walsh’s stuttering.  In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8.  
At the beginning of the interview when Walsh began to stutter, Curry told him they 
already knew about it.  In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, 
at 8.  When Walsh asked how they knew, LaBonte said they had read it in a letter in 
Walsh’s bar application.  In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 
1, at 8. LaBonte asked why a friend who writes a letter of recommendation would mention 
the stuttering.  Id.  Walsh explained that a friend had not actually signed the letter.  In re 
Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8.  Walsh had asked an 
attorney named Edward Cotter to write the letter but Cotter couldn’t submit the letter 
because he was suspended from practice.  In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397 n.17; Bar Counsel 
v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8. Cotter had obtained the signature of a friend named Mulcahy 
on the letter and Mulcahy had also signed Walsh’s bar application as a sponsoring lawyer 
despite not knowing Walsh. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 397 & n.17; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, 
supra note 1, at 8.  Thus, in the interview Walsh revealed information that he had violated 
the Massachusetts Code of Professional Conduct.  See MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUCATION, supra note 13.  This information was subsequently used by lawyers for the 
defendants to attempt to induce Walsh’s cooperation.  See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 366 
(Mass. 2008) (“Donahue told the law clerk that, if he did not cooperate with them, the false 
letter submitted with his bar application would be made public.”); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, 
supra note 1, at 19 (threatening to go public with bar recommendation letter if Walsh did 
not cooperate). 
56 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 8; see also In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398. 
57 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9. 
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his statements about the judge’s purported predisposition.  Crossen and 
Donahue thought that Walsh’s statements about the judge’s alleged bias 
were “‘troubling’” and “‘significant.’”58  Both thought the information 
was significant and that it should be pursued further.  At that point, 
neither seemed to be overly concerned about the ruse or the fact that it 
was being used on a former law clerk to obtain confidential 
information.59  In considering the available options, Crossen thought 
about doing nothing, filing a motion accompanied by affidavits from 
Curry, Reid, and LaBonte, or doing further investigation.60  Despite his 
years of experience as a state and federal prosecutor and his awareness 
that procedures existed for investigating juror misconduct,61 Crossen did 
                                                 
58 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 398; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 359; Bar Counsel v. Curry 
II, supra note 1, at 9. 
59 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 359–60; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9; Bar 
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 61–63.  Donahue relied on Crossen’s supposed 
expertise.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9.  He also gave Crossen a copy of a 
case, Matter of Bonin, 378 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1978), that he apparently thought was 
somehow relevant.  See id.  A review of the Bonin case reveals that the case, which involves 
an investigation into a judge’s alleged out-of-court misconduct by a judicial conduct 
committee at the behest of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, is only remotely, if at 
all relevant.  See Bonin, 378 N.E.2d at 670.  The case does not involve a ruse upon a judicial 
law clerk and does not involve issues of confidentiality or judicial privilege. See id. at 671–
74 (summarizing the allegations made against the judge).  While the committee’s 
investigation included obtaining testimony by the administrative assistant to the judge, 
ultimately the court opinion did not even directly address admissibility issues.  See 
generally id. at 673–85 (discussing testimony from judge’s administrative assistant, but not 
addressing admissibility of testimony).  A few days later, Donahue claims to have raised 
with Crossen the propriety of having contact with a former law clerk, but was really not 
concerned about it because “‘every major law firm in Boston’ [sic] quizzes their former 
clerks on the judges for whom they clerked” and “former law clerks [are] often asked how 
a judge might react to a particular argument[.]”  Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 76.  
Nothing in the record indicates research by either Donahue or Crossen into the propriety of 
contacts with former law clerks prior to their involvement in the second fake interview 
with Walsh, except that prior to the second interview, Donahue apparently sought and 
received a memoranda from another attorney in his firm about the admissibility of affidavit 
statements by the law clerk and investigators in support of a motion to recuse the judge.  
See id. at 71–72, 76–77, 100; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 11–12.  The memo 
apparently only addressed hearsay issues, but not the propriety of either the ruse or 
contacts with the former law clerk, or of any privilege or confidentiality protection attached 
to a law clerk’s information.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 100, & Ex. 20 & 20A 
(on file with the author).  In fact, they relied on cases arising in a completely different 
context—testimony in judicial misconduct proceedings by court administrative clerks.  See 
id. at Ex. 20, Ex. 20A. 
60 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 359; see Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 9; Bar 
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 63. 
61 Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 63.  In Massachusetts, the Rules of Court 
prohibit lawyer contact with jurors, but where allegations of misconduct arise, case law 
establishes a specific process for bringing the matter to the attention of the court.  See infra 
pp. 99–101. 
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not consider the obvious remedy of referring the matter to the chief 
justice of the superior court for an investigation of the matter or formal 
questioning of Walsh.62 
After rejecting the notion of filing a motion accompanied by the 
Curry and LaBonte affidavits because of doubts as to their admissibility 
and credibility,63 Curry, Crossen, and Donahue decided to conduct a 
second fake interview with Walsh, to be held in New York and taped.64  
The plan was that at the interview, Walsh would confirm the statements 
he had previously made in Halifax regarding writing the decision and 
the judge’s prejudice, and once this occurred Crossen would “‘brace[]’” 
Walsh—that is confront him with the ruse and his statements and try to 
convince him to testify on behalf of the defendants’ position that the 
judge was predisposed against them.65  Walsh was again lured to the 
fake interview with money and a plane ticket.  Reid, LaBonte, and 
another investigator, Joseph Rush, hired by defendants’ lawyers, 
conducted the fake interview at a hotel.  The interview was taped and 
observed by video by Crossen from an adjoining room.  Rush and 
LaBonte tried to elicit clear statements by Walsh that the judge had 
improperly prejudged the case.  They also, for a second time, raised a 
matter concerning a recommendation letter that they knew Walsh had 
submitted to the Bar in violation of the Massachusetts Code of 
Professional Conduct, but Walsh indicated that he did not see a problem 
with it.  At a break, investigator Rush reported to Crossen that “Walsh’s 
statements on predisposition were ‘very weak[,]’”and Crossen told Rush 
                                                 
62 See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 63.  The mere fact that the Bonin case, 
recently given to Crossen by Donahue, involved a formal proceeding for investigating 
superior court judge misconduct, see supra note 55, should have alerted Crossen to this type 
of formal remedy.  See supra note 59.   Furthermore, the authority to “receive information, 
investigate, [and] conduct hearings[] . . . concerning allegations of judicial misconduct” is 
also vested in the Commission on Judicial Conduct by statute.  See MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 
211C, sec. 2(1) (1987); see also In re Markey, 696 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Mass. 1998) (explaining that 
an aggrieved litigant filed complaint alleging judicial misconduct with the Commission on 
Judicial Conduct). 
63 See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 
69–70. 
64 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 360; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 399–400 (Mass. 2008); Bar 
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10–11.  New York was selected based on the belief that 
it allowed taping with only one party’s consent. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 360; In re Curry, 
880 N.E.2d at 399; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 10–11; see also Bar Counsel v. 
Curry I, supra note 1, at 69–70, 73–75.  Apparently, after the decision to hold the fake 
follow-up interview in New York was made, a New York federal court decision, Miano v. 
AC&R Advertising, 148 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), was brought to Crossen’s attention under 
which a lawyer’s involvements in surreptitious taping in the context of a ruse was 
disapproved.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 75–76, 88, 203. 
65 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 360–61; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 11; Bar 
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 81–84, 95. 
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to go back and try again.66  Although Walsh made additional statements 
in the interview that suggested that the judge had pre-formed views as 
to credibility and what had occurred, he did not agree that the judge had 
“‘predetermined’” the case, stating that “‘she kept some sense of, of 
open-mindedness.’”67  Apparently, because of the inconsistencies 
between Walsh’s New York interview and the statements attributed to 
Walsh from the Halifax interview, Crossen decided not to “brace” Walsh 
at the interview.  Instead, Walsh was told by Rush that they would get 
back to him shortly about the job.68 
After the fake interview in New York, Crossen reviewed the tapes, 
concluding they were a “‘mixed bag’” because Walsh had answered 
inconsistently regarding the issue of predisposition.69  Meetings with 
other lawyers for the defendants were held regarding the Demoulas 
litigation and the events involving the former law clerk.  At one of these 
meetings Crossen was asked about the propriety of contacting a former 
law clerk, and Crossen answered that “he did not think [it was 
improper] but would look into the matter.”70  Some of defendants’ other 
prominent lawyers, who had not previously been aware of the law clerk 
contacts and ruse, listened to the tapes or read the transcripts and 
viewed them as largely worthless in terms of establishing predisposition 
by the judge.71 
                                                 
66 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 at 13; see also In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363. 
67 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363 n.20; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 at 14.  
Essentially, Walsh had indicated that he and the judge had discussed the case and evidence 
after each trial session, and that her views as to who was going to win were influenced by 
the fact that she had seen most of the witnesses and much of the evidence in the previous, 
substantially overlapping jury trial.  See id. at 13–14; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 
103–11. 
68 See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 14. 
69 Id.; see also In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363. 
70 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15.  He did in 
fact have an associate at his firm research the issue and was given a voicemail, notes, and 
cases that supported the existence of limited judicial privilege between judges and law 
clerks, policy arguments against such contacts, and proscriptions on contacts with jurors, 
but no outright prohibition on contacts with law clerks. See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 363–
64.  Crossen did not discuss the issue further with the associate, but read the cases.  See 
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 117–19.  
Among the cases was a case about Judge Alcee Hastings, Matter of Certain Complaints Under 
Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986), in which the court adopted a limited privilege.  
See id. at 118.  For further discussion of Hastings and the confidentiality privilege, see infra 
notes 262–84. 
71 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 364; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15–16; see 
also Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 119–25.  Among the lawyers who listened to the 
tape were Edward Barshak and (former Superior Court Judge) Samuel Adams.  See In re 
Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 364; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15–16.  At that point, a 
post-trial motion to recuse Judge Lopez was filed based solely on allegations of a dinner 
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Crossen, Curry, and Donahue decided that the final act of the ruse 
would entail bringing Walsh to a meeting at a hotel in Boston 
purportedly to offer him the job.  In fact, the plan was to reveal the ruse 
to Walsh and attempt to get him to confirm statements of prejudgment 
by the judge in an affidavit and otherwise cooperate with the defendants.  
They also planned to place him under surveillance to find out if he went 
to the judge or the plaintiffs’ lawyer after the meeting.72  When Walsh 
arrived for the fake job offer, he was met by Rush and lawyer Donahue.  
Rush told him of the ruse, Donahue told him that defendants hired them 
to look into misconduct by Judge Lopez, and both of them told him that 
they had tapes and affidavits of both the Halifax and New York 
interviews.  Crossen then entered the room and attempted to get Walsh 
to clearly confirm that he had written the entire decision and that the 
judge had been predisposed against the defendants.  He essentially 
advised Walsh that if Walsh did not cooperate with defendants, the 
damaging tapes and information would be revealed.  Lawyer Donahue 
raised the issue of the false bar recommendation letter, threatening to 
make it public if Walsh did not cooperate.73 
As might be expected in the circumstances, the former law clerk, 
who had been expecting to be offered his “dream job,” was angry and 
distraught at learning that he had been tricked and manipulated by the 
defendants’ lawyers.  During the lengthy encounter, he refused to 
discuss the judge’s supposed predisposition, stated that he had just been 
puffing his credentials to get the job, and repeatedly asked to hear the 
tapes.74  Crossen refused the request to hear the tapes and told the 
former clerk that he should seek “independent counsel[]” advice, which 
Crossen believed would result in the law clerk cooperating with the 
                                                                                                             
meeting between the judge and one of the counsel for the plaintiffs during the trial; no 
mention was made of any of the Walsh information.  In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 364.  At 
about the same time, Crossen also was representing defendants in the retrial in federal 
court of a related action in which the Demoulas case defendants alleged that one of the 
plaintiffs had bugged the defendants’ office.  Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 16–17.  
Interestingly, that case, Kettenbach v. Demoulas, involved another ruse apparently 
orchestrated by Crossen.  901 F. Supp. 486, 489–91 (D. Mass. 1995) (explaining that woman 
cooperated to set up a “rendez-vous” to Kittery, Maine to secretly record a conversation 
regarding “involvement in electronic operations conducted in and around [the] DSM 
headquarters[,]” and “to intercept oral communications”).  The Demoulas defendants lost 
both the motion to recuse and the federal court case about the same time their lawyers 
Crossen, Curry, and Donahue decided to try again to get damaging information from 
Walsh.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17. 
72 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 17. 
73 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 19. 
74 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365–66; see Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 137–51. 
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defendants counsel in providing information.75  As it turned out, Crossen 
could not have been more wrong about the effect that obtaining 
independent counsel would have. 
After the meeting, Walsh, believing that his career was going to be 
destroyed if the tapes and bar letter were made public, felt “‘[s]ad, 
scared, [and] emotionally very hurt[.]’”76  He returned to work, where 
his employer found him sitting in a conference room “crying and 
distraught[.]”77  At the suggestion of his employer, Walsh immediately 
contacted and retained a lawyer who, rather than contacting Crossen to 
negotiate some sort of cooperative arrangement, put Walsh in contact 
with the FBI.  This resulted in Walsh wearing a wire as part of a reverse 
sting over the next two weeks in which Walsh had four telephone 
conversations and two in-person meetings with Crossen in an effort to 
document what was viewed by the FBI as a possible extortion attempt.78 
These conversations involved Walsh repeatedly asking to hear the 
tapes before he would discuss the matter further and Crossen repeatedly 
stating to Walsh that Walsh would have to have a “‘candid 
conversation’” with Crossen first.  By this, Crossen apparently meant 
that Walsh would have to confirm that the judge had prejudged the 
Demoulas case.79  The fraudulent bar recommendation letter was also a 
frequent topic during the conversation, with Walsh expressing his 
concern about what Crossen intended to do with that information, and 
Crossen doing little to alleviate Walsh’s concerns.  In fact, when Crossen 
and Donahue finally decided to play a section of the tape from the New 
York meeting, it was the section in which Walsh explained how he had 
submitted a false letter in support of his bar application.80  Then, Walsh 
believed, and the hearing examiner in the discipline case found, that 
Crossen used the letter to “pressure Walsh into agreeing to have the 
‘candid conversation[;]’ [and i]f Walsh agreed to cooperate with him, 
Crossen would use his experience and position to do his ‘best . . . to keep 
it from coming out.’”81  In the last conversation between Walsh and 
                                                 
75 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 19; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 150; 
see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366. 
76 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
77 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366. 
78 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366–68; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20–26; 
Vennochi, supra note 7; Judy Rakowsky, Decision on Lawyers Looming at Justice, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2000, at B4.  Interestingly, the law clerk’s lawyer was retained to represent 
him for all aspects of the Demoulas matter, including “the possible publication of his story.”  
Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 154. 
79 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 366; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 20; Bar 
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 157–81. 
80 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 367; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 23. 
81 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 23; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 367. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/1
2008] Invading Judicial Confidentiality 17 
Crossen on August 25, 1997, Crossen tried to pressure Walsh into 
providing an affidavit supporting defendants’ position by telling him 
that a client strategic meeting was coming up in a couple of days and 
that Crossen “was not ‘optimistic that if we don’t get something done 
before [then] . . . that the client won’t insist upon me dropping the 
hammer[.]’”82 
Instead, shortly after this conversation, “the hammer” dropped on 
Crossen, Donahue, and Curry.  Crossen found out on August 29, 1997, 
that grand jury subpoenas had been served on the investigators who had 
been involved in the ruse and that the FBI was investigating him.  Walsh 
and his lawyer held a press conference on September 17, 1997, and on 
September 26, 1997, the Superior Court Chief Justice filed a complaint 
with the Massachusetts attorney discipline authority—the Office of Bar 
Counsel.83 
C. The Board of Bar Overseers Proceedings 
The Bar Counsel waited to act formally until after the FBI and United 
States Attorney’s Office completed the criminal investigation into 
Crossen’s, Curry’s, and Donahue’s conduct.  Eleven months after the 
lawyers were advised that the matter was being closed without 
indictments, the Bar Counsel filed a petition for discipline against the 
lawyers on January 3, 2002.84  The hearings before the specially 
appointed hearing officer, who was a former Chair of the Massachusetts 
BBO, were the longest in the history of the BBO, with twenty-five days of 
                                                 
82 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 25; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 368.  This 
statement was false, as was Crossen’s denial during the conversation that defendants’ 
investigators had been following Walsh for weeks.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 
1, at 24–26.  The special hearing officer found that during these post New-York ruse 
meetings Crossen and Donahue had “attempted to get Walsh to state under oath that Judge 
Lopez had predetermined the . . . Shareholder Derivative Case” by threatening to disclose 
embarrassing or compromising statements that Walsh had made in the Halifax and New 
York interviews, and by disclosing the false bar recommendation letter that Walsh had 
submitted with his bar application.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 185–86.  The 
BBO accepted these findings.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 33–35, 37–39, 42–
43, 46–51. 
83 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 385 n.57; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 26. 
84 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 368; Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 26; Bar 
Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 1.  The delay was based in part on a request from Curry 
and Donahue to defer the matter until after the FBI investigation was completed and in 
part on the fact that key documents and evidence were in the possession of the FBI until 
after the investigation was closed.  Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 209–10.  Many 
questioned whether Crossen, as a former head of the Criminal Section of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, had received special treatment.  See Shelley Murphy, US Says It Won’t 
Press Case Against Lopez Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2001, at B1; Maggie Mulvihill, Ethics, 
Law Probe Has Legal Observers Scratching Heads, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 8, 2000, at 37. 
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hearings lasting about 18 months.85  In a 229-page decision, with detailed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the hearing officer recommended 
that all three lawyers be disbarred.  The lawyers appealed to the BBO, 
not only challenging the findings of fact, but arguing that their conduct 
was proper, or alternatively, that ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
standards of conduct warranted no punishment, or at most, only a 
reprimand.  The BBO heard arguments in January and February of 2006, 
and on October 16, 2006, and with minor exceptions, unanimously 
adopted the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  As 
to the final disposition, the BBO recommended that Curry and Crossen 
be disbarred and that Donahue be suspended for three years.86 
The vast majority of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
both the hearing officer’s decision and the BBO’s decision related to the 
misrepresentations and deceits that were part of the fake job ruse and the 
threats that were made to expose the former law clerk’s statements and 
bar recommendation letter if he did not cooperate.  The significance of 
the fact that the ruse and threats were directed at a former law clerk or 
that the contacts, regardless of their nature, were intended to penetrate 
the confidential law clerk judge relationship, received only passing 
attention.  Thus, with regard to Curry, the co-architect of the initial ruse, 
the special hearing officer and Board found that the “scheme to induce a 
former law clerk under false pretenses into disclosing confidential 
communications with a judge regarding the decision-making process[,]” 
his “holding out to a former law clerk the false promise of lucrative 
employment[,]” his false representations of his and his associates’ 
identities, and “luring the former law clerk out of the Commonwealth on 
the false pretext of a job interview for the purpose of inquiring into the 
deliberative processes of a judge in a case . . . violated Canon One, DR 1-
102(A)(2) and (4)–(6), and Canon Seven, DR 7-102(A)(5) and (7).”87 
                                                 
85 See  Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 1; Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 
2. 
86 See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 369; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 401 (Mass. 2008); Bar 
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 1–2.  Final determinations of disbarment and 
suspension are made by at least one justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  
See, e.g., In re McBride, 865 N.E.2d. 1110, 1112 (Mass. 2007). 
87 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 27–28; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 400–01.  At 
the time of the events in this case, Massachusetts’s ethical rules were based on the ABA 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.  See Mass.gov, Rules, http://www.mass.gov/ 
obcbbo/rules.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).  DR 1-102 defined misconduct, stating in 
relevant part: 
(A)  A lawyer shall not: 
 . . . 
(2)  [C]ircumvent a disciplinary rule through actions of another. 
 . . . 
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Oddly, this same language regarding trying to acquire “confidential” 
information about the judges’ “deliberative process” was not used by the 
special hearing officer with regard to lawyers Crossen and Donahue.  
Instead, the special hearing officer stated that it was Crossen’s, Curry’s, 
and Donahue’s “conduct in planning, executing, and participating in a 
scheme to induce a former law clerk to make damaging or compromising 
statements about himself or about the judge for whom he clerked with 
the false inducement of lucrative employment . . . in order to force the 
judge’s recusal or undermine her decisions in an ongoing case, [that] 
violated Canon One, DR 1-102(A)(2) and (4)–(6), and Canon Seven, DR 7-
102(A)(5) and (7).”88 
                                                                                                             
(4)  [E]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation. 
(5)  [E]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice. 
(6)  [E]ngage in other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to 
practice law. 
MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 13, at 130; see MASSACHUSETTS 
CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES DR 1-102, available at http://www.mass. 
gov/obcbbo/disciplinaryrules.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).  The substance of these rules 
is now contained in Rule 8.4 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (h) of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 13, at 
130; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2003). DR 7-102 provided in relevant 
part: 
(A)  In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . . 
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact. . . . 
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows 
to be illegal or fraudulent. 
MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 13, at 130.  The counterparts 
under the current Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct are, Rule 4.1, which states 
“[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:  (a) make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a third person[,]” and Rule 1.2, which states “(d) A 
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent.”  Id. at 10, 336; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.2(d), 4.1(a) (2003). 
88 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 28–31; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 368.  See 
supra note 87 for the content of the rules.  In addition, the three lawyers were also found to 
have violated DR-102(A)(2) (acts of another) and (4)–(6) (dishonesty, prejudice to 
admininstration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102 (A)( 5) (false statement) and (7) 
((fraud) by setting up the New York fake job interview for purposes of taping the 
conversation without Walsh’s consent.  Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 28–31. 
Crossen and Donahue were also found to have violated DR-102(A) (4)–(6) (dishonesty, 
prejudice to administration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102(A)( 5) (false 
statement) and (7) ((fraud) by misrepresenting to Walsh that the Halifax conversation was 
taped, threatening to disclose Walsh’s “embarrassing or compromising statements” made 
during the fake job interviews, and threatening to disclose that Walsh had submitted a false 
recommendation letter with his bar application if Walsh did not attest that the judge had 
predetermined the outcome in the shareholder derivative suit.  Id. at 29–32.  Finally, 
Crossen was found to have violated violated DR-102 (A) (4)–(6) (dishonesty, prejudice to 
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Given the outrageousness of the lawyers’ behavior during the ruse 
and the relative clarity of the ethics rules violations relating to the ruse 
and other false statements,89 this focus is not surprising.  A close 
examination, however, reveals that the special hearing officer and the 
BBO assiduously avoided directly taking on the question of whether the 
mere fact that the lawyers had targeted a former law clerk in an effort to 
get confidential information, in and of itself, would warrant discipline.  
Thus, the BBO, apart from its literal recitation of the hearing officer’s 
findings above, did not mention the fact that the lawyers were 
attempting to pierce a confidential relationship between a law clerk and 
judge, except that it did note that the whole ruse was essentially hatched 
because the lawyers did not expect Walsh to “disclose, in violation of his 
obligations as a clerk, confidential communications with a judge unless 
                                                                                                             
administration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102 (A)( 5) (false statement) and (7) 
(fraud) by placing Walsh and his wife under surveillance, and denying it.  See id. at 30.  
Curry was found to have violated DR-102(A)(2) (acts of another) and (5)-(6) (prejudice to 
administration of justice, and lack of fitness) and DR 7-102(A)(7) (illegal or fraudulent 
conduct) by investigating Walsh’s personal life to get damaging personal information.  Id.  
at 28. 
89 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 403–04 (“Curry’s conduct in this matter raised ‘dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation’ and ‘false statement[s] of law or fact’ to heady levels.”); 
In re Crossen,  880 N.E.2d at 376–79 (discussing the obviousness of Crossen’s violations of 
rules prohibiting false statements and misrepresentations, distinguishing cases involving 
testers and prosecutors’ undercover stings); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, 
LEGAL ETHICS—THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 4.1–2 (2007) 
(citing examples that illustrate the broad brush of the prohibition of false statements by 
lawyers);  Michael S. Frisch, Zealousness Run Amok, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1035, 1054–55 
(2007) (discussing the patently unethical nature of the deceptions engaged in by lawyers 
Curry, Crossen, and Donahue); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 577, 577–78 (2005) (explaining that courts “abhor” all types of deception and quoting 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court as stating, “‘it is the responsibility of every attorney at 
all times to be truthful.’”); Livingston Keithley, Comment, Should a Lawyer Be Allowed to Lie? 
People v. Pautler and a Proposed Duress Exception, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 301, 301–04, 325 (2004) 
(explaining that lying to a murderer on the grounds that it may save lives was not held to 
be an exception to the prohibition of lying and deception by lawyers and that allowing 
“‘justifiable deception’” would result in a slippery slope); W. William Hodes, Seeking the 
Truth Versus Telling the Truth at the Boundaries of the Law:  Misdirection, Lying, and Lying with 
an Explanation, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 53, 62–64 (2002) (explaining that truthfulness and honesty 
are ‘“core values’” that separate attorneys from other professionals and that even “few 
instances of real dishonesty[]” can compromise the system); Rebecca Graves Payne, 
Investigative Tactics, They May Be Legal, but Are They Ethical?, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 46 
(quoting the Colorado Supreme Court as stating “[p]urposeful deception by an attorney 
licensed in our state is intolerable, even when . . . attempting to secure the surrender of a 
murder suspect.”); Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deception and Lawyers:  Away from a Dogmatic 
Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding of Deception, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 722, 744–46 
(1989) (explaining the rationales for the “rigid” prohibition on deception and lying by 
lawyers). 
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he were seduced by an offer he could not refuse.”90  The extent to which 
the BBO saw this effort as wrongful per se is drawn into question by the 
BBO’s statement earlier in its opinion apparently suggesting that rather 
than launching the ruse, while in her fax the lawyers should have made a 
“straightforward  request to Walsh that he tell them what had 
happened[.]”91  Even such a straight forward request seemingly would 
have sought confidential information about the judge’s deliberative 
process. 
The special hearing officer more directly, even if not without 
ambiguity, addressed the attempt to invade a confidential relationship.  
Despite the fact that she found that the purpose of the defendants’ 
lawyers’ contacts with Walsh was to get him to breach his duties of 
confidentiality as a former law clerk, and that the parties had extensively 
briefed the question of whether the defendants’ lawyers had invaded a 
“judge-[law] clerk privilege” by their approach to Walsh, the special 
hearing officer “pass[ed] the question[]” because she found that the 
lawyers’ actions had violated their “ethical duties even [if] no such 
privilege had existed.”92  Later she stated:  “Because the deception 
sought improperly to undermine the integrity of a judicial proceeding—
even assuming there existed no judge-clerk privilege to invade—I 
further find that it constituted misconduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice in violation of . . . DR 1-102(A)(5)” and violates 
DR 1-102(A)(6) because “such conduct reflects adversely on one’s fitness 
to practice law[] . . . .”93  The problem is that this brief, ambiguous 
passage, which is not addressed or cited by the BBO, could be read in its 
context of a discussion of defendants’ lawyers’ dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation, to mean that it was the deception that was critical.  
It also could be read to mean that the contact with the former law clerk 
for the purpose of undermining the integrity of the judicial proceeding 
through acquisition of confidential information is itself a violation of the 
ethical proscriptions.  Given the special hearing officer’s repeated “pass” 
on the judge-law clerk privilege question, it should probably be read as 
the former. 
                                                 
90 Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 60–61. 
91 Id. at 53 n.13; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 370 n.33. 
92 Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 195 & n.75.  She also stated that the fact that 
they were trying to induce the law clerk to breach his duty to the judge was the reason that 
they “could not ask him their questions directly and honestly.  Having in mind specific 
answers they sought as to predisposition and authorship, they tailored their 
blandishments, interviews, and interrogation first to trick[ and] later to frighten Walsh into 
making statements he ‘otherwise would not have made.’”  Id. at 195; see In re Crossen, 880 
N.E.2d at 357, 370. 
93 Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 198 (citation omitted). 
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Like the special hearing officer and the BBO, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the disbarment of lawyers Curry 
and Crossen, focused almost entirely on the lawyers’ false statements 
and misrepresentations that were part of the fake job ruse.  In brief 
passages, the court did, however, acknowledge the importance of the 
confidentiality of deliberative process communications between a judge 
and law clerk to the administration of justice and the possible existence 
of a judicial deliberations privilege.94  More importantly, while declining 
to address in these cases whether a deliberative privilege should exist 
regarding judge-law clerk communications, the court indicated that even 
absent such a privilege, “efforts to pierce the confidential 
communications of a former law clerk and a judge in a pending matter to 
benefit one of the litigants also constitute ‘conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.’”95  Thus, the court seemingly indicated, the 
efforts by the lawyers here to induce a former law clerk to reveal 
confidential judicial deliberative information, quite apart from the use of 
misrepresentations and false statements, alone would run afoul of the 
rules of professional conduct, at least where it occurred in the context of 
an ongoing case. 
III.  THE JUDGE-LAW CLERK RELATIONSHIP 
A. Generally 
The judicial law clerk institution in the United States got its start in 
Massachusetts in 1875 when Chief Justice Horace Gray of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, because of his increasingly heavy 
workload, hired a high ranking recent law graduate as his legal 
“‘secretary.’”96  When Justice Gray was appointed to the United States 
Supreme Court in 1882, he brought this practice with him, and soon 
thereafter the practice spread.  Justice Oliver Wendell Homes Junior, 
upon joining the Supreme Court in 1882, emulated Gray’s practice of 
employing a recent honors law graduate because ‘“no one can do all the 
work without breaking down.’”97  In 1886, at the recommendation of the 
                                                 
94 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 373; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406. 
95 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 373; In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406. 
96 See Robert Bloom, The Origin of the Supreme Judicial Court Law Clerk System, LAW 
CLERKS’ SOCIETY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (2003), http://sjclawclerks.socialaw. 
com/history.htm.  Gray called this secretary, whom he had to pay out of his own pocket, a 
puisne judge.  See id.; Gerald Lebovits, Judges’ Clerks Play Varied Roles in the Opinion Drafting 
Process, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jul–Aug. 2004, at 34; J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks:  for Better or for 
Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 323 (1988); see also JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & ROBERT S. 
THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1980). 
97 Bloom, supra note 96. 
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Attorney General, Congress authorized a ‘“stenograhic clerk’” for each 
justice to be paid $1,600 a year by the government, but it appears that, at 
least as used by Justice Gray, the clerk’s duties were very similar to those 
of judicial law clerks as they have become traditionally viewed—
“reviewing newly filed cases, discussing opinions [proposed] by other 
justices [on the Court], [and] engaging in . . . vigorous colloquy on 
opinions[.]”98  The law clerk institution was introduced into the states 
and lower federal courts in the 1930s.99 
There is substantial variability among judges and courts in terms of 
the roles of law clerks and their relationships to particular judges.  While 
some courts and institutions attempt to describe generally the functions 
of the law clerk, the actual role of an individual law clerk is usually 
determined by the judge for whom that law clerk works in the context of 
what is widely recognized to be a uniquely personal relationship.100  In 
its most recent edition of the Federal Law Clerk Handbook, the Federal 
Judicial Center described the basic functions as follows: 
 In most chambers, law clerks concentrate on legal 
research and writing.  Typically, law clerks’ broad range 
of duties includes conducting legal research, preparing 
bench memos, drafting orders and opinions, editing and 
proofreading the judge’s orders and opinions, and 
verifying citations.  Many judges discuss pending cases 
with their law clerks and confer with them about 
decisions.  District court law clerks often attend 
conferences in chambers with attorneys.  Frequently, law 
clerks also maintain the library, assemble documents, 
serve as courtroom crier, handle exhibits during trial, 
and perform other administrative tasks as required by 
the judge to ensure a smooth-running chambers. 
 Law clerks for district court, bankruptcy court, and 
magistrate judges have substantially more contact with 
attorneys and witnesses than do their appellate court 
                                                 
98 See id.; Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Mahoney, supra note 96, at 324.  Gray’s clerks 
were also asked to draft opinions that were used for discussion purposes.  Bloom, supra 
note 96; see also 24 Stat. 254 (1886). 
99 See Bloom, supra note 96; Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Mahoney, supra note 96, at 325–
26; John Paul Jones, Some Ethical Considerations for Judicial Clerks, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 771, 
771 n.1 (1990–91). 
100 See David Crump, Law Clerks:  Their Roles and Relationships With Their Judges, 69 
JUDICATURE 236, 236, 240 (1986); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 326–27; FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
LAW CLERK HANDBOOK:  A HANDBOOK FOR LAW CLERKS TO FEDERAL JUDGES 1 (Sylvan A. 
Sobel ed., 2d ed. 2007); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, LAW CLERK HANDBOOK 1 (2d ed. 2007); 
Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L REV. 152, 153–54 (1990). 
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counterparts.  The principal function of an appellate 
court law clerk is to research and write about the issues 
presented by an appeal, while law clerks for district, 
bankruptcy, and magistrate judges may be involved in 
the many decisions made at every stage of each case.101 
This description probably accurately describes the broad, common 
outlines of the duties of most federal and state law clerks, but it does not 
communicate the potential breadth of law clerks’ functions or the 
unique, intimate access that many of these functions give the law clerk to 
the judge’s inner thoughts and private life.  A much more striking 
picture emerges from examining comments judges themselves have 
made about the law clerk relationship.  Judge Patricia Wald of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated 
that “[t]he judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually 
dependent one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love 
affair.”102  Similarly, Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has described the relationship as a 
“human” one in which “a young lawyer becomes part of the judge’s 
extended family, a disciple, an ally, quite possibly a friend.”103  Given the 
closeness of the relationship, both professionally and personally, 
“[m]utual trust and respect are not merely desirable, they are 
essential.”104 
Other courts have noted that 
 [l]aw clerks are not merely the judge’s errand 
runners.  They are sounding boards for tentative 
opinions[,] and [they are] legal researchers who seek the 
authorities that affect decision[s].  Clerks are privy to the 
                                                 
101 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 100 at 1;  see also Mahoney, supra note 96, at 327–28; 
ALVIN B. RUBIN & LAURA B. BARTELL, LAW CLERK HANDBOOK:  A HANDBOOK FOR LAW 
CLERKS TO FEDERAL JUDGES 1, 16 (1989).  There is also often a mentoring or pupil-teacher 
relationship between the judge and a law clerk.  Comment, The Law Clerk’s Duty of 
Confidentiality, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1232 (1981). 
102 Wald, supra note 100, at 153; see also Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1707, 1708–09 (1991) (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Judge 
Kozinski agreeing). 
103 Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1708. Judge Kozinski notes further that it is not an 
ordinary employer-employee relationship, but one that “calls for an uncommon degree of 
trust, respect and goodwill.”  Id.  at 1718; see also Comment, supra note 101, at 1232 & n.17 
(describing friendships that arise). 
104 Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1709. 
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judge’s thoughts in a way that neither parties to the 
lawsuit nor his most intimate family members may be.105 
Citing and quoting this assessment with approval, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has added the following 
commentary: 
In contrast to court clerks, who frequently perform 
ministerial functions, a law clerk generally performs 
discretionary acts of a judicial nature.  Indeed, a law 
clerk is probably the one participant in the judicial 
process whose duties and responsibilities are most 
intimately connected with the judge’s own exercise of 
the judicial function. . . .  “Law clerks are closely 
connected with the court’s decision-making process. . . .  
Law clerks are simply extensions of the judges at whose 
pleasure they serve.”106 
The closeness of the judge-law clerk relationship arises from, and is 
probably reinforced by, a number of practical factors.  The sheer 
workload that most judges face requires that they rely heavily on their 
law clerks for legal research and opinion drafting.107  Moreover, the 
isolated nature of a judge’s life greatly reduces the number of sources for 
input, feedback, or discussion of issues that a judge has.  As Judge Wald 
has noted, her “[law] clerks are basically the only persons a judge can 
talk to in depth about a case. . . .  If she is in doubt, troubled, or just plain 
frustrated, the clerk is her wailing wall.”108  The judge explained further 
that judges are “often unsure of [their] analyses” and “need to test ideas 
before exposing them to the hard probing of colleagues.”109  They turn to 
law clerks, who must be “unambiguously” loyal and committed to the 
judge, for criticism, especially because judges need to occasionally “let 
                                                 
105 Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983). 
106 Olivia v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Olivia v. Heller, 670 F. Supp. 
523, 526 (S.D.N.Y 1987)) (citation omitted); see also Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 417 & n.6 
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting the closeness of the judge and law clerk’s work and the need for 
loyalty, cooperation, and responsibility by law clerks); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 326–27. 
107 See Mahoney, supra note 96, at 340; see also Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 417 (noting the 
relationship of  law clerk assistance to the “staggering case loads that have crushed all 
courts, but especially [the] state judiciaries[’ courts].”); Wald, supra note 100, at 154. 
108 Wald, supra note 100, at 153; see also Crump, supra note 98, at 240 (noting the solitary 
remote nature a of judge’s job and the need for collegial atmosphere); see also Mahoney, 
supra note 96, at 342 (noting that because judges cannot seek outside assistance on analysis 
and practically cannot consult with busy colleagues, the law clerk “sounding board 
function” is “indispensable”). 
109 Wald, supra note 100, at 153. 
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[their] guard down, to speculate, to experiment, to argue, even to make 
frank and sometimes uncharitable appraisals of our colleagues’ drafts 
and suggestions.”110  Judge Wald believes that “our jurisprudence is 
better for the give and take among judges and law clerks than if judges 
had to go it alone.”111 
Moreover, the close physical proximity of the law clerk to the judge, 
in chambers and otherwise, necessarily results in law clerks having 
access to private personal information about, and from, the judge and 
frequently results in close social interaction.112  For example, during my 
clerkship for a federal appellate judge, it was common for the judge and 
law clerks, as well as other judges and their law clerks, to socialize 
together.113  Furthermore, the mere fact that I spent hours a day in the 
same office suite necessarily resulted in my acquiring a substantial 
amount of information about the judge’s private life, including tastes, 
political opinions, opinions about lawyers and other judges, food 
preferences, personal and family relationships, work habits, and 
financial information.114  Given this kind of access, it is little wonder that 
Judge Kozinski has noted that the judge-law clerk relationship “calls for 
an uncommon degree of trust, respect and goodwill.”115 
B. Confidentiality 
Given law clerks’ functions and access to private information, it is 
hardly surprising that law clerk confidentiality has been traditionally 
viewed as a fundamental aspect of the judge-law clerk relationship.116  
Indeed, from a judge’s perspective, it is essential both for functional and 
personal reasons.  As the Seventh Circuit has stated, “‘[t]he absence 
of . . . confidentiality is disruptive and inevitably impairs the operation 
of any court.’”117  Judges rely on the ability to engage freely in testing of 
their thoughts and ideas with their law clerks.  Without confidentiality, 
                                                 
110 Id. at 153. 
111 Id. at 153–54; see also Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1723 (stating that a clerk advises and 
debates with the judge and “serves as his eyes and ears[]”); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 342 
(clerk’s “opinions or suggestions often result in a more careful search for the means by 
which a just decision should be reached[]” and may compel “a judge to consider 
alternatives that might otherwise have been ignored or considered inadequately.”). 
112 See Kozinski, supra note 102, at 1708–09, 1723; Crump, supra note 100, at 240 (quoting 
Judge Coffin’s statement that “‘[t]he pleasure of [a law clerk’s] company is one of a judge’s 
most refreshing fringe benefits.’”); Comment, supra note 101, at 1235. 
113 This would include informal lunches, dinners, parties, and attending events. 
114 Cf. Comment, supra note 101, at 1235 (stating that clerks have unique views of judges). 
115 Kozinksi, supra note 102, at 1718. 
116 Crump, supra note 100, at 240; Jones, supra note 99, at 775–76; Mahoney, supra note 96, 
at 335–36; Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Comment, supra note 101, at 1236–38. 
117 Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 417 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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many judges would not engage in this process to the serious detriment of 
their decision-making.118  This is because judges understandably would 
be hesitant to publicly expose their uncertainties, possible mistakes or 
unsettled ideas, or unpopular conclusions.119  Moreover, as Judge 
Mahoney of the Second Circuit has noted, disclosure of “the workings of 
a chambers, or any apprehension that this is likely to occur, can only 
undermine the personal relationships involved and tend to induce a 
formal and defensive atmosphere that will undermine collegiality in 
chambers.”120 
Other rationales have been offered in support of confidentiality.  
These have included “[p]reserving public confidence in the judiciary,” 
which is based on the notion that judicial decisions, particularly 
appellate decisions, are often the product of compromise.  It is the final 
written decision that is relevant and should be relied upon and assessed 
by the public.  Disclosure of the compromise or sometimes strident 
differences of opinion leading to the compromise would undermine the 
public’s faith in the justice system.121  Other interests include preventing 
exploitation of information and imposing cost on the system and 
others.122  This is particularly likely to be a problem in pending cases or 
very recently decided cases that are still subject to appeal or 
reconsideration.  A notorious example of exploitation is the 1919 case in 
which a Supreme Court law clerk allegedly leaked information, about a 
pending decision, that was used to engage in insider trading.123  
Improper imposition of costs on the system and opposing parties might 
                                                 
118 See Jones, supra note 99, at 776; Comment, supra note 101, at 1236. 
119 See Jeffrey B. Abrahamson, Should a Clerk Ever Reveal Confidential Information?, 63 
JUDICATURE 361, 362 (1979–1980).  In part, this can be explained by the possibility that 
“courts inevitably will become politicized [if] they are forced to conduct their intramural 
arguments in public.”  Id. at 402.; see also, Comment, supra note 101, at 1239 (noting the 
potentially negative impact on independent judicial reasoning from outside influence if 
candid internal discussions of unpopular ideas are subject to public scrutiny). 
120 Mahoney, supra note 96, at 335–36; see also Comment, supra note 101, at 1237–39 
(stating that judges reported on a survey question that the breach of confidentiality impact 
included “negative impact on the closeness of the relationship” and the type and amount of 
information discussed with clerks, more inhibition by the judge, stricter hiring practices, 
and use of permanent law clerks). 
121 See Comment, supra note 101, at 1239–40. 
122 See id. at 1240.  A recent example of an effort apparently aimed at avoiding 
exploitation of law clerk information is a policy of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit under which the identities of law clerks is maintained as 
confidential by the clerks office to avoid ex parte contacts by law firms. See Emma 
Schwartz, D.C. Circuit Keeps Clerks Confidential, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at 3, 3.  Several 
other Circuit Courts have similar policies.  See id. 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 136–37.  See infra text accompanying notes 164–66 
also for a discussion of the case of the former Illinois Appeals Court law clerk’s use of a 
judge’s memo in the clerk’s run for the judge’s seat in an election. 
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occur where one party attempts to use confidential information as a basis 
for reopening a case, as was contemplated in the Curry case that is the 
subject of this Article.124 
In addition, law clerk confidentiality serves to protect judges’ 
privacy and reputation interests.125  An example of intrusion upon 
privacy interests could involve a law clerk’s public disclosure of a 
judge’s health issues.126  A judge’s reputation could also be unfairly 
harmed by a law clerk’s revelation of confidential information outside 
the context of a judicial disciplinary proceeding and before the veracity 
of the information is established.127  Finally, there is the interest of 
avoiding dissemination of a law clerk’s distorted or inaccurate 
disclosures.  Commentators have cautioned that law clerks’ perspectives 
may not be accurate and may be distorted by their own interests, biases, 
or relationships with a judge.  Also, law clerks’ revelations may be 
distorted by the press.128  An example of such law clerk distortion based 
on personal interest occurred in Bar Counsel v. Curry, where the law clerk 
engaged in puffery regarding his role in drafting the Demoulas 
shareholder derivative decision and made statements about the judge’s 
prejudgment of the case because he thought that was what the job 
interviewers wanted and it would aid him in landing the job.129 
Those who would limit or reject confidentiality have relied on public 
interest rationales.  Probably the most frequent justification for breaches 
of confidentiality, at least by former Supreme Court clerks, is the 
historical and scholarly value of the information.130  Another rationale is 
that because courts are political institutions that frequently decide 
                                                 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 4–13.  It would be improper where the confidential 
information is not a sufficient basis for obtaining a new trial. See In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d  
at 373–74 (bias does not exist merely because a judge’s opinions may be based on 
information from earlier proceedings); Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 54–55 
(indicating that the mere fact that a judge was influenced by evidence in a prior similar case 
is not sufficient for recusal); infra text accompanying notes 260–82, 283–87, 302–24 
(information is privileged and therefore generally inadmissible). 
125 See Comment, supra note 101, at 1240. 
126 See id. (citing the disclosure in The Brethren of details of Justice Douglas’s last illness). 
127 See id. at 1240–41. 
128 See id. at 1241. 
129 See, e.g., Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 223; see In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 365. 
130 See David J. Garrow, “The Lowest Form of Animal Life”?:  Supreme Court Clerks and 
Supreme Court History, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 855, 893–94 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky, Opening 
Closed Chambers, 108 YALE L.J. 1087, 1090–1104 (1999); Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 403–
04.  But see Jones, supra note 99, at 776 n.23 (political and historical value does not justify 
breach of confidentiality in a judge’s lifetime); Richard W. Painter, Open Chambers?, 97 
MICH L. REV.1430, 1436 (1999) (historical and scholarship value is not worth the damage to 
the law clerk judicial relationship).  This justification has a much diluted force outside the 
context of the Supreme Court.    
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matters of fundamental public policy, democratic theory requires that 
the people be informed not only of decisions but also of the basis of those 
decisions.131  A related rationale applicable in states where judges are 
elected is that in order to make informed judgments, voters need 
information about the judges’ internal deliberations and the basis for 
their decisions; in addition, even where judges are appointed, such 
information would be highly relevant to court reform efforts.132  Finally, 
commentators and some courts have noted that exposing wrongdoing by 
members of the judiciary would justify an exception to the law clerk 
confidentiality duty.133 
While originally this secrecy surrounding what goes on in chambers 
may have been simply a tacit understanding, over the years judges and 
court systems have increasingly formalized the confidentiality 
requirement in the face of lapses by law clerks.134  They have also 
clarified that the duty of confidentiality does not expire at the end of the 
clerkship; it continues indefinitely.135  Also, although the exact contours 
of the law clerk confidentiality duty may be blurry at the periphery, 
when it comes to general information about a judge or the procedural 
operations of chambers or the law clerk’s experiences, there is no 
question that a law clerk’s information about the judge’s decision-
making process in particular cases is generally considered secret.136 
                                                 
131 See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 402–04; Comment, supra note 101, at 1241; David 
Lane, Bush v. Gore, Vanity Fair, and a Supreme Court Law Clerk’s Duty of Confidentiality, 18 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 874–75 (2005).  Opening deliberations to public scrutiny may not 
be worth the cost because it can result in loss of the testing of ideas with other judges and 
law clerks, premature judgments, and private and less informed decision-making.  See 
Philip B. Kurland, The Brethren:  Inside the Supreme Court, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 185, 189 (1979) 
(book review); Comment, supra note 101, at 1241 n.60; supra text accompanying notes 116–
19. 
132 See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 403; Comment, supra note 101, at 1242. 
133 See, e.g., Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361, 363, 402; Comment, supra note 101, at 
1242; infra note 222. 
134 See Richard W. Painter, supra note 130, at 1441–42, 1454–55; Mahoney, supra note 96, at 
335–36; text infra text accompanying notes 142–45; see also George Anastaplo, Legal Realism, 
the New Journalism, and The Brethren, 1983 DUKE L. J. 1045, 1046 (1983) (noting unwritten 
nature of Supreme Court secrecy rule at the time of The Brethren). 
135 See infra note 175; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST:  ETHICS 
FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS 6–7 (2002); Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Mahoney, 
supra note 96, at 336; Painter, supra note 130 at 1441–42, 1446–48, 1467–68.  But see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1093–94 (arguing that the 1989 Supreme Court Law Clerk 
Code did not impose a continuing duty of confidentiality); Garrow, supra note 130, at 893–
94 (reviewing former Supreme Court law clerks post-clerkship revelations generally many 
decades later). 
136 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1090–91, 1093 (drawing distinction between 
general conversations and experiences and conversations between law clerk and judge 
about a decision in a particular case and stating that “[n]o consensus exists as to what 
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The most notorious confidentiality breaches have been those 
associated with former Supreme Court law clerks who divulged 
information relating to the operations of chambers and the “inside 
stories” of famous cases, usually in their own later writings or in 
interviews given to other writers.  These have spawned a plethora of 
literature debating the extent to which post-clerkship law clerk 
confidentiality is the expected ethical norm and the extent to which 
specific disclosures by law clerks breached such a norm.137 
Probably the most infamous breach of confidentiality by a Supreme 
Court law clerk occurred in 1919 when Ashton F. Embry, a long-time law 
clerk to Justice Joseph McKenna, allegedly divulged information about a 
not yet released decision in United States v. Southern Pacific Co.138 to some 
co-conspirators who used the information to profit in the stock market.  
When discovered, Embry resigned and was indicted for “‘conspiracy to 
defraud the [g]overnment of its right of secrecy 
concerning . . . opinions.’”  The law clerk’s motion to dismiss, on the 
                                                                                                             
former Supreme Court [Law] [C]lerks can and cannot say.”); Leboivits, supra note 96, at 35 
(drawing distinction between writing about experience and divulging secrets); Painter, 
supra note 130, at 1457–58 (noting ambiguity but arguing that most communications 
between a Justice and a law clerk about the decision-making process and Court’s opinions 
are confidential); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 135, at 5–6 (confidential information 
“includes any information you receive in chambers that is not filed in the public docket[,]” 
such as instructions from the judge and discussions of the judge’s assessment of a case); 
Comment, supra note 101, at 1253–66 (discussing proposed law clerk confidentiality 
guidelines and types of information covered and surveyed from judges’ perspectives as to 
what is confidential). But see Garrow, supra note 130, at 859–74, 893 (reviewing writings of 
former Supreme Court law clerks that revealed aspects of the decision-making process and 
comments by Justices about other Justices, suggesting that as to former Supreme Court law 
clerks there has been a long history of disclosures, usually after the passage of some time). 
137 See, e.g., David J. Garrow, supra note 130, at 859–75, 892–93 (based on historical review 
of disclosures by Supreme Court law clerks, author concludes there has been a “long-
standing historical tradition [of disclosure] that has developed over the past sixty years.”); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1090–1104 (arguing that former Supreme Court law clerk 
Edward Lazarus’s book Closed Chambers about Justice Blackmun and the Supreme Court 
does not violate confidentiality or other legal and ethical duties); Lane, supra note 131, at 
863–76 (reviewing Supreme Court law clerk’s duties of confidentiality and the breaches 
that occurred in The Brethren, Closed Chambers, and an article in Vanity Fair about the Bush 
v. Gore decision); Painter, supra note 130, at 1434–71 (arguing that former Supreme Court 
law clerk Edward Lazarus’s book Closed Chambers about Justice Blackmun and the Supreme 
Court violates confidentiality and other legal and ethical duties, and reviewing law clerk 
confidentiality generally).  See generally Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 
835 (1999) (excoriating Edward Lazarus’s revelations in Closed Chambers as unethical and 
immoral); Laura Krugman Ray, America Meets the Justices:  Explaining the Supreme Court to 
the General Reader, 72 TENN. L. REV. 573, 578–612 (2005) (discussing The Nine Old Men, The 
Brethren, and Closed Chambers—books about the Supreme Court based on law clerk 
information). 
138 251 U.S. 1 (1919). 
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grounds that there was no law forbidding the alleged conduct, was 
denied, and the appeal and petition for certiorari were also denied.  
Nevertheless, the prosecutor ultimately dismissed the prosecution.139  
This is one of the few examples of a breach of confidentiality by a law 
clerk during their employment discussed in the literature.  The  more 
well-known disclosures discussed below involved former Supreme 
Court law clerks who were either sources for, or authors of, books 
written primarily for the general public about the inside workings of the 
Supreme Court. 
Probably, the most famous of these was Bob Woodward’s and Scott 
Armstrong’s 1979 book, The Brethren:  Inside the Supreme Court.140  This 
bestseller chronicles the Court from the October 1969 term through June 
1976, with a focus on the personalities and interactions of the Justices, 
including private conversations and comments about other Justices, 
during the decision-making process on major cases.  Of particular 
importance here is the fact that the authors revealed that the general 
sources of their work  included “interviews with more than two hundred 
people, including several Justices, more than 170 former law clerks, and 
several dozen former employees[,]” who were promised confidentiality 
by the authors.141  Moreover, the authors stated that their sources 
provided them “internal memoranda between Justices, letters, notes 
taken at conference, case assignment sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts 
of opinions and, in several instances, drafts that were never circulated 
even to other Justices.”142 
The revelation that 170 former law clerks had contributed to The 
Brethren did not go unnoticed.  Indeed, it has drawn a firestorm of 
criticism as an egregious example of a breach of confidentiality regarding 
                                                 
139 Lebovits, supra note 96, at 34; Garrow, supra note 130, at 859; see also Chester A. 
Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices:  The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299, 
310 (1961); John B. Owens, The Clerk, the Thief, His Life as a Baker:  Ashton Embry and the 
Supreme Court Leak Scandal of 1919, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 271, 272 (2000). 
140 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 
(1979).  The Brethren, however, was not the first of its genre.  In 1936, Washington 
newspaper columnists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen wrote:  The Nine Old Men, which 
has been described as “a breezy summary of the Court’s history and the major New Deal 
cases[]” that focuses on individual Justices and gives “brief accounts of the Justices that 
expressly tie their decisions to their individual identities and experiences.”  The point was 
to present the legal realist perspective that the Court’s decisions (and Justices’ resistance to 
the New Deal) were “shaped by unconstrained individuals rather than by the impersonal 
force of law.”  Ray, supra note 137, at 579.  Unlike The Brethren, however, The Nine Old Men 
does not reveal the sources for its anecdotes and reports of verbatim private conversations.  
Id. at 580. 
141 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 140, at 3–4.  For a review of some of the more 
interesting aspects of THE BRETHREN, see Ray, supra note 137, at 589–99. 
142 WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 140, at 4. 
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what goes on in chambers.143  It also served as the impetus for the 
adoption of a law clerk code of conduct in 1981 by the United States 
Judicial Conference.144  That Code specifically states:  “‘The relationship 
between judge and law clerk is essentially a confidential one. . . .  [A law 
clerk] should never disclose to any person any confidential information 
received . . . in the course of his duties, nor should he employ such 
information for his personal gain.’”145  In 1996, the Judicial Conference 
implemented a Code of Judicial Conduct for Judicial Employees, 
including law clerks and other employees, which clarified the duty and 
duration of confidentiality.146  It provides as follows: 
A judicial employee should never disclose any 
confidential information received in the course of official 
duties except as required in the performance of such 
duties, nor should a judicial employee employ such 
information for personal gain.  A former judicial 
employee should observe the same restrictions on 
disclosure of confidential information that apply to a 
current judicial employee, except as modified by the 
appointing authority.147 
The next major controversy over Supreme Court law clerk breaches 
of confidentiality erupted with Edward Lazarus’ publication in 1998 of 
Closed Chambers:  The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside 
the Supreme Court.148  Lazarus, a law clerk to Justice Harry Blackmun 
during the Court’s 1988 term, provided detailed accounts and 
documents concerning the Court’s decision-making process in major 
cases decided that term.  During Lazarus’s service to the Court in 1989, 
the Court enacted a Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Law Clerks that 
emphasized the law clerk’s duty of confidentiality to the Justice for 
whom the clerk works and to the Court.  Canon 2 of the Code 
                                                 
143 See, e.g., Anastaplo, supra note 134, at 1053–57; David R Fine, Lex, Lies, and Audiotape, 
96 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 460–61 (1993–94); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 335–36; Painter, supra 
note 130, at 1454–55. 
144 See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS (Judicial Conference of the United States 
1981); Mahoney, supra note 96, at 329 n.43. 
145 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 3(C); see Mahoney, supra note 96, at 336 
(quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS Canon 3(C)). 
146 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES (U.S, Judicial Conference of the United 
States 1996), available at http://www. uscourts.gov./guide/vol2/ch2a.html.  Supreme 
Court employees were not covered by the Code. 
147 Id. at Canon 3(D) (emphasis added). 
148 EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS:  THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC 
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/1
2008] Invading Judicial Confidentiality 33 
specifically stated that “[a] law clerk owes the . . . Justice . . . and the 
Court . . . complete confidentiality, accuracy, and loyalty[,]” that “[t]he 
Justice relies[] . . . on confidentiality in discussing . . . performance 
of . . . judicial duties[,]” and that a law clerk “is in a position to receive 
highly confidential circulations from . . . chambers of other Justices [, [sic] 
and owes a duty of confidentiality with respect to such material similar 
to the duty owed to the Justice employing the clerk[]”; Canon 3 added 
that “[a] law clerk should never disclose to any person any confidential 
information received in the course of the law clerk’s duties, nor should 
the law clerk employ such information for personal gain.”149 
Apparently anticipating the confidentiality controversy that would 
arise from his book, Lazarus attempted to deflect criticism in an 
introductory author’s note in which he essentially stated that although 
he had insider access to information, his accounts were based on 
independent sources.150  He later also asserted that the Supreme Court 
law clerk code in effect at the time of his writing did not apply to former 
clerks.151  Lazarus’s efforts to stave off criticism proved largely 
                                                 
149 Lane, supra note 131, at 877–78 (quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR SUPREME COURT LAW 
CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Canons 2, 3 (1989)).  See Painter, 
supra note 131, at 1441–42, for a discussion of the 1989 Code.  The only sanction expressly 
mentioned in the 1989 Code was dismissal.  See id. at 1446; Chemerinsky, supra note 131, at 
1094. 
150 See LAZARUS, supra note 148 at xi, 1426.  Lazarus states: 
[I]n describing the private decision-making of the Justices, I have been 
careful to avoid disclosing information I am privy to solely because I 
was privileged to work for Justice Blackmun. . . . I have reconstructed 
what I knew and supplemented that knowledge through primary 
sources (either publicly available or provided by others) and dozens of 
interviews . . . . 
Id.  Lazarus’s most probable sources for his revelations of conference discussions and 
conversations involving other Justices and their law clerks are his interviews with “dozens 
of former clerks who agreed to speak with [him] candidly about life inside the Court.”  See 
id. at ix;  see also Painter, supra note 130, at 1438, 1452 (noting Lazarus’s reliance on 
statements by other law clerks that would also be breaches of confidentiality).  Lazarus 
apparently failed to see the ethical problem with his revealing other law clerks’ confidential 
information.  See id. at 1459 (arguing that Canon 3 of the 1989 Supreme Court Law Clerk 
Code protecting the confidentiality of “circulations . . .[among] chambers” would cover such 
communications between law clerks); Kozinski, supra note 137, at 840 (same). But see 
Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1098 (arguing 1989 Code cannot be read to apply to former 
law clerk conversations with other former claw clerks at all). 
151 See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS:  THE RISE, AND FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE 
MODERN SUPREME COURT x (1999) (author’s note to the paperback edition with the changed 
title); Kozinski, supra note 137, at 845 (recounting and critiquing Lazarus’s arguments that 
the Code should be read to only apply to current clerks);  Painter, supra note 130, at 1446–48 
(recounting and critiquing Lazarus’s arguments that the Code should be read to only apply 
to current clerks); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1093–94 (supporting Lazarus’s 
position  that the Code did not apply to former clerks). 
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ineffective, and publication was met with a flurry of book reviews and 
other critiques of Closed Chambers asserting that Lazarus had behaved 
unethically by revealing confidential information.152 
The most important reaction to Closed Chambers, however, was by the 
Supreme Court itself.153  In 1998, the Court removed much, if not all, 
ambiguity about the scope and duration of the law clerk confidentiality 
obligation when it revised the Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Law 
Clerks.154  The revised Code indicated that the duty of confidentiality 
was owed not only to the appointing Justice, but to “all other Justices 
and the Court as an institution[.]”155  This duty of confidentiality 
encompasses “[a]ll oral and written communications from the Justices or 
clerks in other chambers pertaining to the work of the court . . . [,]” 
including the outcomes, votes, identities of opinion authors in cases, 
“and the positions or preliminary ideas or views of any justice with 
respect to cases that have been before the Court, are pending before it, or 
are likely to come before it.”156  The confidentiality relationship exists 
between law clerks and other Justices, and between law clerks; “[a]ll 
intra- and inter- chambers communications are confidential and 
communications from the chambers of another Justice enjoy the same 
protections of confidentiality, including communications from one law 
clerk to another discussing the work of the Court.”157  Moreover, after 
the law clerk’s employment ends, “communications with the press are 
governed by the continuing obligations[.]”158  Finally, not only does the 
revised Code specifically state that the confidentiality obligation “is a 
                                                 
152 See, e.g., supra note 137.  For a recent summary of the reactions to Closed Chambers, see 
Ray, supra note 137, at 599–611. 
153 See Lane, supra note 131, at 868 & n.47 (noting that not only the timing suggested, but 
a contemporaneous news report stated, that the law clerk rules were tightened to 
“‘discourage [clerks] from writing tell-all books that reveal the [C]ourt’s inner workings.’”).  
It is also clear from a review of the provisions emphasizing the continuing nature of the 
confidentiality obligation and potential sanctions beyond employment, and explicitly 
including communications between law clerks for all Justices, see infra text accompanying 
notes 154–58, that the revised code is responsive to Lazarus’s arguments in defense of his 
actions in Closed Chambers.  See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
154 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
(June 15, 1998).  See Lane, supra note 131, at 877–79 for the relevant part of the Code as 
revised.  Interestingly, the law clerk code itself apparently became a confidential document 
and is not available.  Id. at 868 n.47; Todd Peppers, Law Clerks and Confidentiality, EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES, Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/ 
03/law_clerks_and_.html (stating that Todd Peppers in writing a book on Supreme Court 
Law Clerks was told by the Court and Justice Rehnquist’s Chambers that it was not 
publicly available). 
155 Lane, supra note 131, at 877 (emphasis omitted). 
156 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
157 Id. at 877–78 (emphasis omitted). 
158 Id. at 879 (emphasis omitted). 
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continuing one” that applies to former law clerks, it provides that this is 
a “condition[] of their employment, as attorneys, and as members or 
future members of the bar.  Any breach of these provisions is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice and therefore will subject the law clerk to 
appropriate sanctions.”159 
Despite the clarity of the revised Supreme Court Code of Conduct on 
the issue of law clerk confidentiality, the Supreme Court’s controversial 
involvement in the 2000 presidential election in Bush v. Gore 160  provided 
the next impetus for major breaches of that duty.  Four years after the 
Court’s decision, writer David Margolick relied on interviews with 
former Supreme Court law clerks in his Vanity Fair magazine article “The 
Path to Florida,”  detailing the behind the scenes, and supposedly 
political machinations, of the Court’s decision.161  However, none of the 
safeguards in place at the time—the tradition of confidentiality, the 
recent Law Clerk Code, and apparently the fact that the law clerks had 
signed a confidentiality agreement with the Court when they accepted 
their positions did162—prevented the breaches.  According to Margolick, 
the law clerks justified their actions because they believed that the Court 
had acted improperly in taking and deciding Bush v. Gore as it did.163 
Not surprisingly, as with the publication of Closed Chambers and The 
Brethren, the public criticized the law clerks’ disclosures to Margolick.164  
In fact, “90 prominent lawyers and former Supreme Court law clerks, 
including former attorneys general Richard Thornburgh and William 
Barr” took the unusual step of issuing a joint statement condemning 
                                                 
159 Id. (emphasis omitted).  This latter provision clearly ties the confidentiality obligation 
to the Rules and Codes of Professional Conduct and potential disciplinary sanctions 
applicable to attorneys through bar authorities. See supra note 87; infra text accompanying 
notes 397–416.  The provision thereby expands the explicit sanctions beyond those, such as 
dismissal, that could be imposed by the Justice for whom the clerk worked as reflected in 
the 1989 Code. See Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1094; Lane, supra note 131, at 871 
(quoting CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW CLERKS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Canon 6 (1989)).  Another possible sanction that might be available would be a breach of 
contract claim against the former clerk.  See Lane, supra note 131, at 872 n.60; Comment, 
supra note 101, at 1248; infra text accompanying notes 358–61. 
160 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
161 See David Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 4, 2004, at 310–12, 320, 
available at http://makethemaccountable.com/articles/The_Path_To_Florida.htm.  Among 
the accusations were that conservative members of the Court—Justices Rehnquist, 
Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas—acted as partisans rather than neutral jurists.  See 
id. at 319–22, 355–59. 
162 Id. at 320 n.2. 
163 Id. (stating the “‘extraordinary situation . . . [justifies] breaking an obligation we’d 
otherwise honor[]’”). 
164 See, e.g.,  Lane, supra note 131, at 863–67. 
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Margolick’s law clerk sources’ breaches of confidentiality.165  The article 
even spurred a call for a congressional investigation into the alleged law 
clerk misconduct because, as put by Texas Republican Senator John 
Cornyn, “‘[i]f members of the judiciary cannot rely on the confidentiality 
of their deliberations and discussions with law clerks, the judiciary as we 
know it simply could not function.’”166 
Understandably, with the much diminished press and academic 
interest in the lower federal and state courts’ operations, instances of 
breaches of the duty of confidentiality by law clerks in those courts have 
received little attention.167  As will be discussed in Part III.C below, most 
reported cases involving questions of law clerk confidentiality in these 
courts have arisen in circumstances in which information was sought 
from present or former law clerks as part of an official investigation or 
court proceeding.168  However, one example of a somewhat unusual and 
blatant breach of confidentiality involved John N. Gregorich, a former 
Illinois Appellate Court research staff attorney,169 who used confidential 
information as part of his political campaign for a judgeship against one 
of the judges he had worked for on the court.  The confidential 
information, which the staff attorney argued demonstrated the judge’s 
unfitness, consisted of an internal court memorandum in which the 
appellate judge had made a comment about a then-pending case—that 
“he was willing to ‘chalk up [his] present reservations to [his] chronic 
state of confusion about civil law and (once again) simply slink away in 
the night with a quiet concurrence.’”170  In response to the charge that the 
former research attorney had “failed to act in a manner consistent with 
                                                 
165 Tony Mauro, Lawyers Bemoan Breach:  Prominent Attorneys Blast Law Clerks Blast Clerks 
for “Bush v. Gore” Leaks to the Press, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 4. 
166 Toney Mauro, Chasing Clerks, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at 3. 
167 A recent novel written by a  former law clerk for a judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, has received some attention.  See SAIRA RAO, CHAMBERMAID 
(2007).  CHAMBERMAID has been described as follows:  “With Chambermaid, debut novelist 
Saira Rao breaks the code of silence surrounding the clerkship and boldly takes us into the 
mysterious world of the third branch of US government, where the leaders are not elected 
and can never be fired.” Powell’s Books, http://www.powells.com/biblio?show= 
9780802118493 (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).  Eighteen percent of the state and federal court 
judges who responded to a 1981 survey by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
indicated that they believed their court had experienced a breach in confidentiality by law 
clerks.  Comment, supra note 101, at 1238 & n.43.  The survey included a sampling of 
federal and state appellate and trial court judges, in addition to all United States Supreme 
Court Justices.  Id. at 1263. 
168 See infra text accompanying notes 262–323. 
169 A research staff attorney in the Illinois Appellate Court is generally the functional 
equivalent of a law clerk.  See Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1995). 
170 Carol McHugh Saunders, Judge Candidate Who Used Court Memo Faces Suspension, CHI. 
DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 16, 1996, at 1. 
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the integrity and independence of the judiciary, engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty[,] and breached his fiduciary duty by improperly 
revealing the contents of the confidential memo[,]” the Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Committee recommended the attorney be 
suspended for four years.171 
IV.  MECHANISMS OF IMPOSING AND PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. Codes and Agreements 
As the foregoing discussion reflects, the law clerk confidentiality 
obligation no longer is grounded on mere tradition or customary ethics.  
Courts have employed various measures to emphasize the importance of 
confidentiality and ensure compliance.172  As discussed above, federal 
courts have adopted increasingly expansive codes of ethics, like the 1981 
Code of Conduct for Law Clerks,173 the 1996 Code of Conduct for 
Judicial Employees,174 the 1989 Code of Conduct for Law Clerks of the 
Supreme Court of the United States,175 and the 1998 revised Code of 
Conduct for Supreme Court Law Clerks.176  Similar codes have been 
enacted by many state courts,177 and some state courts also require law 
                                                 
171 Id.  Interestingly, the same research attorney was involved in an unsuccessful 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 suit, at about the same time, in which he argued that he had been fired for 
engaging in union-organizing activities.  In that case, the Seventh Circuit found that the 
staff research attorney-judge relationship, including confidentiality, formed a basis for 
finding that the judge, who fired the staff research attorney, was entitled to qualified 
immunity because he could reasonably believe that such an individual should refrain from 
an adversarial role to the court.  Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 417–18. 
172 See Mahoney, supra note 96, at 336 & n.65; Comment, supra note 101, at 1243. 
173 See supra text accompanying note 144. 
174 See supra text accompanying note 146. 
175 See supra text accompanying note 149. 
176 See supra text accompanying note 154. 
177 See, e.g., Faye A. Silas, Mums the Word:  The Law Clerk as Confidant, A.B.A. J., July 1985, 
at 36, 36 (1985) (discussing South Carolina Code); ARIZONA CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES 
AND JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES Canon 3(D) & Commentary (Aug. 1997) (imposing confidentiality 
obligation), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/hr/Forms/CodeofConduct.pdf; 
Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 2006-8 (stating that “‘Deliberative Privilege 
and Case Discussions in the Supreme Court[]’” provides that discussions, memos, and 
correspondence regarding case deliberations are permanently confidential, except with 
regard to certain judicial misconduct), quoted in Richard D. McLellan, Commentary:  
Proper Time to Divulge Information on Charges Against Fellow Justices Is Now, MICH. LAW. 
WKLY., Feb. 12, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2846279; MODEL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
JUDICIAL EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE OF NEVADA Canon 3(D) (March 2004) (imposing 
confidentiality for present and former judicial employees), avaliable at http://www.nv 
supremecourt.us/documents/misc/jc_employeeConduct.pdf); RULES OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE R. 46 Canon 3 (setting out confidentiality 
obligations applicable to present and former law clerks), available at http://www.courts. 
state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-46-3.htm; RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW 
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clerks to sign confidentiality oaths.178  A large number of courts rely on 
the provision of written or verbal guidance to law clerks about their duty 
of confidentiality.179 
Massachusetts, where lawyers Crossen, Curry, and Donahue 
induced a breach of confidentiality by a state Superior Court law clerk, 
does not have a law clerk code of conduct.  However, at least since the 
early 1990s, Superior Court law clerks, as well as legal interns working 
for the court, have been given written guidelines emphasizing the law 
clerks’ confidentiality obligations, particularly as to the judges’ decision-
making process and opinions.180  Moreover, as a condition of 
employment, law clerks must sign a confidentiality agreement.181  In fact, 
the law clerk involved in Curry was required to sign a form employment 
contract in which he agreed to the conditions of employment that had 
been set out in the offer of employment letter from the Chief Justice of 
the Superior Court, including the duty of confidentiality.182 
                                                                                                             
JERSEY, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIARY EMPLOYEES Appendix I Code of Conduct for 
Judiciary Employees, Cannon 2 (Feb. 2004) (imposing confidentiality restrictions on current 
and former employees), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/appemploy. 
htm.  Prior to the enactment of many of these Law Clerk Codes, some courts dealt with the 
issues through local rules.  See Comment, supra note 101, at 1236. 
178 See, e.g., Silas, supra note 177, at 36 (stating that South Carolina and Iowa require oaths 
of confidentiality);  Comment, supra note 101, at 1236, 1248 & n.102; Peter N. Thompson, 
Confidentiality in Chambers:  Is Private Judicial Action the Public’s Business, BENCH & B. MINN., 
Feb. 2005, at 14, 18 (stating that Minnesota Court of Appeals requires law clerk 
confidentiality agreements). 
179 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 135, at 5–7; Silas, supra note 177, at 36 (stating 
that oral instruction is the most common practice); comment, supra note 101, at 1236.  A 
nationwide survey of a sampling of state and federal judges conducted in 1981, following 
the publication of The Brethren, showed that 94% of judges relied on oral instruction and 
about 50% provided manuals to law clerks in addition to oral instructions.  Comment, supra 
note 101, at 1236 & nn. 35, 37. 
180 See MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE SUPERIOR COURT 
CLERKSHIP 3–6 (Massachusetts Superior Court 1993–94), reprinted in Exhibit 33, at 3–6, Bar 
Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 (on file with author); Superior Court Ethical Guidelines 
(on file with author). 
181 See, e.g., Letter of Acceptance to Superior Chief Justice Barbara Rouse regarding 
Employment as a Law Clerk to the Massachusetts Superior Court for the September 1, 2008 
to August 31, 2009 term (on file with author). 
182 Exhibit 11, Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1 (Letter offer and employment contract 
part of the record and on file with author).   The law clerk testified that he understood that 
“he was not supposed to reveal information gained in chambers to third parties and that 
his obligation to maintain that confidentiality was to last ‘forever.’”  Bar Counsel v. Curry I, 
supra note 1, at 55. 
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B. Attorney-Client Confidentiality and Privilege 
It has also been suggested that law clerks function as lawyers for 
their judges, essentially the way an attorney represents a client.183  This 
raises the question of whether the attorney-client confidentiality 
protections of the Rules of Professional Conduct184 and the common-law 
attorney-client privilege185 would require law clerks to maintain the 
confidentiality as a general matter, at least where a law clerk has been 
admitted to the bar and is therefore covered by a jurisdiction’s law on 
confidentiality protections.  Although the application of the rules of 
professional conduct and the attorney-client privilege would have little 
significance where law clerks are subject to a special code of conduct that 
includes a confidentiality obligation, or where a jurisdiction has 
recognized the existence of a judge-law clerk evidentiary privilege,186 in 
those jurisdictions that have not adopted such codes, applying the 
lawyer rules of professional conduct would establish clearer and more 
uniform principles regarding a law clerk’s continuing duty of 
                                                 
183 See Crump, supra note 100, at 240 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Norman Black); 
Kozinski, supra note 137, at 842 & n.38 (analogizing a judge-law clerk relationship to an 
attorney-client relationship); Comment, supra note 101, at 1245–46 (same); Painter, supra 
note 130, at 1447–48, 1461–62 (same); Peter N. Thompson, supra note 178, at 17 (suggesting 
lawyer code and privileges apply);  see also, In re Cohen’s Estate, 174 N.Y.S. 427, 427–28 
(Sur. Ct. 1919) (analogizing the privilege for communications between a judicial officer and 
his clerk/stenographer assistants and the attorney-client privilege).  But see Chemerinsky, 
supra note 130, at 1095–96 (rejecting attorney-client privilege analogy). 
184 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.6, which provides in 
relevant part that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent[]” or it is permitted by an exception to the 
rule (e.g., “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm[]” or “to prevent 
the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of 
which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services[]”).  Id.  This broad principle of 
confidentiality applies to “all information relating to the representation, whatever its 
source.”  Id. at cmt. 3.  The earlier Code of Professional Responsibility contained a similar 
provision. Under DR 4-101, attorneys were required to preserve the “[c]onfidences and 
[s]ecrets” of their clients unless otherwise authorized by the client or the rule. MODEL CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101.  Confidences were information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and “‘secret’ refers to other information gained in the professional 
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would 
be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.”  MASSACHUSETTS 
CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES, DR 4-101(A) (1981). 
185 The attorney client privilege is an evidentiary privilege that shields, from compulsory 
evidentiary production, the testimony of a lawyer about confidential communications with 
the client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or services.  See In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 
1263, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING 9-25 to -26 (3d. ed. 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS §§ 68–70 (2000); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2003). 
186 See discussion infra Parts IV.C.1–2. 
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confidentiality, as well as the possibility of disciplinary sanctions for 
violations by former clerks.187 
As Judge Kozinski has noted, “[l]aw clerks perform many of the 
functions of lawyers:  They research the law, provide legal advice, and 
draft legal documents.”188  Moreover, at least a major portion of the 
rationale underlying both the attorney-client privilege and the rule of 
confidentiality protection—that confidentiality regarding client 
information is necessary so that the client may freely and candidly 
communicate with the lawyer and, thereby, obtain the best legal advice 
and promote the ends of justice—189 would seem equally applicable to 
the relationship between the law clerk and the judge.  Similarly, the 
concept of loyalty underlies both the judge-law clerk and attorney-client 
relationship.190  Moreover, where the rules of client confidentiality 
protection or attorney-client privilege apply, they survive the 
termination of the relationship,191 a principle that is consistent with the 
law clerk code of confidentiality provisions.192 
Apart from the fact that lawyer rules of conduct only apply to 
members of a jurisdiction’s bar, thereby limiting their impact since law 
clerks do not necessarily have to be admitted to the bar to work for 
judges, the more significant problem with applying lawyer rules of 
professional conduct relates to the definition of who is a client in the 
government context for purposes of the rule.193  The ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct and the rules of the states based thereon do not 
expressly address the confidentiality aspect of the judge-law clerk 
relationship.  The comments to the lawyer confidentiality rules, however, 
do discuss the applicability of the rule to government lawyers.  For 
example, the lawyer codes of many states specifically indicate that the 
“requirement of maintaining confidentiality of information relating to 
                                                 
187 See Comment, supra note 101, at 1247. 
188 Kozinski, supra note 137, at 842 n.38. 
189 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c 
(2000) (“The rationale for the [attorney-client] privilege is that confidentiality enhances the 
value of client-lawyer communications and hence the efficacy of legal services.”). 
190 See Comment, supra note 101, at 1243–44; Wald, supra note 100, at 153–54 (stating that 
judges expect “unambiguous[]” “loyal[ty]”); supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text. 
191 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(2) (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 77 (2000); see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 
U.S. 399, 407–10 (1998) (holding that privilege applies even after client’s death); In re John 
Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70–72 (Mass. 1990) (same). 
192 See supra notes 160–17 and accompanying text. 
193 See Comment, supra note 101, at 1245–46; Joshua Panas, Note, The Miguel Estrada 
Confirmation Hearings and the Client of a Government Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 
547–48 (2004); Thompson, supra note 178, at 17. 
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representation applies to government lawyers who may disagree with 
the policy goals that their representation is designed to advance.”194  
Similarly, the comments to the ABA Model Rule provision relating to a 
lawyer’s responsibilities to entity clients not only make clear that the 
Rule 1.6 confidentiality obligation extends to entities, but also directly 
states that the rule is applicable to “government organizations.”195 
While there is no obvious reason that judges or the judicial branch 
should not be generally encompassed within the term government 
organization, the difficulty arises in precisely determining the “client[]” 
to whom the confidentiality duty is owed—i.e., who would have access 
to the information.196  The answer to the question may vary depending 
on the context or particular governmental structure, as well as the 
requirements of constitutions, statutes, and regulations.197  The Rules of 
Professional Conduct provide only minimal guidance.  Acknowledging 
the difficulty of the issue, the comment to Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.13 states as follows: 
Defining precisely the identity of the client and 
prescribing the resulting obligations of [government] 
lawyers . . . is a matter beyond the scope of these [r]ules.  
Although in some circumstances the client may be a 
specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, 
such as the executive branch, or the government as a 
whole. . . . Thus, when the client is a governmental 
organization, a different balance may be appropriate 
between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that 
the wrongful act is prevented or rectified, for public 
business is involved.198 
                                                 
194 See, e.g., RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR R. 4-1.6 cmt. (2007), available at http:// 
www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/BC9881429B46D73985256BBC004B9AEC; MASS. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2003).  This language was part of the ABA Model 
Rules until it was deleted as unnecessary during the Ethics 2000 revisions since the rule 
itself contained no exception regarding government lawyers.  See ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION, 
REPORT ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, available at http://www.abanet. 
org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule16rem.html. 
195 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmts. 2, 6 (2003). 
196 This is a question that has received substantial attention as to governmental lawyers 
generally.  See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whisteblower:  Confidentiality and the 
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 292, 296–98 (1991); Panas, supra note 193, at 
546–59. 
197 See Cramton, supra note 196, at 296; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 9 
(2003). 
198 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6 (2003) (citation omitted).  Rule 1.13 
addresses the responsibilities of lawyers representing entities, particularly where the 
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The Restatement is slightly more helpful.  The comments to Section 
97 recognize that a universal definition of the government lawyer’s client 
is not possible, but that the identity of the client may vary depending on 
the context and the functions being performed.  While recognizing that 
as a general matter it may be asserted that the government lawyer 
represents the public or the public interests or perhaps the government 
as a whole, it indicates that this is usually not that helpful.  Instead, a 
better approach in many instances is to regard an agency and those who 
are empowered to direct that agency as to a particular matter as the 
client.  Ultimately, given the variety of forms and structures of 
government, the determination of the client’s identity will depend on the 
circumstances, considering “such factors as the terms of retention or 
other manifestations of the reasonable understanding of the lawyer and 
the hiring authority involved, the anticipated scope and nature of the 
lawyer’s services, particular regulatory arrangements relevant to the 
lawyer’s work, and the history and traditions of the office.”199 
Thus, it is theoretically possible for the government lawyer’s client, 
including the government judicial law clerk’s client, to be viewed as the 
general public, the government as a whole, the branch of government for 
whom the lawyer works, the agency (acting through its administrators) 
for whom the lawyer works, or the agency official for whom the lawyer 
works on public business.  Nevertheless, the models that seem most 
appropriate in the context of the confidentiality duty, and which seem to 
be endorsed by most authorities, would be either the agency or branch 
model.200  Unless otherwise mandated by statute, court order, or other 
                                                                                                             
lawyer knows that a constituent of the organization is engaging in activity that is illegal or 
violates a legal obligation to the corporation and is likely to injure the corporation 
substantially.  Id. 
199 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000) (citation 
omitted); see also Comment,  supra note 99, at 1246–47 (citing Opinion 73-1 of the Federal 
Bar Association to the effect that the government lawyer’s client, in terms of immediate 
confidentiality obligations, is the employing agency and its administration); Panas, supra 
note 193, at 549–50 (discussing Federal Bar Associations 1990 Model Federal Rules under 
which the lawyer represents the employing agency, but obligations may be affected by 
“more general obligations to the United States[]”). 
200 See Cramton, supra note 196, at 298;  Panas, supra note 193, at 556–57, 560–61; 
Comment, supra note 101, at 1246–47; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 97 cmt. c (2000).  The general public or public interest client model can be 
criticized for being too amorphous or subjective, giving too much discretion to the lawyer, 
interfering with the lawyer’s counselor functions, raising separation of powers concerns, 
ignoring the democratic process, and providing virtually no guidance.  See Cramton, supra 
note 196, at 298–300; Panas, supra note 193, at 552.  Similarly, critics of the government-as-a-
whole approach assert that it would violate separation of powers.  Id. at 554. 
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law,201 the law clerk’s obligation would run to the judges for whom the 
law clerk worked and to those judges in charge of administration of the 
court, as they conduct public business.202  Although it is conceivable that 
in some circumstances confidential information that a law clerk has 
about a particular judge would have to be disclosed to others within the 
judicial branch or in law enforcement,203 the duty of confidentiality 
would bar disclosures like those in the Curry matter made to private 
individuals outside the government.204 
While the issue has generated substantial debate,205 it has been well-
accepted that the attorney-client privilege generally applies to the 
government client,206 and much of the previous discussion regarding the 
identity of the aforementioned client in the context of the rule of conduct 
confidentiality would be applicable here.207  Recent federal court 
decisions, however, have indicated that at least in the context of criminal 
grand jury proceedings seeking compelled testimony by government 
lawyers, the issue of to whom the duty of confidentiality is owed and to 
whom the privilege belongs is more complicated. 
As part of the “Whitewater” investigation into the involvement of 
President Clinton and Hillary Clinton with a savings and loan and land 
                                                 
201 See RESTAMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. d (2000).  See 
Cramton, supra note 196, at 303–14 for a discussion of the ways in which statutory and 
regulatory provision, including whistleblower statutes, might impact the duties of the 
government lawyer. 
202 See Comment, supra note 101, at 1247. 
203 For example, case law would suggest that in some circumstances a government 
lawyer can be compelled to testify about client information as part of a grand jury 
proceeding investigating criminal activity.   See infra text accompanying notes 206–22. 
204 Even if the particular matter fell within one of the exceptions to the lawyer conduct 
rule confidentiality obligations, such as the authorization in ABA Model Rule 1.6(b) where 
the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is necessary “to prevent reasonably certain death 
or substantial bodily harm[]” or “to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud 
that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests . . . of 
another and in furtherance of which the client has used . . . the lawyer’s services[,]” the 
disclosure would be limited.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2007).  As the 
comment to the rule points out, authorized disclosures are limited to those necessary to 
prevent the harm identified in the rule.  “If the disclosure will be made in connection with 
a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits . . . access to 
the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it . . . .”  Id. at cmt. 14.  Thus, if a law 
clerk reasonably believed that a judge had used the law clerk’s services to engage in fraud 
or illegal conduct that would substantially injure a party, the proper recourse under the 
rule would appear to be raising the matter within the court system, probably to a judge 
with administrative responsibility.  See id. 
205 For a recent review of the issue, see Nancy Leong, Attorney-Client Privilege in the Public 
Sector:  A Survey of Government Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 163, 166–73 & n.50 (2007). 
206 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 74 (2000); Leong, supra 
note 205, at 165. 
207 See Panas, supra note 193, at 544–46. 
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development corporation, the Office of Independent Counsel 
subpoenaed for grand jury proceedings certain documents relating to  
meetings between the President, Hillary Clinton, and White House 
Counsel.  The White House asserted that the documents were protected 
by the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection.208  
Treating the case as a dispute between two entities of the federal 
government—the Office of Independent Counsel and the White House—
the court addressed the narrow issue of whether one of those entities 
could assert the attorney-client privilege in the face of a grand jury 
subpoena in the context of a criminal investigation.209  While the basis of 
the court’s decision that the privilege would not apply is not entirely 
clear from a doctrinal perspective, the court emphasized the following 
factors:  the criminal investigatory context and the importance of the 
information to that investigation, the strong public interest in disclosure 
of information relevant to public official wrongdoing, its view that there 
would be minimal impact of the disclosure on the governmental entity 
since the entity itself is not subject to criminal liability, and its view that 
there would be a lack of impact on the government attorney’s advice as 
to future conduct.210 
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia confronted virtually the same issue.  The Office of 
Independent Counsel sought information for a grand jury investigation 
from Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey as part of the now 
expanded Independent Counsel investigation into whether Monica 
Lewinsky or others had engaged in perjury or obstruction of justice in 
connection with the civil suit against President Clinton by Paula Jones.  
Lindsey refused to answer questions about certain conversations with 
the President, asserting the attorney-client privilege.211  While the court 
recognized the existence of the government attorney-client privilege that 
was “rather absolute” in civil contexts, the question here was whether 
such a privilege existed in a grand jury investigation instigated by one 
part of the government against another.212  The court’s conclusion that 
the attorney-client privilege does not apply in this context rests heavily 
on its view that the government lawyer’s loyalty lies not only with the 
agency official or agency, but extends to serving the public interest by 
providing evidence of criminal wrongdoing by public officials.213 
                                                 
208 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913–15 (8th Cir. 1997). 
209 Id. at 915. 
210 Id. at 918–24. 
211 In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
212 See id. at 1269–72. 
213 See id. at 1273–74.  In support of this conclusion, the court relied in part on the policy 
embodied in a federal statute that required Executive Branch officials to report possible 
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The preceding two cases involved intra-federal government criminal 
disputes where, arguably, a government lawyer’s duties can be seen to 
extend beyond the immediate official or agency for whom the lawyer 
works, consistent with the general public, or government-as-a-whole, as 
client perspective.214  Two other recent cases reaching inconsistent results 
have addressed the issue in the context of a criminal investigation by the 
federal government into the activities of state governments.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the attorney-
client privilege was not available in In re:  A Witness Before the Special 
Grand Jury 2000–02,215 a case involving a federal grand jury investigation 
into allegations of bribery in the Illinois Secretary of State’s office.  When 
federal prosecutors by grand jury subpoena sought the testimony of the 
Department of State Chief Legal Counsel Roger Bickel regarding 
conversations he had in his official capacity with the then Secretary of 
State, the former Secretary of State invoked the attorney-client 
privilege.216  Accepting the parties’ position that the privilege applies to 
government lawyers in the civil context, the court saw the issue as 
whether the privilege should apply in criminal proceedings where the 
government lawyer was representing a government official.217  The court 
adopted much of the reasoning of the earlier Eighth and D.C. Circuit 
decisions in concluding that the privilege would not apply.  In particular, 
the court emphasized that in the context of criminal proceedings against 
government officials, government lawyers have a higher duty than 
merely representing an individual client; instead, they must serve the 
public interest and ensure compliance with the law, as well as facilitate 
an open and accountable government.218 
In a very similar case involving a federal investigation into 
allegations of bribery in the Connecticut Governor’s Office, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a contrary 
conclusion on the privilege when federal prosecutors subpoenaed the 
Governor’s former Chief Legal Counsel to testify regarding 
conversations with the Governor and his staff.219  Reversing a district 
                                                                                                             
violations of federal criminal law to the Attorney General.  See id. at 1274 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 
535(b)).  The court noted that public officials who want complete confidentiality can obtain 
personal, rather than governmental, counsel.  Id. at 1276. 
214 See Panas, supra note 193, at 512–54. 
215 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002). 
216 Id. at 290–91. 
217 Id. at 291–92. 
218 Id. at 293–94.  The court rejected the argument, based on federalism, that the privilege 
should exist because of fact that the case involved a state lawyer and state client that were 
involved in a federal criminal investigation.  Id. at 294–95. 
219 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 528–29 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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court decision that had rejected the attorney-client privilege based on 
public interest reasons, the court was unwilling to accept the proposition 
that the public interest invariably lies with the disclosure of information 
about possible criminal wrongdoing to a grand jury.220  Instead, the court 
not only recognized the applicability of the privilege to government 
lawyers in private civil litigation disputes, but also found that the 
general instrumental rationale for the applicability of the privilege—to 
induce candor by clients so that lawyers can receive all necessary 
information to render and act upon the best legal advice—is equally if 
not more applicable to the government lawyer and client.221  In essence, 
the court believed that the public interest served by the privilege 
outweighed the general public interest in law enforcement and 
accountability served through grand jury proceedings. 
The recent cases on the government attorney-client privilege, in the 
context of grand jury criminal investigations of government officials, 
should have relatively little impact on the availability of the privilege in 
the judge-law clerk relationship.  At most, they suggest that where a 
judge is being investigated for criminal wrongdoing by government 
prosecutors, the attorney-client privilege might not be found to exist 
with regard to a grand jury subpoena of a law clerk’s confidential 
information relating to advice and discussions on legal issues relevant to 
that investigation.  As will be discussed in sections IV.C.1 and IV.C.2 
below, this result would be consistent with the result under a 
particularized limited judge-law clerk privilege that has been adopted by 
some jurisdictions.  For most cases, however, including those involving 
civil litigation like the Curry matter, the attorney-client privilege should 
be available.222 
                                                 
220 Id. at 534–35. 
221 Id. at 533–35.  The court stated as follows: 
It is crucial that government officials[] . . . be encouraged to seek out 
and receive fully informed legal advice.  Upholding the privilege 
furthers a culture in which consultation with government lawyers is 
accepted as a normal, desirable, and even indispensable part of 
conducting public business.  Abrogating the privilege undermines that 
culture and thereby impairs the public interest. 
Id. at 534.  The court also noted that the Connecticut legislature had recognized this by 
enacting a statute that applied the privilege absolutely to government lawyers.  Id. at 534. 
222 Commentators who have rejected the analogy to, or applicability of, attorney-client 
confidentiality and privilege to law clerks have done so because they have viewed these 
doctrines as inconsistent with their perception of the duty of confidentiality of law clerks, 
largely because they see attorney-client confidentiality as a permanent bar to disclosure, 
whereas they have argued that law clerk confidentiality does not extend indefinitely after 
employment, see, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 1095, 1100, or that the attorney client 
privilege is absolute, whereas law clerks should be able to disclose information where 
relevant to a specific proceeding that involves the investigation of judicial wrongdoing.  See 
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C. Judicial Deliberations Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest recognized privilege for 
confidential communications.223  One of the most recent privileges to be 
formally recognized has been referred to as the judicial privilege, the 
judicial proceedings privilege, or the judicial deliberations privilege.224  
Given its relatively infrequent invocation, the exact source and precise 
boundaries of this privilege have not been clearly identified.  
Nevertheless, like other testimonial privileges, at its core, this privilege, 
when applicable, shields from compelled or voluntary disclosure a 
judge’s deliberative thoughts and communications among judges and 
their staff, including law clerks.225 
                                                                                                             
Comment, supra note 101, at 1260–61.  As previously discussed, current law clerks’ codes 
do make the duty of confidentiality permanent.  See supra notes 133, 156–57, 175, 180 and 
accompanying text.  Moreover, the most recent case law on the government lawyer 
attorney-client privilege would not apply the privilege in a criminal grand jury 
investigation of government official wrongdoing.  See supra text accompanying notes 213–
16.  It should also be noted that the “[c]rime or [f]raud” exception to the attorney-client 
privilege would vitiate the privilege, where a lawyer is consulted by the client for 
assistance in committing a crime or fraud or where the client uses the lawyer’s services to 
commit a crime or fraud.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 82 (2000). 
223 See Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1455 
(1985) [hereinafter Developments]; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981); 
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).  Cases from as early as 1577 
acknowledge the existence of the attorney client privilege.  Developments, supra, at 1456.  
Other evidentiary communication privileges that have been widely recognized include the 
spousal, doctor-patient, clergy, and psychiatrist-patient privileges.  See id. at 1456–63. 
224 The term “[j]udicial [p]rivilege” has been used in a variety of contexts to refer to not 
only the evidentiary privilege that exists with regard to confidential communications 
between judges and their law clerks, see, e.g., 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5674 (1992 & Supp. 2007); Robert S. Catz & 
Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1987); Kevin C. Milne, The Doctrine of 
Judicial Privilege:  The Historical and Constitutional Basis Supporting a Privilege for the Federal 
Judiciary, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 213, 213 (1987), but also to doctrines that are generally 
unrelated to the type of evidentiary privilege at issue here. Most often, the term has been 
used to refer to the doctrine of tort immunity for allegedly defamatory statements made in 
the course of judicial proceedings.  See, e.g., 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 8.1, 
at 8-1 to -5 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that common law absolute privilege for judicial 
proceedings dates at least to 1772 for civil and criminal case participants); Robert E. 
Nunley, Judicial Privilege:  Does It Have a Role in Military Courts-Martial?, 138 MIL. L. REV. 53, 
53 & n.2.  It has also been used generally in the context of judicial immunity to describe all 
judicially created privileges and a descriptive label for a court’s right to engage in certain 
activities or to summarize or comment on particular matters.  See id; Catz & Lange, supra, at 
121–22.  To avoid confusion and to achieve a more accurate descriptive label, the term 
“judicial deliberations privilege” will be used here. 
225 See infra text accompanying notes 262–89, 304–23; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 89–
90; Milne, supra note 222, at 213; Nunley, supra note 224, at 55. 
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Before addressing the history and details of the judicial deliberations 
privilege, a brief review of the development of evidentiary privileges is 
appropriate for contextual background.  These privileges generally are 
based on a determination that other societal interests outweigh the goal 
of truth seeking.226  The most commonly asserted bases for 
communication privileges are that such privileges are necessary (1) to 
assure candor and openness in desirable communications between 
individuals in certain relationships that will ultimately serve society’s 
interests and (2) to protect the privacy expectations inherent in those 
relationships.227  Moreover, in the context of government privileges, 
preservation of constitutional separation of powers is implicated.228   
As Professor Wigmore stated, as to the first instrumental rationale, 
the following four conditions should exist for the establishment of a 
privilege: 
(1)  The communications must originate in a confidence 
that they will not be disclosed.  (2)  This element of 
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relation between the parties.  (3)  The 
relation must be one which in the opinion of the 
community ought to be sedulously fostered.  (4)  The 
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure 
of the communications must be greater than the benefit 
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.229 
                                                 
226 Developments, supra note 223 at 1454; Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-
Critical Analysis:  The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 
74 WASH. L REV. 913, 982 (1999); Denise P. Lindberg, The Accountant-Client Privilege:  Does It 
and Should It Survive the Death of the Client?, 1987 BYU L. REV. 1271, 1291 (1987); Note, 
Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100 HARV. L. REV. 910, 928 (1987). 
227 Developments, supra note 223, at 1471–72, 1481–83; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 95–
96; James J. Dalessio, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusion of Derivative Evidence:  
Commentary and Analysis, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 625, 631–38 (1989).  Some commentators 
have argued that the privileges are actually established to benefit those in power or “as a 
means of preserving the image and legitimacy of the legal system.”  Developments, supra 
note 223, at 1493–98, 1498–1500; see Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 98–100.  Critics of 
evidentiary privileges attack them primarily on the ground that no empirical support exists 
for the instrumental rationale that privileges will encourage candid communication.  In 
other words, whether people have knowledge that a privilege exists or is available has no 
bearing on their likelihood of candid communication.  Developments, supra note 223, at 
1474–75; Leong, supra note 205, at 187–92.  For a review of the critiques of the rationales for 
evidentiary privileges, see Developments in the Law, supra note 223, at 1472–83. 
228 See infra text accompanying notes 239, 249, 257, 269; Milne, supra note 224, at 213–14; 
Nunley, supra note 224, at 68–72, 78–82; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 119. 
229 See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at 527 
(John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/1
2008] Invading Judicial Confidentiality 49 
While evidentiary privileges initially were created by common law, 
subsequently they have been created by statute or constitution.230  The 
attorney-client and the spousal communication privileges are early 
examples of the common-law privileges.231  In the Nineteenth Century, 
states began supplanting common-law privileges with privilege 
statutes.232  In the mid-to-late Twentieth Century, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence that contained an article on privileges, 
including the attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, and clergy-
communicant privileges, which were ultimately adopted by many states, 
at least in substantial part.233  Examples of constitutionally-based 
testimonial privileges are the legislative privilege arising from the 
Speech and Debate Clause,234 the implied executive privilege, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination.235 
Tracing the precise origins of the judicial deliberations privilege is 
difficult, in part because its existence may have been presumed long 
                                                 
230 See Developments, supra note 223, at 1454–71; Nunley, supra note 224, at 55–59.  For a 
concise overview of the developments of privilege law in American courts, see 
Developments, supra note 223, at 1454–71. 
231 Developments, supra note 223, at 1456–57; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 93–94. 
232 Developments, supra note 223, at 1458; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 100; Nunley, 
supra note 224, at 57–58. 
233 Developments, supra note 223, at 1462–63; see UNIF. R. EVID. Art. V (1974); 13 U.L.A. 
2009 (1980).  Privilege law in federal courts remained largely unsettled and non-uniform 
until the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, with the courts relying on 
state statutory law, state or federal common law, federal statutes, and the Constitution in 
various contexts and times.  See Developments, supra note 223, at 1463–66; Nunley, supra note 
224, at 58.  An unsuccessful attempt at specific codification of nine testimonial privileges 
was made in Article V of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence transmitted to Congress 
for approval in 1973.  As a result of the very substantial controversy over this rule, 
Congress substituted the current Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence under which 
generally in diversity cases state privilege law applies and in federal question cases courts 
rely on the Constitution, federal statutes, and federal common law.  See Developments, supra 
note 223, at 1465–70; Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 103–04; Nunley, supra note 224, at 58–
59.  A judicial communications or deliberations privilege was not among the nine 
privileges originally specified.  See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for United States 
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230–58 (1972). 
234 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 provides: 
Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony[,] and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during 
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in 
going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in 
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. 
Id.  The last part of this clause has been held to provide a form of immunity from 
prosecutions for legislative acts and a privilege against testifying in court about those acts 
that extends to legislators’ staffs.  See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615–18 (1972); 
Nunley, supra note 224, at 68–69. 
235 U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–09 (1974). 
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before it was formally asserted or referred to in published opinions or 
otherwise.  While neither the Constitution nor federal statutes expressly 
set forth an evidentiary privilege applicable to the judiciary, dicta in 
some opinions suggest that such a privilege exists and emanates from 
the Constitution in a manner similar to the Executive privilege.236  It has 
also been regarded by some courts as essentially a common-law 
privilege.237 
1. The Privilege in Federal Court  
Probably the first formal intimation of a judicial testimonial privilege 
relating to judicial proceedings occurred in 1953.238  As part of an 
investigation into United States Department of Justice activities 
apparently relating to certain grand jury proceedings, a House of 
Representatives Sub-Committee subpoenaed a federal district court 
judge to testify before the Committee at a hearing.  The judge appeared 
and read statements signed by all the judges of the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California and by the Chief Judge of 
the District, which asserted that under the constitutional doctrine of 
separation of powers, Congress could not compel judges to testify 
concerning judicial proceedings.239  Noting that the court was aware of 
no instance in which a congressional committee had similarly 
summoned a federal judge to testify, the judges stated:  “‘The 
Constitution does not contemplate that such matters be reviewed by the 
Legislative Branch, but only by the appropriate appellate tribunals.  The 
integrity of the Federal Courts, upon which liberty and life depend, 
requires that such Courts be maintained inviolate against the changing 
moods of public opinion.’”240  Apparently, nothing further occurred 
                                                 
236 See infra text accompanying notes 240–61; Nunley, supra note 224, at 68. 
237 See infra text accompanying notes 246–49; Matthew Singer, Protecting the Public’s 
Interest in an Open Government Through the Creation of an Executive Privilege?:  The Dann v. 
Taft Decisions, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (2007); Nunley, supra note 224, at 55; Catz & 
Lange, supra note 224, at 90. 
238 An issue of judicial testimonial privilege actually occurred at the time of the American 
Constitutional Convention in the case of Trevett v. Weeden (Providence 1787) where the 
judges of the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a state statute abrogating the right to a 
jury trial in certain cases was unconstitutional under the state constitution.  The Rhode 
Island General Assembly summoned the judges before it to explain their holding, and 
when the judges refused to answer questions, sought their removal.  Eventually, the 
removal proceedings were terminated because removal required a trial on criminal 
misconduct.  See Milne, supra note 224, at 216–17. 
239 Statement of the Judges of the U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., Made to the 
Subcomm. of the Comm. of the House of Representatives to Investigate the Dep’t of Justice 
of the U.S., 14 F.R.D. 335, 335–36 (1953) [hereinafter Statement of Judges]. 
240 Id. at 336. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/1
2008] Invading Judicial Confidentiality 51 
concerning this assertion of a testimonial privilege as to judicial 
proceedings.241 
Dicta in a series of federal court cases in the 1970s provide the next 
references to a possible judicial deliberations or communications 
privilege.  The cases also linked the privilege to the rationale underlying 
the then-emerging governmental deliberative process privilege and 
Executive privilege.  In his dissent in New York Times Co. v. United 
States,242 in which he asserted that the Executive Branch of the 
government had inherent authority to classify and withhold documents, 
Chief Justice Burger analogized to what may well have been an implicit 
assumption by prior courts as to their own power: 
No statute gives this Court express power to establish 
and enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy 
of our deliberations and records.  Yet I have little doubt 
as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the 
confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever 
judicial measures may be required.243 
This notion of inherent judicial authority for a confidentiality 
privilege was picked up at about the same time in a concurring opinion 
in Soucie v. David,244 a case primarily involving the issue of the public 
availability under the Freedom of Information Act of a report prepared 
                                                 
241 Nunley, supra note 224, at 73.  It should be noted that the assertion of privilege was 
limited to testimony about judicial proceedings.  The judges expressed no objection to 
congressional requests for testimony on “other than Judicial proceedings.”  Statement of 
Judges, 14 F.R.D. at 336.  A similar issue of judicial testimonial privilege was apparently 
recognized in In re Wallace, 170 F. Supp. 63 (M.D. of Ala. 1959).  In that case, the Civil Rights 
Commission sought certain voting and registration records as part of an investigation.  
Local officials refused to turn over the records, and some records were impounded by state 
court Judge George C. Wallace.  When the Commission issued a subpoena duces tecum to 
Judge Wallace to produce the records, he did not appear.  Id. at 65–67.  In a subsequent 
subpoena enforcement proceeding, the Judge argued that enforcement of the subpoena 
“would constitute an improper inquiry into judicial acts of judicial officers.”  Id. at 67.  
Rejecting the argument, the court indicated that the subpoena was not seeking judicial 
testimony or records, but county voting records, and that there was no “judicial privilege 
or immunity” not to produce those records.  Id. at 68–69.  In dicta, the court noted that the 
judge would still be immune from inquiry into judicial acts and that neither the 
Commission nor Congress could question the Judge on “why he impounded these records 
or what factors he took into consideration when he impound [sic] these records.”  Id. at 69. 
242 403 U.S. 713 (1971).  In this case the government sought to enjoin publication of a 
classified government study on United States involvement in Vietnam. The Court in a per 
curiam opinion affirmed lower decisions allowing publication under the First Amendment. 
243 Id. at 752 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
244 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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by a federal agency for the President.245  In his concurring opinion, Judge 
Wilkey commented upon the constitutional privilege against disclosure 
of the decision-making process, which he believed applied equally to the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and had both 
common law and constitutional sources.246  He alluded to the “common 
law principle . . . that public officials are entitled to the private advice of 
their subordinates and to confer among themselves freely and frankly, 
without fear of disclosure, otherwise the advice received and the 
exchange of views may not be as frank and honest as the public good 
requires.”247  In doing so, he specifically referenced its applicability to the 
“‘deliberation[s] of judges in conference[]’” and the advice of 
subordinates such as law clerks.248  Judge Wilkey saw this common-law 
privilege on non-disclosure as bolstered further by the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers, which protects each branch of 
government from encroaching on the powers of the other branches.249  
This principle would include a right of all three branches of government 
to withhold information in certain circumstances,250 and would preclude 
Congress, through acts such as the Freedom of Information Act, from 
                                                 
245 Id. at 1070–71.  The Freedom of Information Act provides public access to federal 
agency records and reports that are not exempt from disclosure.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1)-(3) 
(2000).  In Soucie, private citizens sought release from the Office of Science of a report it had 
prepared for President Nixon evaluating the Supersonic Transport.  Soucie, 448 F.2d at 
1070.  The appeals court held that the Office of Science and Technology was a federal 
agency covered by the Act, id. at 1073, and remanded to the district court for a 
determination of whether a statutory or constitutional privilege would preclude disclosure.  
Id. at 1079.  The constitutional privilege referred to by the court, which had not been 
asserted by the government at that point, was the executive privilege. Id. at 1071–72. The 
statutory privilege most likely implicated—the deliberative process privilege—protects 
“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by 
law to a party other that an agency in litigation with the agency[.]”  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).  
The rationale underlying this qualified privilege is “to encourage the free exchange of ideas 
during the process of deliberation and policymaking; accordingly, it has been held to 
protect internal communications consisting of advice, recommendations, opinions, and 
other material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes[.]”  Soucie, 448 F. 2d at 
1077.  For a discussion of the deliberative process privilege generally, see Nunley, supra 
note 224, at 74–75; Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 
54 MO. L. REV. 279 (1989); Erin Hoffman, The Deliberative Process Privilege in Kentucky, 25 J. 
NAT’L ASSN. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 485, 485–89 (2005). 
246 Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1080–81 (Wilkey, J., concurring). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 1081.  Judge Wilkey noted that as to the Executive Branch of the government 
most of the common law privilege has now been covered by the Freedom of Information 
Act exemption for interagency and intra-agency records.  Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 1082. 
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“conferring upon any member of the general public a right which 
Congress, neither individually nor collectively, possesses.”251 
Two years later, the existence of a judicial confidentiality privilege 
again arose in dicta in another Executive privilege case.  In Nixon v. 
Sirica,252 the Special Prosecutor sought enforcement of a grand jury 
subpoena for certain tape recordings between President Nixon and his 
advisors that the President had refused to produce on the grounds of 
absolute Executive privilege.253  The court recognized the existence of an 
Executive privilege with constitutional underpinnings which is intended 
to “protect the . . . executive decision-making process[ and] is analogous 
to that between a congressman and his aides under the Speech and 
Debate Clause; to that among judges, and between judges and their law 
clerks; and similar to” exemption five of the Freedom of Information 
Act.254  That privilege, however, while presumptively applicable, was 
found not to be absolute, and thus subject to a balancing of interests.  
That balance was found to favor disclosure in light of “the uniquely 
powerful showing made by the Special Prosecutor in this case.”255 
The Supreme Court addressed the Executive privilege in United 
States v. Nixon,256 in the context of the President’s assertion of an absolute 
privilege in the face of a subpoena for White House tapes for use in the 
criminal trials of several presidential aides.  The President argued two 
grounds for the privilege:  (1) the need for protection of communications 
“between high Government officials” and their advisors; and (2) the 
doctrine of separation of powers.257  The Court acknowledged the 
importance of confidentiality, stating “[h]uman experience teaches that 
those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper 
candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process.”258  Moreover, the Court 
                                                 
251 Id. at 1081. 
252 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
253 Id. at 704–05. 
254 Id. at 717 (footnote omitted); see id. at 713–17. 
255 Id. at 717.  In his dissenting opinion in Nixon v. Sirica, asserting that the executive 
privilege should be absolute, Judge MacKinnon elaborated on the judicial privilege. See id. 
at 740–42 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).  He noted that “[e]xpress authorities sustaining this 
position are minimal, undoubtedly because its existence and validity has been so 
universally recognized.  Its source is rooted in history and gains added force from the 
constitutional separation of powers of the three departments of government[,]” and quoted 
the executive’s brief for the proposition that “‘[i]t has always been recognized that judges 
must be able to confer with their colleagues, and with their law clerks, in circumstances of 
absolute confidentiality.’”  Id. at 740. 
256 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
257 Id. at 705–06. 
258 Id. at 705. 
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recognized the constitutional basis of the President’s generalized need 
for confidentiality of communications with advisors, as one of those 
powers or privileges incident to the “supremacy of each branch within 
its own assigned area of constitutional duties.”259   Nevertheless, the 
Court concluded that neither this ground nor separation of powers 
justified an absolute privilege, but that these interests may be, and here 
were, outweighed by the needs of the criminal judicial process.260  In 
reaching this conclusion, however, the Court reiterated that the 
fundamental importance of confidentiality of communications justified a 
presumption that Presidential communications are privileged, and again 
analogized to judicial deliberation, stating that this privilege: 
like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, 
for example, has all the values to which we accord 
deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to 
those values, is the necessity for protection of the public 
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh 
opinions in Presidential decisionmaking.  A President 
and those who assist him must be free to explore 
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and 
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be 
unwilling to express except privately.261 
The first federal court case to address in any detail and actually 
apply a judicial deliberations privilege, Matter of Certain Complaints 
Under Investigation by an Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council of 
the Eleventh Circuit,262 is also the case that first drew substantial academic 
attention to the privilege.263  After Judge Hastings had been acquitted by 
                                                 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 706–13. 
261 Id. at 708. 
262 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Hastings v. Godbold, 477 U.S. 904 
(1986) [hereinafter Hastings II].  For a review of the history of the cases involving former 
federal judge Alcee Hastings, including his efforts to quash his criminal indictment for 
bribery (United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 
(1983)), and his subsequent acquittal on criminal charges (Hastings v. Judicial Conference 
of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988)), see 
Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 132–43; Nunley, supra note 224, at 845–89. 
263 See, e.g., Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 132–43; Milne, supra note 224, at 224–26; 
Nunley, supra note 224, at 84–89.  Prior to the Hastings II case, a couple of federal court 
cases had made passing reference to assertions of some form of judicial privilege.  See 
McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 431, 432–33 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Magistrate, on 
grounds of judicial privilege, refused to order deposition testimony regarding a sentencing 
report prepared for court by an assistant to the Georgia Supreme Court who argued that he 
was functioning as a judicial law clerk or attorney for the client; upon review District Court 
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a federal jury on bribery charges, two district court judges in the 
Eleventh Circuit filed a complaint under the Judicial Councils Reform 
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,264 alleging, inter alia, 
that Judge Hastings “engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and 
expeditious administration of the business of the courts and has violated 
several Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct[.]”265  In the course of its 
investigation, the Investigating Committee of the Judicial Council of the 
Eleventh Circuit sought to enforce subpoenas of Judge Hastings’s 
secretary and three law clerks or former law clerks.  The judge and his 
staff resisted compliance with the subpoenas on several grounds, 
including that the subpoenas sought information that was covered by a 
testimonial privilege protecting from disclosure of “confidential 
communications among an Article III judge and members of his staff 
regarding the performance of his judicial duties.”266  This privilege was 
likened to the Executive privilege protecting presidential 
communications, the protection afforded Congress under the Speech and 
Debate Clause, and the common-law attorney-client privilege.267 
The court began its analysis by acknowledging that it could find no 
cases applying a confidential judicial communications privilege, but 
stated that “the probable existence of such a privilege has often been 
noted.”268  The court then reviewed and quoted extensively the dicta 
discussed above from Nixon v. Sirica, New York Times v. United States, 
Soucie v. David, and United States v. Nixon, the opinions that had alluded 
to a privilege for communications among judges and between judges 
and their law clerks relating to judicial deliberations that found support 
in the common law and constitutional principles, such as separation of 
powers and the inherent power of each branch to ensure that it can 
                                                                                                             
found it ‘“unnecessary to rule on whether or not the Magistrate correctly 
analyzed . . . claim of judicial and/or attorney-client privilege[]’”); Nunley, supra note 224, 
at 83 (discussing an unreported case involving assertion of judicial privilege by federal 
magistrate judge in challenge to grand jury indictments).  Also, a 1979 California state 
investigation of possible misconduct by state supreme court judges, in which a judicial 
testimonial privilege was asserted, generated some academic commentary.  See, e.g., 
Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361; Comment, supra note 101, at 1230–31.  For a discussion 
of the California matter, see infra notes 290–93. 
264 Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 ((codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 
372), repealed by Pub. L. 107-273, Div. C, Title I, § 11043(a)(1)(B), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 
1855). 
265 See Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1491–92. 
266 Id. at 1492–93, 1517–18.  The judge and his staff also raised challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the court and the constitutionality of the Judicial Council’s Reform and 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.  Id. at 1494, 1499. 
267 Id.  at 1518. 
268 Id. 
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effectively discharge its duties.269  Emphasizing the critical importance of 
confidentiality in fostering the candor that is necessary for the decision-
making process that was central to the Supreme Court’s recognition of 
the qualified privilege protecting presidential communications in United 
States v. Nixon, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Judges, like Presidents, depend upon open and candid 
discourse with their colleagues and staff to promote the 
effective discharge of their duties.  The judiciary, no less 
than the executive, is supreme within its own area of 
constitutionally assigned duties.  Confidentiality helps 
protect judges’ independent reasoning from improper 
outside influences.  It also safeguards legitimate privacy 
interests of both judges and litigants. 
 We conclude, therefore, that there exists a privilege 
(albeit a qualified one[]) protecting confidential 
communications among judges and their staffs in the 
performance of their judicial duties.270 
The court indicated that this qualified privilege is limited “to 
communications among judges and others relating to official judicial 
business such as, for example, the framing and researching of opinions, 
orders, and rulings.”271  In the Hastings matter, this condition was clearly 
met so as to establish the presumption of privilege as to the testimony 
sought from the law clerks since the investigating Committee sought to 
question them about discussions among the judge and his staff members 
concerning pending cases.  Nevertheless, further analysis was required 
because of the qualified nature of the privilege.272  That the court found 
the privilege to be qualified is not surprising given its reliance on the 
analogy to the Executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, where the 
Supreme Court had concluded neither the President’s need for 
confidential advice nor separation of powers would justify an absolute 
privilege.273  Determining whether the presumptive privilege applies 
requires a weighing of the need of the investigating party seeking the 
information against “the degree of intrusion upon the confidentiality of 
privileged communications[.]”274  Measuring the need for access requires 
consideration of “the importance of the inquiry for which the privileged 
                                                 
269 See id. at 1518–20; supra notes 242–61 and accompanying text. 
270 Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1519–20 (citation omitted). 
271 Id. at 1520. 
272 Id.  at 1521. 
273 See id. 
274 Id. at 1522. 
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information is sought; the relevance of that information to [the] inquiry; 
and the difficulty of obtaining the desired information through 
alternative means.”275 
Applying this balancing process to the circumstances involving the 
Judicial Council Committee’s investigation of Judge Hastings, the court 
determined that the testimony of the law clerks would be allowed.  The 
court found the matter to be of “surpassing importance[]” to society 
given the potential outcome—either exoneration of the judge or a 
recommendation for impeachment—and the gravity of the allegations 
against the judge, particularly bribery, which have implications for “‘the 
public confidence in the judiciary, [and] the independence and 
reputation of the accused judge[.]’”276  The court also believed that the 
information sought from the two law clerks, regarding their role in the 
case in which the alleged bribery occurred, to be highly relevant despite 
the fact that the Committee had access to the law clerks’ previous grand 
jury and criminal trial testimony.277  In assessing the strength of the 
judge’s interest in confidentiality, the court analogized again to United 
States v. Nixon, where the Supreme Court found the President’s 
generalized interest in confidentiality was overridden by the needs of the 
criminal process, and found the judge’s interest only generalized.  It also 
found that any intrusion on confidentiality was mitigated by the fact that 
the law clerks’ testimony would be to a committee of federal judges, 
“uniquely cognizant of the need to safeguard” the communications of 
the judge and his staff, and that the Act required that privileged 
documents and testimony received by the Committee remain 
confidential.278  The court specifically left open questions about the 
                                                 
275 Id. 
276 Id.  The court noted that bribery and treason were the two constitutionally specified  
“‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’” which would justify impeachment.  Id. at 1522 n.31 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4). 
277 Id. at 1522.  The court explained that there may be matters that were not covered 
previously, that transcripts of testimony were not a substitute for live testimony where the 
Committee could make its own credibility determinations, and that the strength of the 
privilege was somewhat weakened by the fact that the law clerks had already testified and 
therefore breached confidentiality. Id. at 1522–23.  The court declined to decide whether 
this prior testimony could be seen as a waiver of the privilege. 
278 Id. at 1524–25.  In support of this point, the court cited the Supreme Court’s order in 
United States v. Nixon that ordered in camera examination by the district judge as a means 
of protecting confidentiality interests.  The court acknowledged in a footnote that 
information that the Judicial Council deems necessary for purposes of impeachment can be 
released, id. at 1525 n.34, a point that commentators have seized upon in questioning the 
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis.  See Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 142–43.  On the other 
hand, it is clear that the confidentiality protections of either in camera review or review by 
a committee of judges will protect, to a substantial degree, confidentiality interests for the 
majority of judges as to whom no finding of wrongdoing will occur. 
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applicability of the privilege in circumstances other than those in the 
Hastings case, such as where the alleged misconduct involved is less 
serious than the “impeachable offense of bribery[,]” or the privilege is 
asserted for a reason other than the “generalized need for 
confidentiality[,]” or the privilege is asserted in a proceeding other than 
under the Act.279 
The most recent mention of judicial privilege in federal court 
occurred in another case in which the testimony of law clerks was 
sought, this time in connection with a civil proceeding challenging the 
Texas election district plans that had been assigned to a three-judge 
federal district court.280  The defendants sought to recuse two of the 
federal court judges who had been assigned to the case on the grounds 
that there may have been improper ex parte communications with one of 
the judges or his law clerks, and the district court judge in Terrazas v. 
Slagle 281 was delegated the task of determining whether depositions of 
the judges’ law clerks would be allowed to support the defendants’ 
recusal argument.282  Although the court quashed the subpoenas to the 
law clerks on the grounds that their testimony could not answer the 
question of whether the judges were actually influenced by any alleged 
communications, in dicta it briefly noted that the defendants recognized 
“the sanctity of communications between the judges and their law 
clerks” and acknowledged “existence of a ‘limited judicial privilege’ 
protecting those communications.”283  Moreover, the court explained:  
“All counsel admit that public inquiries by the litigants as to the internal 
operations and communications of the Court will, not may, destroy the 
integrity of our present legal system.  This Court will not be a party to 
that destruction.”284 
                                                 
279 Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1525.  Commentators have generally assumed that the privilege 
could be asserted in other contexts, such as a civil or criminal trial.  See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, 
supra note 224.  It should also be noted that Hastings II has been cited by the Court of 
Military Appeals [now Court of Appeals for the Armed Services] in support of its 
determination that a privilege protecting judicial communications exists.  See Nunley, supra 
note 224, at 94–95. 
280 See Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex 1992), aff’d by Richards v. Terrazas, 
505 U.S. 1214 (1992), and by Slagle v. Terrazas, 506 U.S. 801 (1992). 
281 142 F.R.D. 136 (W.D. Tex. 1992). 
282 Id. at 137–38. 
283 Id. at 138–39 (citing Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1520).  The court also stated that it believed 
that the real aim of the defendants was to disqualify the judges by the mere tactic of having 
the law clerks testify, as there is legal precedent for a rule that “if a law clerk testifies as a 
witness in a case before his judge, the judge must disqualify himself.”  Id. at 139. 
284 Id. at 139. 
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2. The Judicial Deliberations Privilege in State Court 
A privilege attaching to judicial deliberations and communications 
has also received some attention and express acceptance in state courts.  
In fact, a somewhat obscure 1919 case from the New York Surrogate 
Court, In re Cohen’s Estate,285 may have been the first case actually to 
recognize a judicial deliberations privilege.  In that case, a challenge was 
made to the attorney’s fees awarded to the attorney who was the 
proponent of a will in probate.  The challenger sought the depositions of 
the chief clerk and stenographer to the then retired surrogate (judge).  
The court, analogizing to the common-law attorney-client privilege and 
citing public policy, found that the relationship between the judge and 
his assistants was a confidential one and that discussions of matters 
relating to the court’s decisions were privileged.286  Exposing such 
matters would offend “the dignity of the court” and be inconsistent with 
“[t]he fair administration of justice[.]”287  While the court did not 
expressly address whether this was an absolute or qualified privilege, it 
did suggest that a judge could be questioned “regarding acts which were 
directed against the proper administration of the law, as, for example, 
his advice to destroy public records in his office, or direction to commit 
forgery or perjury.”288  Finally, from the court’s opinion, it seems clear 
that the court considered this common law privilege for communications 
between a judge and those in a confidential relationship with the judge 
to be a well established corollary of the common-law attorney-client 
privilege.289 
When the question of a judicial communications privilege next arose 
in the states, sixty years later, it was in the context of a 1979 investigation 
into alleged judicial wrongdoing by justices of the California Supreme 
Court.  In 1978, the court had allegedly improperly delayed the decision 
in a controversial case until after judicial elections had taken place in 
order to avoid the possible negative impact of their positions on the 
                                                 
285 174 N.Y.S. 427 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1919). 
286 Id. at 428–29. 
287 Id. at 428. 
288 Id. at 428–29.  This can be seen as somewhat analogous to the crime-fraud exception to 
the attorney-client privilege, under which the privilege does not attach, where the 
communication with the attorney is for the purpose of the commission of a crime or a fraud 
by the client.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).  
It also appears to be similar to the exception to the privilege recognized in Hastings II for 
serious judicial misconduct.  See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
289 See In re Cohen’s Estate, 174 N.Y.S. at 428.  The court also cited as relevant the rules that 
grand juries and judges cannot be called to testify as to the basis for their decisions.  Id. 
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election of one or more justices, including Chief Justice Rose Bird.290  
When the Commission on Judicial Performance subpoenaed law clerks 
to the justices to testify, two of the seven justices instructed their clerks 
not to testify; staff members of other justices testified as to conversations 
that had presumably been confidential.291  Also, one of the justices, 
Justice Newman, specifically citing judicial privilege for confidential 
information, declined to answer most of the substantive questions asked 
by the Commission.  Although the Commission, relying on United States 
v. Nixon, rejected the privilege, it apparently did not compel the judge to 
answer the questions as to which privilege had been claimed.292  The 
Commission ultimately failed to bring charges against any of the 
justices.293 
A recent Minnesota case in which the affidavits of two former law 
clerks were offered by a criminal defendant in support of his motion for 
a new trial and post-conviction relief has drawn attention because the 
Minnesota courts did not apply, or even raise, the issue of a judicial 
communications privilege.294  In Greer v. State,295 the defendant in a 
murder case repeatedly unsuccessfully sought the removal of the trial 
judge on the grounds of bias and improper ex parte contacts with the 
                                                 
290 See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361; Comment, supra note 101, at 1230–31 & n.7; 
Frank Greenberg, Judicial Misadventures in California:  A Response to Professor Tribe, 65 A.B.A. 
J. 1493, 1493 (1979);  Nunley, supra note 224, at 82; Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, 
and Change:  A History of Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 1960–1990, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 2049, 2075 n.88 (1993).  The story of the alleged delay was leaked to the press on the 
morning of election day in 1978 causing a major controversy that resulted in Chief Justice 
Bird calling for an investigation of the allegations and leaks by the California Commission 
on Judicial Performance.  Greenberg, supra, at 1494; Irene A. Tesitor, Calif. Commission 
Won’t File Charges in Probe of Supreme Court, 63 JUDICATURE 296, 296 (1980).  The Judicial 
Council of the state altered the strict rule of confidentiality applicable to investigations by 
the Commission on Judicial Performance to require that the hearings of the Commission in 
this case only be held in public. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 489 n.11 (1979); 
Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 363, 402; Greenberg, supra, at 1494; Laurence H. Tribe, 
Trying California’s Judges on Television:  Open Government or Judicial Intimidation, 65 AB.A. J. 
1175, 1177 (1979).  The modification requiring public hearings was declared 
unconstitutional in Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d at 499.  Subsequently, the Mosk 
decision was abrogated by an amendment to the California Constitution requiring public 
judicial performance hearings.  Adams v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 8 Cal. 4th 630, 
638 (1994). 
291 Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 361. 
292 See Nunley, supra note 224, at 82.  Thus, absent an intractable situation requiring 
court-ordered enforcement or quashing of the subpoenas, no court actually addressed the 
deliberations privilege in the California matter. 
293 Tesitor, supra note 290, at 296. 
294 See Thompson, supra note 178, at 15–16. 
295 673 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 2004). 
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prosecutor and jury.296  Sometime after the trial, the defendant’s lawyer 
obtained the affidavits of two former law clerks to the trial judge.  The 
affidavits, which included statements by the former law clerks that the 
judge had told them that he had denied the defendant’s challenges for 
cause “‘because he was angry with [defense counsel,]’” were offered in 
support of post conviction relief on the basis of actual bias.297  The 
defendant did not explain how or when the affidavits had been obtained, 
no objection to their entry in the record was made, and the briefs in the 
case did not raise issues regarding the production of the affidavits.298   
Without commenting on the evidentiary propriety of the law clerks’ 
affidavits, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the lower court’s 
denial of post conviction relief, noting that “[e]ven if presented during 
appellant’s numerous recusal motions, it is unlikely that the law clerks’ 
affidavits would have formed a basis in themselves for removal of [the 
j]udge . . . .”299 
At least one commentator, Professor Peter Thompson, found the case 
troubling in the court’s failure to address the propriety of “the use of 
affidavits from the judge’s law clerks disclosing private aspects of the 
trial judge’s decision-making process[.]”300   Noting that the affidavits in 
the Greer case contained the former law clerks’ “subjective opinions 
about the judge’s thought processes[]” and disclosed the “judge’s 
statements, presumably made in the privacy of the judge’s chambers[]” 
in the course of the decision-making process, Professor Thompson 
warned that the court’s failure to address this invasion of the judicial 
decision-making process is a dangerous precedent that would encourage 
other litigants in the future to attempt to get information from court 
personnel in order to overturn court decisions.301  Because of the strong 
policy arguments supporting the protection of confidential 
communications between judges and their law clerks relating to judicial 
integrity and efficiency, and because of the lack of clarity as to the legal 
sources for the protection of that confidentiality, Professor Thompson 
urged the state to take affirmative steps to assure confidentiality of in-
                                                 
296 See id. at 152–54.  Given that confidential law clerk information was sought to be used 
to obtain removal of a judge for bias, the Greer case appears quite similar to the Curry case 
in Massachusetts. 
297 Id. at 154.  The affidavit of one of the former law clerks also contained the law clerk’s 
assessment of the judge’s anger based on the judge’s “‘tone of voice, . . . agitated manner 
and . . . low frustration level[]’” and the clerk’s impression that the judge’s reason for not 
sending a post trial juror questionnaire was that two juror notations that the they believed 
the judge favored the prosecution would be evidence of bias.  Id. at 154. 
298 Id.; Thompson,  supra note 178, at 16. 
299 Greer, 673 N.W.2d at 157. 
300 Thompson, supra note 178, at 14. 
301 See id. 
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chamber discussions.302  Among the suggested solutions were adopting a 
mandatory law clerk code similar to that adopted by the federal courts, 
enacting a statutory judicial communications privilege, developing the 
common-law privilege in the next case in which the issue was presented, 
and requiring contractual confidentiality agreements for judicial 
employees.303 
A recent, and probably the most broad, application of a judicial 
deliberations privilege occurred in a somewhat unusual 2005 Illinois 
case.  In Thomas v. Page,304 an Illinois Supreme Court justice brought a 
defamation case against a newspaper, reporter, and editor based on 
articles that the paper had published asserting that the justice was 
improperly influencing the court’s decision in an attorney discipline case 
for political reasons.305  The defendants sought documents and testimony 
from the other justices of the court and their law clerks that related to the 
attorney discipline case.  The justices filed a motion to quash, asserting 
the “‘Doctrine of Judicial Privilege.’”306  The trial court found that Illinois 
recognized a judicial deliberations privilege as to communications 
between a judge and the judge’s own law clerks, but not as to the 
communications between a judge and another judge’s law clerks or 
between law clerks.  Furthermore, the trial court held that the plaintiff 
justice, by filing the defamation case, had waived the privilege as to his 
communications with other judges, his law clerks, and other judge’s law 
clerks.  Nevertheless, the trial court certified for interlocutory appeal the 
issues surrounding the recognition and application of a judicial 
deliberations privilege to the Illinois Supreme Court Justices and law 
clerks in this case.307 
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that “[i]t is well-
settled that a judge may not be asked to testify as to his or her mental 
                                                 
302 See id. at 16–18. 
303 Id. at 17–18.  Professor Thompson asserted that while law clerks should be able to 
provide information regarding judicial misconduct through appropriate channels such as 
judicial conduct boards, direct communications with the litigants by law clerks should be 
prohibited.  Id. at 18. 
304 837 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
305 John Flynn Rooney, Court to Decide If Deliberation Privilege Exists, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., 
May 13, 2005, at 1.  The case involved a lawyer running for county prosecutor who 
apparently, during her election campaign, had offered county jobs in exchange for 
campaign contributions.  Id.  One article in the paper accused Justice Thomas of the Illinois 
Supreme Court of engaging in “‘a little political shimmy-shammy[]’” in connection with 
the discipline case.  Id. at 24; see also Brian Mackey, Give Up the Privilege Shield, Justices Asked 
in Libel Case, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 5, 2005, at 1. 
306 Thomas, 837 N.E.2d at 487. 
307 Id. at 488.  The issues relating to the judicial deliberations privilege were found to be 
“questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion[,]” 
the resolution of which may advance the ultimate conclusion of the litigation.  Id.. 
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impressions or processes in reaching a judicial decision[,]”308 apparently 
because the issue of whether Illinois recognizes the judicial deliberations 
privilege was seen as directly related to this basic proposition.  The court 
cited the dicta from the previously discussed federal cases recognizing 
such a privilege and expressed its agreement with the rationale of the  
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for recognizing a confidential 
communications privilege in Hastings II—that  the effective discharge of 
judicial duties requires the ability to have candid conversations with 
other judges and judicial staff and that “‘[c]onfidentiality helps protect 
judges’ independent reasoning from improper outside 
influences . . . [and] safeguards legitimate privacy interests of both 
judges and litigants.’”309 
Furthermore, the court applied Dean Wigmore’s four-part test for 
determining whether particular communications should be privileged 
generally and concluded that a judicial deliberations privilege clearly 
satisfied the test.310  The communications between judges and court staff 
obviously occur with the expectation that they are confidential.  
Moreover, this confidentiality is essential to the relationship between 
judges and their staff, which requires that in deciding cases, judges be 
able to receive “open and honest” advice and exchange views with other 
judges and staffs “freely and frankly[.]”311  For effective judicial decision-
making, judges must be assured that these communications may be 
completely candid and will not later be made public.312  The court also 
found “a strong public policy favoring the protection of the 
                                                 
308 Id. (citing Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 307, (1904)); Washington v. Strickland, 
693 F.2d 1243, 1263 (5th Cir.1982), rev’d on other grounds, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)); see also United 
States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 805 (2d Cir. 1994); 
State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 735 (W. Va. 2000). 
309 Thomas, 837 N.E.2d at 489 (quoting Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1520); see id. at 489–94 
(explaining the rationale, extent, and limits of the judicial deliberations privilege). 
310 Id. at 489–90.  As discussed previously, see supra text accompanying note 227, the 
Wigmore test is as follows: 
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will 
not be disclosed. 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and 
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community 
ought to be sedulously fostered. 
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the 
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the 
correct disposal of litigation. 
Id. at 489 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, 
at 527 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed.1961)) (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. at 489–90. 
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confidentiality of intra-court communications made in the course of the 
judicial decision-making process[]” in that it is the public that is the 
intended beneficiary of the confidentiality protection.313  This is because 
the “very integrity of the process often rests on judges’ candid 
communications with their colleagues and staffs” that contribute to “the 
impartial and independent resolution of matters” in the public interest 
that could be undermined by the “pressures of public opinion” were 
intra-court communications disclosed.314  For these reasons, the court 
also believed that the damage that could occur to the decision-making 
process from “disclosure of such communications would, in almost 
every instance, be far greater than the benefit which might be gained by 
those seeking disclosure.”315  Accordingly, the court held that a judicial 
deliberation privilege exists for the confidential communications 
between judges and between judges and their staff members in the 
course of official court business.316 
Having recognized a judicial deliberations privilege, it remained for 
the court to determine its scope, including whose communications were 
covered and whether the privilege was absolute or qualified.  The court 
had little difficulty concluding that the privilege should extend beyond 
communications between judges and between judges and their own law 
clerks.  Noting that law clerks are staff to the court as well as the judge 
for whom they immediately work and that law clerks occasionally confer 
confidentially with other judges to the benefit of the decision-making 
process, the court concluded that the privilege should extend to 
communications between “a judge and another judge’s law clerk[.]”317  
Furthermore, the court held that the privilege should extend to 
communications among law clerks that are part of the deliberative 
process because the “clerks frequently discuss cases among themselves 
in order to clarify and distill the issues” before discussing the case with 
the judge.318  This “test[ing of] their analysis of a case before conferring 
                                                 
313 Id. at 490. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. at 491–92.  In so holding, the court firmly rejected the defendants’ arguments that, 
consistent with  Illinois case law rejecting the creation of a deliberative process privilege for 
municipal workers, the creation of new privileges by the judiciary is “strongly 
disfavored[,]” and that the creation of a judicial privilege for judges themselves would raise 
the “‘appearance of impropriety[.]’”  Id. at 490.  The court stated as follows:  “the judiciary, 
as a co-equal branch of government, supreme within its own assigned area of constitutional 
duties, is being asked to exercise its inherent authority to protect the integrity of its own 
decision-making process.”  Id. 
317 Id. at 491–92. 
318 Id. at 491. 
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with their judges . . . strengthen[s] the integrity of the judicial decision-
making process.”319 
The court next briefly addressed the defendant’s argument that any 
deliberations privilege should be a qualified one, as the Eleventh Circuit  
Court of Appeals held in Hastings II.320  The court first indicated that it 
believed the privilege that precludes judges from being required to 
testify about their mental processes and motivations in deciding cases 
has been treated as absolute.321  In concluding that the judicial 
deliberations privilege it was recognizing was also absolute, the court 
relied on its view that the privilege was already “narrowly tailored, 
applying only to intra-court communications made in the course of the 
judicial decision-making process and concerning the court’s official 
business[,]” and that “[a]nything less than the protection afforded by an 
absolute privilege would dampen the free exchange of ideas and 
adversely affect the [judicial] decision-making process.”322  After 
answering the certified questions, the appellate court remanded the case 
to the trial court.323 
The issue of the existence of a deliberative privilege most recently 
arose in Michigan.  Apparently fearing that one of the justices of the 
Michigan Supreme Court intended to publicize information about the 
court’s internal deliberations on cases, a majority of the court enacted an 
emergency administrative order expressly addressing the “Deliberative 
Privilege and Case Discussions in the Supreme Court,” and providing as 
follows: 
                                                 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at 492. 
321 Id. at 492–93 (citing of State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 735 (2000)). 
322 Id. at 493.  The Appellate Court declined to address the issue of whether the filing the 
defamation claim by one of the justices constituted a waiver of the privilege as to that 
justice’s communications or as to the privilege claims of the other justices.  Id. at  494. 
323 Id. at 496.  The case has continued to be quite active and controversial.  After the 
Appellate Court’s decision finding a deliberations privilege, the defendants sought an 
immediate appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.  Mackey, supra note 305.  The majority 
of Supreme Court Justices, upon defendant’s motion, recused themselves from hearing the 
petition; and, therefore, the Appellate Court’s decision stood.  Brian Mackey, Newspaper 
Wins Pyrrhic Victory With Recusal Motion, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 9, 2006, at 1.  Justice 
Thomas prevailed in a jury trial for a $7 million verdict, which was reduced by remittitur to 
$ 4 million.  Because of the involvement of the Supreme Court Justices in the trial, 
defendants’ appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was assigned to the same Appellate Court 
panel that decided the privilege issue.  See Brian Mackey, Judge Nearly Halves Libel Award to 
State’s Chief Justice, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 2, 2007, at 1; Tony Mauro, Newspaper Smacked 
With Damage Award Fights Back, Claims Trial of Illinois Justice’s Lawsuit Was Unfair, LEGAL 
TIMES, June 18, 2007, at 8.  Defendants filed a federal court civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against the state claiming that they have not received a fair hearing because of the 
application of the privilege and the justices’ involvement in the case.  See id. 
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All correspondence, memoranda and discussion 
regarding cases or controversies are confidential.  This 
obligation to honor confidentiality does not expire when 
a case is decided.  The only exception to this obligation is 
that a justice may disclose any unethical, improper or 
criminal conduct to the JTC [(Judicial Tenure 
Commission)] or proper authority.324 
The four-justice majority stated that the purpose of the order  
was to preserve “the integrity and confidentiality of the 
court’s deliberative process and to reflect practices that 
have characterized [the deliberations of] the Michigan 
Supreme Court, and to the best of our knowledge every 
other appellate court within the United States, including 
the United States Supreme Court, since their 
inception . . . .”325 
The rule has been viewed as formalizing a deliberative privilege 
traditionally applicable to “the internal case deliberations of the court 
and its staff[.]”326 
The foregoing shows that a judicial deliberations privilege, with 
roots in the common law as well as constitutional, functional, and 
separation of powers principles, is well-entrenched in both state and 
federal courts.  In fact, not a single court opinion that has actually 
addressed the question of the existence of the privilege has rejected it.327  
The relatively small amount of attention to the privilege in case law and 
                                                 
324 Richard D. McLellan, supra note 177 (quoting Admin. Order-2006-8); see Todd C. Berg, 
Supreme Court Confidential, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Feb. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 
2278937; Allan Falk, Commentary:  Admin Order 2006-8 Should be Supported, MICH. LAW. 
WKLY., Feb. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 2278967. 
325 Berg, supra note 324.  Michigan Lawyer’s Weekly emailed 40 states about their 
confidentiality practices or rules.  Six of eight state Supreme Courts who responded 
(Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, and Tennessee, and West Virginia) indicated that 
they had “‘long-standing’” rules, practices, or policies on confidentiality of court 
deliberations.  Id. 
326 Id.; see Falk, supra note 324; McLellan, supra note 177.  The Michigan Supreme Court 
held a public administrative hearing on the order on January 17, 2007.  Id. 
327 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the Crossen and Curry appeals avoided 
addressing the existence of a judicial deliberations privilege, indicating that it need not 
address the issue given the fact that a lawyer’s efforts to obtain judicial deliberative 
communications with a law clerk would, in any event, be impermissible because “[t]he 
administration of justice requires respect for the internal deliberations and processes that 
form the basis of judicial decisions, at very least while the matter is still pending.”  In re 
Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406.  See text infra section IV.F. 
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secondary sources should not be attributed to the novelty or tenuousness 
of the privilege.  Instead, it probably stems from a number of factors, 
including the relative infrequency with which the issue of a judicial 
deliberations privilege has arisen or is likely to arise.  Related to and 
contributing to the infrequency is the obvious need for confidentiality of 
judicial deliberative communications and an attendant privilege for 
those communications.328  In this regard, it should be remembered that 
the launching point for much of the analysis that led federal courts to 
conclude that deliberative process and Executive privileges existed for 
the Executive Branch of the government was the assumed existence of 
such an inherent privilege for the judiciary.329  Where challenges to the 
assumed privilege of confidentiality of judicial deliberations have arisen, 
courts have formally acknowledged the privilege through judicial 
common law-making as in In re Cohen’s Estate,330 Hastings II,331 and 
Thomas v. Page,332 or by judicial rule as in Michigan. 
Moreover, as the case law has recognized, including the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Hastings II and the Illinois Appellate Court Thomas v. Page, 
acceptance of at least a qualified privilege333 that applies to 
communications among judges and their staff members relating to 
judicial deliberations is clearly supported by the policies applicable to 
communications privileges generally.  Indeed, the case for a judicial 
deliberative communications privilege is arguably more compelling than 
most, given the impact on the quality of justice that the absence of the 
privilege is likely to have and the constitutional values protected by the 
privilege.334  Unquestionably, the relationship among judges and 
between judges and their law clerks is premised upon the confidentiality 
of communications, especially concerning the judges’ deliberations.335  
                                                 
328 See Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 89–90, 114–15. 
329 See supra text accompanying notes 242–61. 
330 See supra text accompanying notes 285–89. 
331 See supra text accompanying notes 268–70. 
332 See supra text accompanying notes 308–22. 
333 The Illinois Appellate Court’s conclusion that the privilege is absolute is not well-
supported by the court’s own analysis and is inconsistent with the rationale underlying 
deliberative privileges generally–that at some point the values being served by the 
privilege are less important than the values served by access to information, at least in 
official investigations of serious criminal wrongdoing and judicial misconduct.  See, e.g., 
supra text accompanying notes 274–76 (explaining that the judicial privilege was not 
applicable under the facts of Hastings II because the need for the privilege was overridden 
by the needs of the criminal process); supra text accompanying note 260 (explaining that the 
privilege in United States v. Nixon was outweighed by the needs of the criminal judicial 
process). 
334 See supra text accompanying notes 269–70, 284, 287, 311–15; Catz & Lange, supra note 
224, at 115–19, 144–45. 
335 See supra text accompanying notes 116–20. 
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Courts and judges have been emphatic that the confidentiality of 
communications is essential for effective decision-making in the public 
interest.  It not only allows for the uninhibited exploration, debate, and 
testing of ideas in the formulation of decisions, but it insulates judges 
from intrusion by other branches of government, public pressures, and 
popular opinion that can be inconsistent with justice, and other 
interference with judicial impartiality, independence, and efficiency.336  
Indeed, judicial efficiency and finality in the administration of justice 
could be seriously undermined in the absence of a judicial deliberations 
privilege, given the incentive that litigants—such as those in the present 
Curry matter and the Minnesota Greer case—337often have to leave 
virtually no stone unturned in order to get the result in their case 
overturned. 
Presumably, critics of the privilege, as critics of the confidentiality 
surrounding chambers generally, focusing largely on the United States 
Supreme Court, would essentially rest their opposition on the historical 
distortion or inaccuracy concerning, and the public’s general loss of 
information about, the courts’ operations and procedures that are 
engendered by confidentiality.338  As noted previously, however, there is 
always a loss of truth, accuracy, and information attendant to the 
application of a confidential communications privilege, but the value of 
confidentiality and privacy is considered to serve greater public 
interests.339  Thus, in this regard it has been noted:   
 Equally strong but opposing values of truth and 
individual privacy have come to a balance [in other 
privileges], allowing some claims of privacy to 
transcend the goal of producing “every man’s evidence” 
in court.  Public policy dictates that we maintain a 
judiciary free of interference from other branches of 
government and from the population at large and the 
judicial privilege is an example of a privilege that easily 
passes the truth/privacy balancing test.340 
                                                 
336 See supra text accompanying notes 114–21, 128, 270, 302, 307; Milne, supra note 224, at 
231–34. 
337 See Thompson, supra note 178, at 14, 16; supra text accompanying note 301. 
338 See Abrahamson, supra note 119, at 363, 403–04; Arthur Selwyn Miller & D.S. Sastri, 
Secrecy and the Supreme Court:  On the Need for Piercing the Red Velour Curtain,  22 BUFF. L. 
REV. 799, 802–06, 822–23 (1973); Milne, supra note 224, at 230–31. 
339 See supra text accompanying notes 226–27. 
340 Catz & Lange, supra note 224, at 144; see also Milne, supra note 224, at 231–34. 
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Some commentators have asserted that given the infrequency of its 
use outside the context of judicial corruption, a judicial deliberations 
privilege is really not needed.341   This ignores that the existence of the 
privilege itself provides protection for judicial deliberative 
confidentiality and the values it serves in several ways.  First, a process 
exists that governs the access to, and use of, deliberative 
communications.  Assuming that the communications between a judge 
and law clerk are shown to meet the threshold requirement of being 
made in connection with judicial function, such as the court’s 
deliberations on a case, the information is presumptively privileged and 
the party seeking the information bears the burden of establishing that 
their need for the information outweighs the values served by the 
assertion of the privilege in the particular instance.  The determination of 
these issues most likely will occur in the context of an in camera review 
in connection with a case or a confidential judicial conduct proceeding 
by a judicial body342—circumstances that will protect confidentiality 
until a determination is made that disclosure is required. 
Furthermore, while the exact showing of need required in order to 
overcome the assertion of the privilege has not been clearly delineated, 
based on the cases decided to date in the area of the executive and the 
judicial deliberative privilege, it is probably wrong to assume that mere 
allegations of some form of judicial misconduct or mistake are sufficient.  
Thus, in United States v. Nixon, the Court’s conclusion that the President’s 
generalized interest in confidentiality did not outweigh the 
“demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial[,]” 
emphasized the negative impact that application of the privilege would 
have on the “fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair 
administration of criminal justice[]” protected by the Confrontation and 
Compulsory Process Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.343  The 
Court’s opinion appears to indicate that the result might not be the same 
if what was involved was “the need for relevant evidence in civil 
litigation[.]”344  Similarly, in Hastings II, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals referred to the Judicial Council Committee’s investigation of 
Judge Hastings as being of “surpassing importance[]” particularly in 
light of the gravity of the allegations of bribery—one of the two expressly 
                                                 
341 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 224, at § 5674 (noting “the rarity in which such 
communications would be relevant to a proceeding that did not involve judicial 
corruption[]”). 
342 See id.; Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1524.  This is, of course, assuming that the privilege is in 
fact qualified as opposed to an absolute privilege. 
343 418 U.S. 683, 711–13 (1974). 
344 See id. at 712 n.19. 
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mentioned impeachable offenses in the Constitution—and the context of 
the Committee’s investigation for purposes of making a 
recommendation as to impeachment of a federal judge.345  The court left 
open the possibility that judicial privilege might prevail “in other 
contexts, such as where the investigation is aimed at conduct less serious 
than the potentially impeachable offense of bribery[] . . . or where a 
privilege is invoked in a proceeding other than an investigation under 
the Act.”346 
Certainly, mere allegations of more general improper judicial 
conduct, such as bias and ex parte contacts, should not be sufficient to 
even trigger the balancing process under the qualified privilege, much 
less provide sufficient grounds for overcoming the privilege.347  To 
conclude otherwise would virtually vitiate the value of the privilege, 
invite frequent intrusions into the judicial deliberations process by 
disappointed litigants grasping for any grounds upon which to obtain a 
different result outside the normal appeal process, and increase litigation 
costs. 
Recognition of a narrowly prescribed privilege, which can only be 
overcome upon a party’s production of evidence of a substantially 
important need related to criminal wrongdoing or serious judicial 
misconduct, will serve as a disincentive to the time-wasting, cost-
imposing, and potentially harassing behavior reflected in cases like In re 
Cohen, Greer v. State, and, particularly, the Curry case, where litigants 
have demonstrated that they apparently are willing to go to substantial 
lengths to obtain a different result in their cases by intruding into the 
confidential relationship between judges and their law clerks.  Parties 
would unlikely pursue obtaining information from law clerks and other 
court staff if they knew it is unlikely that the information will be legally 
admissible because of the privilege.  Also, as discussed in sections IV.D, 
IV.E, and IV.F below, not only does the likelihood of not being able to 
use the information serve as a disincentive, but the existence of the 
privilege triggers other doctrines under tort and lawyer professional 
                                                 
345 Hastings II, 783 F.2d at 1522 & n.31. 
346 Id. at 1525.  Obviously, if the privilege is absolute as in the Illinois Thomas v. Page case, 
no showing of need can overcome the privilege. 
347 Cf. Liteky v. United States., 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (stating that judicial opinions 
based on evidence or events occurring during prior proceedings generally do not constitute 
disqualifying bias); Greer v. State, 673 N.W. 2d 151, 157 (Minn. 2004) (holding law clerk 
affidavits are legally insufficient to establish bias and improper ex parte contacts); Terrazas 
v. Slade, 142 F.R.D. 136, 138–39 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding law clerk affidavits on ex parte 
contacts are not a legally sufficient basis for recusal).  Indeed, in In re Crossen,  the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the statements by the law clerk 
regarding possible judicial bias would not constitute ‘“cognizable evidence of judicial 
misconduct or a disqualifying bias.’”  880 N.E.2d 352, 373 (Mass. 2008). 
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responsibility law that allow penalties to be imposed upon lawyers who 
interfere with a privilege or induce another to breach a privilege.348 
The proper application of the judicial deliberative privilege should 
be analogous to, and is supported by the rationale of, the rules 
prohibiting the admission of testimony by jurors regarding their 
deliberations349 and prohibiting unsupervised post-verdict contact by 
lawyers.350  For example, in the leading Massachusetts case of 
Commonwealth v. Fidler,351  a criminal defendant sought a new trial based, 
in part, on an affidavit that his lawyer had obtained after the trial from 
one of the jurors that discussed alleged misconduct that had occurred 
during the jury’s deliberations.352  The Supreme Judicial Court first 
reiterated the well-established rule barring impeachment of verdicts 
through juror testimony, except where that testimony shows improper 
extraneous influence.353  This rule is designed to protect jurors from 
harassment (by losing parties who try to come up with evidence of 
misconduct) and to preserve the quality of the deliberations process 
                                                 
348 See text infra text accompanying notes 358–94. 
349 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 224, § 5674; FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (juror testimony 
only allowed as to “(1) whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury’s attention, (2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought 
to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the 
verdict form[]”). 
350 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fidler, 385 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Mass. 1979); Florida. Bar v. 
Newhouse, 498 So. 2d 935, 936–37 (Fla. 1986); United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 
(1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 9101 (1985); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d) 
(no lawyer initiated post verdict communications with the jury without leave of court for 
good cause shown, and “[i]n no circumstances shall such a lawyer inquire of a juror 
concerning the jury’s deliberation processes.”), available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/ 
rpc3.htm#Rule%203.5.  At the time of Fidler, the Massachusetts Disciplinary Rule 7-108(D) 
prohibited only contacts with a juror “‘calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or 
to influence his actions in future jury service.’”  Commonwealth v. Solis, 553 N.E.2d 938, 
941 (Mass. 1990) (quoting then extent DR-7-108(D)).  The rule was amended to formally 
implement the Fidler decision. See Alice Saker, Note, Massachusetts’ Revision of DR 7-108(D):  
Attorney Postverdict Communication With Jurors, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 719–20 (1992).  
Interestingly, the relevance of these principles to the lawyer communications with law 
clerks was apparently recognized by lawyer Crossen in the Curry case.  Crossen specifically 
asked that another attorney in his firm look at these cases in researching the propriety of 
the sham job interviews with the law clerk.  See Bar Counsel v. Curry II, supra note 1, at 15. 
351 385 N.E.2d 513 (1979). 
352 The purported misconduct included allegations that the jury considered evidence and 
comments that it had been instructed to disregard, and that the jury was exposed to 
information not admitted at trial.  Id. at 515.  The affidavit apparently had been obtained as 
a result of a communication initiated by a juror.  Id. 
353 Id. at 516–17.  Examples of extraneous influence include an unauthorized jury view, 
outside communications, and consideration of documents not in evidence.  Id. at 517.  
While juror testimony is allowed as to the existence of such influence, it is not allowed as to 
the impact that the extraneous matter had on the jury’s actual deliberations.  See id. at 516, 
519. 
Sorenson, Jr.: Are Law Clerks Fair Game? Invading Judicial Confidentiality
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
72 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
because allowing admission of such evidence would “‘make what was 
intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public 
investigation[—]to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of 
discussion and conference.’”354  The rule is also intended to diminish the 
incentives for jury tampering, promote finality of decisions, and 
maintain confidence in the jury’s decision.355 
Because the Court in Fidler was concerned, however, that the mere 
inadmissibility of most juror testimony was not sufficiently protective of 
the jury system, it addressed methods that would be allowed for 
gathering admissible evidence.  It established a rule requiring that “any 
post-verdict interviews of jurors by counsel, litigants, or their agents” 
must be conducted under court direction and supervision.356  This rule 
was found to be necessary for the following reasons:  “unrestricted post-
trial interviews . . . [(1)] would defeat the important interests protected 
by restrictions on the use of juror testimony to impeach verdicts[;]” (2) 
“could lead to harassment of jurors, exploitation of jurors’ thought 
processes, and diminished confidence in jury verdicts[;]” and (3) could 
result in interrogation that exceeds the proper scope.357  Finally, in 
“emphatically” condemning post-verdict contacts by lawyers and 
litigants with jurors, the court stated that any lawyer or litigant who does 
so “‘acts at his peril, lest he be held as acting in obstruction of the 
administration of justice.’”358 
Like the restrictions on litigant and lawyer post-verdict contacts with 
jurors and the use of juror evidence, a judicial deliberations privilege 
applicable to communications with law clerks and judicial control of the 
method by which a determination is made as to whether the privilege 
applies will serve virtually identical important policy interests, inhibit 
lawyer harassment of participants in the judicial process, protect the 
                                                 
354 Id. at 516 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915)). 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 519.  Thus, to obtain a post-verdict interview with a juror, a lawyer for a party 
would first have to bring to the court’s attention by motion some evidence that extraneous 
matters tainted the jury’s deliberations.  The court would then decide what, if anything, 
further is required, including whether post-verdict interrogation under the court’s 
supervision will be allowed.  Where lawyers receive unsolicited information, they may 
only investigate it as necessary to determine whether it should be brought to the court’s 
attention.  See id. at 520 & n.12. 
357 Id. at 519; see also United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(“Permitting the unbridled interviewing of jurors could easily lead to their harassment, to 
the exploitation of their thought processes, and to diminished confidence in jury verdicts, 
as well as to unbalanced trial results depending unduly on the relative resources of the 
parties.”). 
358 Fidler, 385 N.E.2d at 520.  Lawyers may investigate unsolicited information only as 
necessary to determine if it is “worth bringing to the judge’s attention.”  Id. 
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frankness and completeness of deliberative discussion, preserve public 
respect for the deliberative process, and serve the interests of finality.  
Just as the Fidler case presented an opportunity for the state’s highest 
court to adopt what effectively amounts to a privilege protecting jury 
deliberations, the Curry matter presented the court with a rare 
opportunity to recognize a deliberative privilege.359  Indeed, the Curry 
case clearly demonstrates that both clarity in the law and very strong 
disincentives are needed to prevent lawyers from attempting to intrude 
into the communications between judges and their law clerks that are 
part of the deliberative process.  Although adoption and application of 
the privilege in Curry would not have altered the outcome given the 
numerosity of lawyers’ violations of the rules of professional conduct 
there,360 it would have put all lawyers on notice that, in the future, post-
judgment efforts to obtain information about the court’s deliberations 
from law clerks or former law clerks is not only generally impermissible 
                                                 
359 The court unquestionably has the power to recognize the privilege.  See Babets v. Sec’y 
of the Executive Office of Human Servs., 526 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Mass. 1988) 
(acknowledging the court’s power to adopt common law privileges such as the deliberative 
process privilege, but declining to adopt an executive deliberative process privilege for 
Massachusetts); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. 
Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985) (stating that courts have power to answer novel 
questions of law and provide relief where no precedent exists).  Although the court in 
Babets declined to adopt the deliberative process privilege for Executive Branch agencies, it 
did so in a context that is arguably distinguishable from that involving a judicial 
deliberative communications process.  The court’s decision not to recognize the privilege 
rested primarily on the following factors (1) the fact that the court’s general approach had 
been to leave the creation of privileges to the legislature’s determination because the court 
believed the legislature is in the best position to balance the competing social values 
usually involved in creating privileges; (2) the Massachusetts Legislature had created a 
statutory deliberative process privilege that applies until the final decision has been 
reached; and (3) the executive agency involved in Babets had failed to meet its burden of 
showing that the privilege was necessary for effective decision-making. Babets, 526 N.E.2d 
at 1264–66 & n.8.  In this regard, the court specifically noted that the agency’s argument 
that absence of the privilege would chill intra-agency communications was speculative and 
conjectural.  Id. at 1266.  The Illinois court in Thomas v. Page faced the same issue when it 
recognized an absolute judicial deliberations privilege because the Illinois Supreme Court 
had previously declined to adopt the executive deliberative process privilege.  See supra 
text accompanying note 314.  There, the court noted it was not being asked to create a 
privilege for another branch of government, but instead “the judiciary, as a co-equal branch 
of government, supreme within its own assigned area of constitutional duties, is being 
asked to exercise its inherent authority to protect the integrity of its own decision-making 
process.”  Thomas v. Page, 837 N.E.2d 483, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  As the court in Thomas 
recognized, the court has the necessary first-hand information regarding the need for the 
judicial deliberations privilege and is in the best position to balance the interests involved. 
360 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (listing all of the lawyers’ actions that the 
BBO found to violate the rules of professional conduct). 
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but likely to be a fruitless effort because the information obtained would 
likely be inadmissible.   
D. Breach of Contract, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Inducement of Breach 
Although recognition of a judicial deliberations privilege applicable 
to the communications between judges and law clerks would most 
clearly and directly discourage deleterious intrusions into judicial 
decision-making, other legal doctrines also may deter such intrusions 
and provide a basis for sanctions against lawyers who attempt them.  
Law clerks have a fiduciary duty to maintain the confidentiality of the 
information they have obtained during the course of their employment 
that would preclude using or disclosing confidential information during 
and after their employment.361  Moreover, in those jurisdictions that 
require law clerks to sign a confidentiality agreement or subscribe to a 
confidentiality oath, a contractual duty of non-disclosure would arise.362  
Thus, law clerks who breach their fiduciary or contractual obligations 
may be subject to liability, although the potential remedies available may 
not be all that effective in preserving the court’s interests in 
confidentiality.  In most cases, damages from the breach would be 
difficult to measure, injunctive relief could not cure past indiscretions, 
and a constructive trust remedy would only be relevant where the law 
clerk had profited from the breach.363  More importantly, however, it is 
also possible that the breach of fiduciary or contractual duty of 
confidentiality could be used as the basis for professional discipline 
                                                 
361 See Comment, supra note 101, at 1248–50; supra note 171 and accompanying text (in 
Gregorich, a former staff attorney law clerk breached a fiduciary duty by using a 
confidential court memo);  see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 & n.11 (1980) 
(holding that CIA employee in position of trust has a fiduciary obligation not to use or 
reveal confidential information); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395, 396(b) (1958), 
amended by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006) (duty of agent not to use or 
disclose confidential information is acquired during agency, unless authorized by the 
principal); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 & Reporter’s Note (1979) (imposing tort 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty:  “One breach of fiduciary duty that is more commonly 
regarded as giving rise to an action in tort is the disclosure of confidential information.”); 
Alan B. Vickery, Note,  Breach of Confidence:  An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 
1431–32, 1444–48, 1459–60 (1982) (discussing breach of confidentiality actions generally). 
362 Comment, supra note 101, at 1248; see supra note 178 and accompanying text 
(discussing confidentiality agreements); Vickery, supra note 361, at 1444–48 (discussing 
confidentiality contract actions generally). 
363 Comment, supra note 101, at 1250.  Perhaps in the situation in which a former law 
clerk published a book that revealed confidences, the constructive trust remedy could be 
meaningful.  Cf. Snepp, v. United States, 444 U.S. at 515–16 (the Supreme Court approved 
the imposition of a constructive trust on the proceeds from a book by a former CIA agent 
who breached contractual and fiduciary obligations). 
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against a law clerk or former law clerk who has been admitted to the 
bar.364 
Furthermore, and of particular relevance to circumstances like those 
in the Curry matter, not only may liability for breaches of confidentiality 
be imposed on law clerks, but under emerging doctrines liability may be 
imposed on those who induce the law clerks’ breaches.  Thus, the 
Restatement of Torts not only recognizes liability for the breach of a 
fiduciary duty of confidentiality, but also extends liability to one “who 
knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust[.]”365  In 
Alberts v. Devine,366 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied 
this “general rule that a plaintiff may hold liable one who intentionally 
induces another to commit any tortious act that results in damage to the 
plaintiff[]” in a case involving the induced breach of a fiduciary duty of 
confidentiality.367  In Devine, a minister’s supervisors obtained 
confidential information from the minister’s psychiatrist that was used to 
keep the minister from being retained.  In recognizing the theory of 
liability, the court first held that a fiduciary obligation of confidentiality 
arose as part of the physician-patient relationship and that recovery of 
damages in tort was available for a physician’s violation of that duty.368  
To establish liability against the minister’s superiors, the plaintiff had to 
show that they (1) “knew or reasonably should have known of the 
existence of the physician-patient relationship;” (2) intended to induce or 
reasonably should have anticipated their actions would induce 
                                                 
364 Thus, in the Illinois case in which a former law clerk had utilized a confidential court 
memorandum for personal purposes in an election campaign, the disciplinary authority 
recommended a four-year suspension from practice.  Supra notes 168–69 and 
accompanying text.  Breaches of confidentiality by law clerks could also be considered to 
constitute actions that are “prejudicial to the administration of justice[,]” so as to run afoul 
of provisions like ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d).  See infra text 
accompanying notes 398–412. See also supra note 159 and accompanying text, discussing 
confidentiality under the 1998 Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Law Clerks, including 
the provision that “[a]ny breach of these provisions is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice and therefore will be subject the law clerk to appropriate sanctions.” 
365 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt. c (1979) (citing § 876).  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) provides liability for harm caused by tortious conduct of a 
third person where one “knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and 
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself[] . . . .” 
Actual physical assistance or participation is not required; mere “[a]dvice or 
encouragement” is sufficient.  Id. § 876 cmt. on cl. (b). 
366 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985). 
367 Id. at 121.  For similar applications see, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 
F. Supp. 793, 795 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (action against insurance company that induced 
physician to reveal confidential patient information); Morris v. Consol. Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 
648, 650 (W. Va. 1994) (action against employer that induced physician to reveal 
confidential information). 
368 Devine, 479 N.E.2d at 120. 
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disclosure of patient information; and (3) “did not reasonably believe 
that the physician could disclose that information . . . without violating 
the duty of confidentiality[.]”369 
While the majority of tort cases involving liability for breaches of the 
confidentiality duty appear to involve physician-patient or banking 
relationships, the basic principle and rationale underlying that principle 
should apply to other confidential relationships such as lawyers and 
clients, counselors and advisees, and law clerks and judges.370  Thus, in 
circumstances like those in Curry, assuming that the law clerk has a 
fiduciary duty of confidentiality, there would be no question as to 
satisfaction of the first two elements of the tort:  The lawyers not only 
knew of the judge-law clerk relationship, but specifically targeted that 
relationship to induce the law clerk to divulge information about that 
relationship and the judicial deliberative process in the Demoulas case.  
The only question, then, is whether they would have reasonably believed 
that the law clerk could divulge the specific information they were 
seeking without violating his duty of confidentiality.  As will be 
discussed below,371 this element should also be met in the factual 
circumstances of the Curry matter. 
Where the duty of confidentiality is established by the terms of the 
employment contract, there is also a similar potential claim for 
interference with a contract or inducement of a breach of contract.372  The 
Restatement of Torts recognizes liability for pecuniary loss from the 
breach of a contract where “[o]ne . . . intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) 
between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing 
the third person not to perform the contract . . . .”373  To be accountable 
                                                 
369 Id. at 121. 
370 See Vickery, supra note 361, at 1431–32.  Perhaps one reason for the absence of cases 
involving attorney inducement of breaches of confidentiality relates to the fact that such 
actions are often caught early and serve as the basis for motions to disqualify counsel in 
litigation.  See, e.g., authorities cited infra note 386. 
371 See infra text accompanying notes 406–09, 418–19 (discussing lawyers’ reasonable 
knowledge of the confidentiality of deliberative communications between a law clerk and 
judge). 
372 See Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s Former 
Employees:  Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines, and 
Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 979–81 & n.717 (2003);  see also Floor Graphics, 
Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., Inc., Civ. No. 04-3500 (AET), 2006 WL 2846268, at 
*4–5 (D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) (recognizing a claim for tortious interference with contract, 
including a confidentiality provision under New Jersey law); Givens v. Mullikin, No. 
W1999-01783-COA-R9-CV, 2000 WL 1839128, at *9–11 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 7, 2000) 
(recognizing a cause of action against a law firm for inducing a breach by a physician of a 
contractual duty of confidentiality). 
373 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979). 
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for interference or inducement one must have knowledge of the 
contract,374 but the types of conduct that are considered inducement 
“may be any conduct conveying to the third person the actor’s desire to 
influence” the third person to not perform the contract, including “a 
simple request or persuasion exerting only moral pressure[,]” “a 
threat[,]” or “the promise of a benefit[.]”375  That inducement must also 
be improper, which requires evaluating and balancing a number of 
factors, most important of which is the “nature of the actor’s 
conduct[.]”376  Ordinarily, conduct involving fraudulent 
misrepresentations, threats of illegal conduct, actions contrary to 
“established public policy[,]” and “[v]iolation[s] of recognized ethical 
codes . . . or of established customs or practices” relating to certain 
activities will be seen as improper.377  In a case like the Curry matter, it 
appears that the lawyers’ conduct would be considered improper, 
particularly in light of the fraudulent misrepresentations made to the law 
clerk regarding the non-existent job opportunity, the threats of disclosure 
of the law clerk’s bar application violation, and the lawyers’ violations of 
the ethical code applicable to their contacts with the law clerk 
generally.378  Actual knowledge of the express contract between the law 
clerk and the court, including the confidentiality term, however, may be 
absent, rendering interference with the contract claim unavailable. 
Of course, the availability of a tort remedy for inducement of a 
breach of a duty of confidentiality, whether as an action based on breach 
of a fiduciary duty or on express contract, depends on the existence of 
damages to a particular plaintiff, judge, or the court to whom that duty is 
owed, and it may be difficult to measure those damages.379  One possible 
                                                 
374 See id. § 766 cmt. j. 
375 Id. § 766 cmt. k. 
376 Id. § 767.  The other factors are: 
(b) the actor’s motive, 
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct  
interferes, 
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,  
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor 
and the contractual interests of the other, 
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the 
interference and  
(g) the relations between the parties. 
Id. 
377 Id. § 767 cmt. on cl. (a). 
378 See supra notes 8–13, 87–88 and accompanying text; text infra Parts IV.E—F (discussing 
ethical violations). 
379 See supra text accompanying note 363; Comment, supra note 101, at 1250.  Under the 
Restatement, because the actions sound in tort rather than contract, the potential damages 
available are broader and not constrained by limitations in contract damages such as that 
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situation in which damages could be shown is where a judge is required 
to expend resources in replying to the public disclosure of confidential 
deliberative information.  For example, in a system with elected judges, 
the public disclosure of confidential information obtained from a law 
clerk might require a judge to expend funds during an election to explain 
or counter that disclosure.380  Although the absence in most cases of the 
availability of significant monetary damages may make the use of 
inducement actions unlikely, and therefore reduce their potential 
effectiveness as a deterrent to efforts to acquire confidential judicial 
deliberations information, as discussed below in sections IV.E and IV.F, 
the conduct giving rise to such actions in the context of inducing 
breaches of the duty of confidentiality by law clerks may serve as a basis 
for disciplinary actions against lawyers under state rules governing 
lawyer conduct.381 
E. Intrusion upon Third Party Legal Rights 
The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit using “methods of 
obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights” of others.382  The exact 
scope of this section and the precise nature of the legal rights 
encompassed are not entirely clear.  In this regard, the comment to Rule 
4.4 states:  “It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include 
legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons 
and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the 
client-lawyer relationship.”383  Thus, as a general matter this section has 
                                                                                                             
the loss caused by the breach be within the contemplation of the contracting parties.  See 
RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A cmt. d (1979).  Thus, damages could include 
“pecuniary loss of the benefits of the contract[,]” consequential damages legally caused by 
the breach, and damages for any reasonably expected emotional distress or damage to 
reputation.  Id. § 774A(1). 
380 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 169–70 (explaining the Illinois Gregorich case, in 
which a former law clerk used a deliberative memo in a campaign election against a judge). 
381 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2002) (“Respect for Rights of Third 
Persons”) (emphasis omitted); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (“conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice[]”); see also MASSACHUSETTS CANONS OF ETHICS 
AND DISCIPLINARY RULES, DR 1-102(A)(5) (1981), available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo 
/disciplinaryrules.pdf (same language). 
382 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2002). 
383 Id. at R. 4.4 cmt. 1.  The language specifically identifying “privileged relationships[]” 
as being among the rights protected was added to the comment in 2002. CENTER FOR 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 418 (6th ed. 2007).  One treatise on lawyer professional conduct 
simply states that under this section “a lawyer who obtains evidence or information for a 
client may not violate the law.”  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL 
ETHICS:  THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 4.4-2(a), at 872 (2007–
08).  The disciplinary rules of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility did not contain 
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been applied to lawyer efforts to obtain confidential or privileged 
information that is protected by law,384 including information protected 
by rules of civil procedure such as discovery rules protecting work 
product,385 information that is protected by the attorney-client 
privilege,386 and other litigation-related confidential information.387  It 
                                                                                                             
an equivalent provision regarding intrusions on the legal rights of another, but improper 
acquisitions of confidential information may have been addressed under the provision 
governing conduct considered “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  See infra Part 
IV.F. 
384 See generally ABA/BNA AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL 
AFFAIRS,  LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 71:805 (2007); CENTER FOR 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 383, at  418; Clark v. 
Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs. Inc., 797 N.E.2d 905, 911–12 & n.10 (Mass. 2003) (stating 
that there is an abundance of authority that lawyers gathering information from former 
employees of opposing party must “strictly . . . avoid matters that are privileged or 
confidential”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 (2000) 
(in communicating with non-clients, lawyers are prohibited from trying to obtain 
“information that the lawyer reasonably should know the nonclient may not reveal without 
violating a duty of confidentiality to another imposed by law.”).  Examples of  protected 
information include information protected under the attorney-client privilege, work-
product immunity, or the doctor-patient privilege, but the Restatement also indicates that 
the confidentiality imposed by law is based on the “law of agency, evidence, and unfair 
competition and similar bodies of law[,]” and notes the overlap with tort law because one 
who knowingly obtains from an agent confidential information as to the principle 
“commits an actionable wrong against the principal.” Id. § 102 cmt. b. 
385 See 2 GEOFFREY. C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM  HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 40.4, 
at 40–12 (3d ed. 2004); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 cmt. b 
(2000). 
386 See Arnold v. Cargill, Inc., No. 01-2086 (DWF/AJB), 2004 WL 2203410, at *7–8, *14 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 24, 2004) (disqualifying plaintiffs’ lawyers for violating Minnesota Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.4 by acquiring privileged and confidential documents from former 
management employee of defendant); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Hora, 
Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-CV-1429, 2005 WL 1387982, at *11–13, *18 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005) 
(disqualifying a lawyer who acquired attorney-client information through opponent 
party’s employee); Becker, supra note 372, at 954–57 (acquiring attorney-client privilege 
information from former employees was the basis for disqualification, sanctions, and 
discipline under Rule 4.4); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-
359 (1991) (attempt to acquire privileged information from former employee of opposing 
corporate party lawyer could violate Rule 4.4); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408, n.14 (1997)  (“Gaining from a former government 
employee information that the lawyer knows is legally protected from disclosure for use in 
litigation nevertheless may violate Model Rules 4.4, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) and also may result in 
court-imposed sanctions.” (citing case where law firm was disqualified when it 
interviewed former government employee regarding discussions with government counsel 
about plaintiff’s case)). 
387 See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 40.4, at 40-10 to -11 (conduct involving 
infiltrating opponent’s camp to acquire litigation strategy or obtaining evidence by 
subterfuge violate Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4); N.J. Sup. Ct. Adv. Comm. on 
Prof. Ethics Op. 680 (1995) (surreptitious copying of confidential documents in possession 
of attorneys for adverse party violates Rule 4.4); see also Patriot Scientific Corp. v. Moore, 
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has also been applied in other contexts, such as attempts to obtain 
confidential patient-psychiatric information,388 confidential personnel 
files and information,389 and confidential criminal records information.390  
Furthermore, because state rules of professional conduct also establish a 
general legal right to confidentiality from one’s attorney that is broader 
than the evidentiary attorney-client privilege for confidential 
communications,391 these confidentiality rules would also form the basis 
for a violation of Rule 4.4 where a lawyer attempts to obtain confidential 
client information from another lawyer.392  Finally, although no cases on 
                                                                                                             
178 F. App’x. 18, 22–23 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (lawyers’ inducement of former attorney for 
opposing party in patent suit to breach fiduciary duty of client confidentiality violated 
California Rule of Professional Conduct 1-120 concerning inducement of another to violate 
rules of conduct and justified disqualification of inducing lawyer); N.Y. State Ethics Op. 749 
(2001) (lawyers may not use software that examines and traces modifications to electronic 
transmissions received from other parties or their counsel; to the extent this gives lawyer 
access to confidential communications between another lawyer and client, it is an 
impermissible intrusion into the lawyer-client relationship). 
388 See Conn. Bar Ass’n Informal Op. 96-4 (1996) (under Rule 4.4, a lawyer cannot acquire 
psychiatric records of a client's ex-wife made confidential by statute); Pa. Bar Ass’n 
Informal Op. 93-135 (1993) (Rule 4.4 prohibits a lawyer from surreptitiously gaining access 
to opposing party’s witness’s psychiatric records that are confidential under state case law). 
389 See United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp. 43, 47–48 (D. P.R. 1995) (lawyer use of 
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 civil subpoena ex parte to obtain confidential police personnel records for 
use in criminal case violated Model Rule of Professional Conduct  4.4); EEOC v. Hora, Inc., 
2005 WL 1387982, at *13–14, *18 (lawyer who acquired confidential personnel and other 
proprietary information through opponent party’s employee violated Rule 4.4 and was 
disqualified); see also, Spencer v. Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 486–89 & n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(lawyer use of FED. R. CIV. P. 45 civil subpoena ex parte to obtain telephone records from 
third parties for use in case violated Pennsylvania Model Rule of Professional Conduct  
4.4). 
390 See BBO Public Reprimand No. 2005-21 IN RE:  CAROL A. GILBERT, 21 MASS. ATT. 
DISC. REP. 280, 281 (LEXIS NEXIS 2005) (lawyer’s improper acquisition of criminal offender 
record information (“CORI”) for use in a probate and family proceeding violated 
Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4). 
391 See, e.g., MODEL RULES PROF’L OF CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (unless client consents or 
exception applies, information acquired by lawyer that relates to representation must not 
be disclosed); id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (noting that the confidentiality duty under the rules 
encompasses more than attorney-client communications protected by privilege). 
392 Cf. Patriot Scientific Corp., 178 F. App’x at 22–23 (lawyers’ inducement of former 
attorney for opposing party in patent suit to breach fiduciary duty of client confidentiality 
violated California Rule of Professional Conduct 1-120 concerning inducement of another 
to violate rules of conduct and justified disqualification of the inducing lawyer); Rentclub, 
Inc.  v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 654, 658 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (lawyer 
inducement by payments to former employee to reveal confidential information about 
opposing party’s management practices and other litigation-relevant information violated 
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-1.6 because the duty of attorney 
confidentiality “imposes upon attorneys a correlative duty to refrain from inducing others 
to disclose confidential matters[]” and is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
under Florida Conduct Rule 4-8.4(d), thereby also resulting in disqualification of lawyer.). 
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point are available, it would seem that the legal rights embodied by the 
tort actions for inducement of breach of confidentiality, whether as a 
matter of contract or fiduciary duty, should independently be protected 
under Rule 4.4 and serve as the basis for discipline.393 
As discussed previously in Part IV.D above, lawyers’ efforts to 
acquire confidential judge-law clerk information may run afoul of tort 
doctrines relating to inducement of the breach of duty.  Also, as 
discussed below in Part IV.F, such efforts may violate the rules of 
professional conduct relating to “conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice[.]”394  However, the application of these 
doctrines and rules can be complicated, uncertain, and require nuanced 
interpretations, thereby leaving the level or extent of protection for 
confidential judicial deliberations information in a highly ambiguous 
state.  Rule 4.4, protecting legal rights of third parties generally, presents 
a more direct analytical path.  Where a jurisdiction has enacted formal 
codes of conduct that include provisions imposing on law clerks and 
other court personnel a duty of confidentiality as to the court’s 
deliberative process,395  Rule 4.4’s proscriptions on violating the legal 
rights of third parties in attempting to obtain evidence should prohibit 
efforts by lawyers to induce law clerks and former law clerks to violate 
those confidentiality codes.  Such codes arguably establish legal rights to 
confidentiality for the benefit of judges and courts that are analogous to 
the confidentiality protections established by statutes, evidence rules, 
and case law that have been found to be encompassed by Rule 4.4.396  
Moreover, in jurisdictions that formally recognize the existence of at least 
a qualified judicial deliberations privilege, the application of Rule 4.4 
should be even more straight forward given the wide acceptance of the 
basic proposition that the rule is intended to prohibit intrusion upon 
such evidentiary privileges.  Thus, where there is either a law clerk 
confidentiality code or a judicial deliberations privilege, the message of 
                                                 
393 Cf. Becker, supra note 372, at 981 (violation of private confidentiality agreements may 
trigger sanctions under ethics and civil rules).  But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 102 cmt. b (2000) (stating that the section does not apply to 
“confidentiality duties based only on contract”).  The Restatement seems to recognize the 
overlap between ethical protections for confidential information and tort law because one 
who knowingly obtains from an agent confidential information as to the principal 
“commits an actionable wrong against th[at] principal.”  Id.  On the other hand, it 
concludes that because an agent can contract for a degree of confidentiality greater than 
that ordinarily established by law and the confidentiality rights protected are based on 
“fundamental and general law such as the attorney-client privilege. . . . [C]onfidentiality 
duties based only on contract are not within the Section.”  Id. 
394 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2002); see also text infra Part IV.F. 
395 See supra notes 170–80 and accompanying text. 
396 See supra notes 379–90 and accompanying text. 
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what is expected from lawyers should be much clearer; therefore, the 
expected deterrence should be much greater, than where the application 
of Rule 4.4 is dependent on a jurisdiction’s finding that a law clerk has a 
fiduciary or contractual duty of confidentiality, the inducement of a 
breach of which by a lawyer is encompassed by the rule. 
F. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and its predecessor 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR1-102(A)(5) contain 
provisions making it misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”397  This broad provision 
is particularly relevant to the Crossen and Curry cases, the facts of which 
occurred prior to adoption by Massachusetts of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, including the more narrowly-focused Rule 4.4(a), regarding 
obtaining evidence in violation of third party rights.398  While Rule 8.4(d) 
has been applied, so as to overlap conduct affecting the administration of 
justice that is also covered by other rules,399 it has also been applied to 
other conduct that is considered independently prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.400  For purposes of this Article, the question is 
whether the “prejudicial to the administration of justice standard,” 
standing alone, should be interpreted to apply to the mere act of 
attempting to acquire confidential judicial deliberative process 
information from a former law clerk. 
                                                 
397 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2002); see CENTER FOR 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 383, at 575; 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384, 
§ 101:501; 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65–11;  see also MASSACHUSETTS 
CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES DR 1-102(A)(5), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/disciplinaryrules.pdf (same language). 
398 As discussed supra at notes 87–88 and accompanying text, the lawyers in the Curry 
matter were charged with violating several then-applicable Massachusetts disciplinary 
rules, including DR 1-102(A)(5),  for their actions directed at the former law clerk.  This 
provision could also be drawn upon in jurisdictions that have not adopted Rule 4.4's 
restrictions on acquiring evidence in violation of third party rights.  See STEPHEN GILLERS & 
ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:  STATUTES AND STANDARDS 331 (2007) (explaining 
that New York has “no direct counterpart to ABA Model Rule 4.4(a) or (b)[] . . . .”). 
399 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384, 
§ 101:502 (overlap with rules on competence and diligence);  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra 
note 385, § 65.6, at 65-11 to -12 (noting overlap with rules limiting advocacy in Part 3 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct); CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 614 (5th ed. 2003) 
(“encompasses conduct prohibited by other ethics rules[]”). 
400 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384, 
§ 101:502; 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12; CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 399, at 614. 
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Given the breadth of the language of the Rule, it is not surprising 
that it has been challenged as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  
While generally courts have upheld the constitutionality of the 
provision,401 in doing so, they have given the Rule a relatively narrow 
interpretation.402  Conduct that “undermine[s] the legitimacy of[,]”403 or 
interferes with, the judicial process triggers the application of Rule 
8.4(d).404  Where the conduct does not violate another rule of professional 
conduct, it must be “‘egregious’” and “‘flagrantly violative of accepted 
professional norms.’”405  The Rule was intended “to address[] violations 
of well-understood norms and conventions of practice only.”406  In 
applying this standard, the perspective to be applied is that of “lawyers, 
who are professionals and have the benefit of guidance provided by case 
law, court rules[,] and the ‘lore of the profession.’”407  Accordingly, as a 
rule “‘written by and for lawyers . . . [it] need not meet the precise 
standards of clarity that might be required of rules of conduct for 
laymen.’”408  Moreover, for an attorney to be on notice that particular 
conduct is covered, it is not necessary that a court has previously 
addressed similar circumstances.409 
Not unexpectedly, given the unique circumstances in Curry, beyond 
these general principles, little guidance can be gleaned from prior case 
                                                 
401 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384, 
§ 101:502; 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 665.6, at 65-23; CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 383, at 592. 
402 See, e.g., In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1078 (Mass. 2004); 2 HAZARD 
& HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12; see also Grievance Adm’r v. Fried,  570 N.W.2d 
262, 265 (Mich. 1997). 
403 In re Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093, 1098 (Mass. 1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
404 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 384, 
§ 101:502; CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra 
note 399, at 614.  While conduct that occurs during the course of court proceedings is 
covered, the rule also extends to other conduct unconnected to a particular proceeding that 
has a negative impact on the administration of justice.  Id.; GILDA TUONI RUSSELL, 
MASSACHUSETTS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 84.01[1], at 84-13 (2d ed. 2003). 
405 In re Crossen,  880 N.E.2d at 379; In re  Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d at 1099.  But 
see Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ficker, 572 A.2d 501, 505–06 (Md. 1990) (rejecting 
flagrant or egregious standard; only requiring lawyer to be reasonably able to determine 
appropriate conduct). 
406 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12; see also Fried, 570 N.W.2d at 265; cf.  
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 556 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (stating that discipline should 
not rest upon a “determination after the fact that conduct is unethical if responsible 
attorneys would differ in appraising the propriety of that conduct.”). 
407 Howell v. State Bar of Tex., 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.1988) (citing In re Snyder, 472 
U.S. 634, 645 (1985)); see also Ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n. v. Bourne, 880 P.2d 360, 362 (Okla. 
1994); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Goldsborough, 624 A.2d 503, 510 (Md. 1993). 
408 In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d at 1079. 
409 Goldsborough, 624 A.2d at 511. 
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law and treatises applying the “prejudicial to the administration of 
justice” standard in answering the question of whether inducing a 
former law clerk to breach the duty of confidentiality would violate the 
Rule.  While it is relevant that the Rule has generally been applied to 
efforts to improperly influence the outcome of litigation,410 including by 
improperly acquiring or using confidential information411 or trying to 
taint the deliberative process,412 the applicability of the Rule to the mere 
act of trying to obtain confidential information about judicial 
deliberations in a particular case presents a novel question. 
As this Article has extensively discussed in the context of law clerk 
confidentiality and the judicial deliberations privilege, it seems clear that 
allowing lawyers to intrude into the confidential judge-law clerk 
relationship and the judicial deliberations process will seriously 
undermine the judicial process.413  Such intrusions would be inimical to 
the trust and candor essential to effective decision-making.  Thorough 
testing of ideas would be inhibited and judicial independence would be 
threatened by increased exposure to public pressures and popular 
opinion inconsistent with justice.414  With the loss of confidentiality 
would also come increased costs to parties and to the administration of 
justice generally resulting from challenges to the finality of judicial 
decisions based on perceived defects in the deliberative process learned 
                                                 
410 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 383, 
§ 101:502. 
411 See, e.g., In re Allen, 783 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ind. 2002) (holding that reading opposing 
counsel's confidential documents at deposition is conduct prejudicial to the administration 
of justice);  In re Moran, 840 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that lawyer 
who posted confidential information on his website concerning attorney Grievance 
Committee investigation into the conduct of a rival law firm engaged in conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice that adversely reflected on his fitness as a lawyer); 2 
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 385, § 65.6, at 65-12 (secretly interviewing opposing party’s 
expert witness and offering to pay for information about case preparation); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 (1997) (acquiring information legally 
protected from disclosure from former government employee for use in litigation). 
412 Grievance Adm’r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d 262, 267–68 (Mich. 1997) (lawyer retained 
judges’ relatives on cases to get recusal; it is unethical conduct for a lawyer to tamper with 
the court system or to arrange disqualifications);  In re Keilor, 380 A.2d 119, 125 (D.C. 1977) 
(conduct which taints the decision- making process is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; in this case, a lawyer represented a company using a law firm associate as an 
arbitrator without telling the union representative); In re Orfanello, 583 N.E.2d 1277, 1278–
81 (Mass. 1991) (lawyer had ex parte contact with judge, telling the judge that a supporter 
of his judicial nomination had a case scheduled to come before the same judge; this was an 
effort to influence the disposition of the case and was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice, and showed lack of fitness to practice). 
413 See supra 90. 
414 See supra text accompanying notes 108–11. 
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about through lawyer communications with law clerks.415  Moreover, 
exposure of the compromises and uncertainties that are necessarily a 
part of the judicial deliberations process could erode public confidence in 
the justice system.416  Finally, another potential harm that exists is harm 
to the privacy and reputational interests of judges from the public 
revelation of information from a law clerk that may be untrue, or may be 
the product of misperceptions or personal biases.417 
What is less clear is whether such intrusion in the name of zealously 
protecting a client’s interests would clearly violate “accepted ethical 
norms of the profession.”418  The answer to this question seems to 
depend on whether reasonable lawyers could differ as to the propriety of 
the conduct.419  Factors supporting a conclusion that such conduct is 
generally viewed as impermissible include the pervasiveness of the 
concept of the law clerk’s duty of confidentiality and the well-accepted 
reasons for that duty, as well as the judiciary’s tacit assumption of the 
existence of a judicial deliberations privilege.420   Also relevant is the 
response of the other attorneys involved in the Demoulas case upon 
learning of the efforts being made to acquire information about the 
deliberative process from a former law clerk.421  In this regard, it should 
be remembered that, except for lawyers Curry, Crossen, and Donahue, 
the other attorneys raised serious questions as to the permissibility of 
contacting the former law clerk.  Moreover, the research memorandum 
prepared for lawyer Crossen flagged the existence of at least a limited 
judicial deliberations privilege.422 
On the other hand, the fact that formal recognition of a judicial 
deliberations confidentiality privilege applicable to former law clerks has 
been limited and had not occurred in Massachusetts, and the fact that a 
number of attorneys have expressed the view that Crossen, Curry, and 
Donahue did nothing wrong,423 support an argument that in 1997 when 
Crossen and the other lawyers induced the law clerk to breach his duty 
of confidentiality, such conduct would not have been seen as flagrantly 
inconsistent with professional norms.  In the end, these arguments are 
                                                 
415 See supra text accompanying note 301. 
416 See supra text accompanying note 301. 
417 See supra text accompanying note 301. 
418 See In re Discipline of an Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Mass. 2004). 
419 See supra text accompanying notes 407–09. 
420 See supra Parts II.B, III.C. 
421 See Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 122–25, 127 (at least three of the defense 
team lawyers questioned the propriety of approaching the former law clerk about the case, 
and apparently one lawyer, Edward Barshak, advised lawyer Donahue that he would leave 
the case if the law clerk information was used.). 
422 See supra note 70. 
423 See sources cited supra note 7. 
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unconvincing.  The fact that a few lawyers fail to recognize the 
boundaries between legitimate zealous advocacy and accepted ethical 
norms of practice should not result in a dilution of those norms.  This is 
particularly true where virtually no authority or precedent existed at the 
time that would have endorsed the type of intrusion into judge-law clerk 
deliberative confidential communications that occurred here, but, 
instead, the available information viewed through the eyes of a 
reasonable lawyer would clearly have indicated that such an intrusion 
was impermissible.  Perhaps what is ultimately most damning, however, 
is the fact that the lawyers seemed to know that what they were doing 
was wrong.  As the special hearing officer noted, rather than approach 
the law clerk openly and directly for information about possible judicial 
prejudgment, the lawyers attempted “first to trick[ and] later to frighten 
Walsh into making statements he ‘otherwise would not  have made.’”424 
In their appeals to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
lawyers Crossen and Curry raised arguments regarding the lack of a 
clear prohibition on communicating with a law clerk about judicial 
deliberations.  Crossen argued that the “prejudicial to the administration 
of justice” standard was unconstitutionally vague when applied to his 
actions.  The court summarily rejected that argument, agreeing with the 
BBO “that prior bar disciplinary law and prevailing professional norms, 
as well as his own colleagues’ understandable misgivings about his 
conduct, placed Crossen on notice that, in the Board’s words, ‘such 
outrageous conduct’ was proscribed.”425  More importantly, the court 
tersely brushed aside Curry’s argument that his contacts with the law 
clerk were proper, given the absence of an explicitly recognized judicial 
deliberations privilege in Massachusetts, stating, “efforts to pierce the 
confidential communications of a former law clerk and a judge in a 
pending matter to benefit one of the litigants also constitute ‘conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.’”426 
The context and brevity of the court’s treatment of this issue is 
problematic.  On the one hand, it could be seen as an indication of the 
obviousness of the widely-understood importance to the administration 
of justice of the principle of the confidentiality of deliberative 
                                                 
424 Bar Counsel v. Curry I, supra note 1, at 195 & n.75; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 370 
(Mass. 2008); see also  supra text accompanying notes 90, 92. 
425 In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d at 379.  In particular, the court drew attention to Crossen’s 
efforts to obtain confidential information from the law clerk through threats.  Id.  The court 
also specifically found that as an experienced attorney, Crossen “knew that the 
communications about deliberative processes that flow between judge and law clerk were 
confidential and an important aspect of the administration of justice.”  Id. at 373. 
426 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406.  In fact, the court stated that Curry’s actions showed “a 
breathtaking lack of respect for the administration of justice[.]”  Id. at 407. 
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communications between judges and law clerks—a view that is 
supported by a broad reading of the court’s statement that no one “is 
free to induce or coerce a law clerk into revealing confidential 
communications between the clerk and the judge about an ongoing 
matter to benefit one of the litigants, in particular confidential 
communications that the law clerk otherwise would not have 
revealed.”427  On the other hand, the absence of substantial analysis of 
the issue leaves at least some question as to whether, absent the deceit 
and threats employed by the lawyers in Curry, the court would have 
found that simply contacting the former law clerk for confidential 
deliberative information would be impermissible under the “prejudicial 
to administration of justice” standard.  As argued above in this Article,428 
a more extended analysis would clearly support that conclusion. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Curry case is a remarkable example of lawyers engaging in 
clearly unacceptable conduct purportedly in the name of zealous 
advocacy for a client.  The focus to date by the public and bar discipline 
system has been on the more sensational aspects of the case—the 
elaborate phony job scam involving deceit and apparent extortion 
directed at a former judicial law clerk by three lawyers, two of whom 
previously had been well-regarded by the legal profession.  This aspect 
of the case was seen by the Massachusetts BBO as justifying the severe 
sanctions of suspension and disbarment that were imposed on attorneys 
Curry, Crossen, and Donahue, and it is this conduct upon which the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court focused in its review. 
Overshadowed by the lawyers’ outrageous conduct, however, is an 
arguably equally severe ethical lapse that should not be ignored.  As this 
Article has demonstrated, the mere act of attempting to acquire from a 
former law clerk confidential information relating to the judicial 
deliberations process itself runs afoul of rules of professional conduct 
and ethical norms, thus warranting substantial discipline.  That such 
conduct impermissibly intrudes upon confidential relationships, 
constitutes improper inducement of a breach of fiduciary duty, and is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice should be made patently clear.  
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s review of the Curry and 
Crossen cases offered a rare opportunity for the court to remove any 
doubt that former judicial law clerks simply are not fair game for 
                                                 
427 In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d at 406. 
428 See supra text accompanying notes 401–24. 
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lawyers seeking to acquire information about the judicial deliberation 
process. 
Although the court did appear to take a substantial step in this 
direction when it seemingly indicated that efforts to obtain confidential 
deliberative information from former law clerks would be inconsistent 
with the proper administration of justice, that principle should have 
been more fully explored and explained in the court’s opinions.  
Moreover, the court passed up the chance to directly and more 
effectively protect judicial deliberative confidentiality from improper 
intrusions by also formally recognizing the judicial deliberations 
privilege, a privilege that is essential for the effective functioning of the 
judiciary.429  Adopting the privilege and appropriate procedures for 
acquiring privileged information about the judicial deliberations where 
warranted, such as those the court adopted regarding post judgment 
lawyer inquiries about juror deliberations,430 would serve the legitimate 
interests of advocates in acquiring evidence of improper judicial conduct 
while preserving the quality of judicial decision-making.  Moreover, the 
formally recognized privilege, in conjunction with Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 4.4, prohibiting intrusions upon privileged 
relationships by lawyers,431 would make pellucid that law clerks cannot 
be targeted by lawyers for information about the deliberative process.  
Perhaps, with this clarity in the law, even lawyers apparently blinded by 
adversarial zeal, such as those in the Curry case, would be restrained. 
                                                 
429 See supra Part III.C. 
430 See supra text accompanying notes 346–57. 
431 See supra Part III.E. 
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